Conflicts Called and Not — Opioid Firm Fired, Judicial Recusal Reviewed, Implicated Attorney Disqualified in Malpractice Matter


Alaska fires law firm Motley Rice in opioid litigation, joining Utah” —

  • “The state of Alaska has terminated a contract with a national plaintiffs law firm it hired eight years ago to pursue a lawsuit over opioid painkillers, claiming it violated confidentiality and conflict-of-interest provisions. Law firm Motley Rice failed to disclose that it was representing other clients in separate opioid litigation at the same time it represented the state, Republican Alaska Attorney General Stephen Cox’s office said in an October 23 letter to the firm.”
  • “Alaska has ‘reason to believe that the firm may have shared confidential information obtained through its representation of the state,’ Cox’s office said. The letter, obtained by Reuters through a records request, said the state would hire new counsel.”
  • “Alaska’s move is the latest setback for Motley Rice, after Utah’s attorney general terminated a similar contract with the firm on October 16. Motley Rice had been representing the states in lawsuits alleging that pharmacy benefits managers prioritized opioid access for patients despite the drugs’ high risk of addiction and harm.”
  • “Motley Rice in a statement said it had represented Alaska in opioid litigation for nearly a decade and helped the state recover tens of millions of dollars to benefit Alaskans. It said it was proud of its work for the state.”

Stocks, Recusal, and Copycats- ‘No problem’ on APJ Conflict” —

  • “The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that an administrative patent judge’s (APJ) recusal in an inter partes review (IPR) based on ownership of stock in one of the defendant’s corporations in an amount below the statutory monetary threshold was not erroneous but remanded the case for further consideration of the copying evidence. Centripetal Networks, LLC v. Palo Alto Networks, Inc., Case No. 23-2027 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 22, 2025) (Moore, Hughes, Cunningham, JJ.)”
  • “In September 2022, Centripetal learned that a member of the Board panel owned stock in Cisco. However, Centripetal did not move for recusal until December 30, 2022, when
  • it sought recusal of the entire panel and vacatur of the institution decision.”
    “In January 2023, the Board panel denied Centripetal’s rehearing request and granted Cisco’s joinder motion. Nevertheless, two of the three members of the panel withdrew to narrow the issues before the Board. The reconstituted panel then denied Centripetal’s motion for vacatur and held that the recusal motion was untimely, because Centripetal
  • had been aware of the potential conflict since September 2022.”
    “In May 2023, the Board found certain claims of Centripetal’s patent to be unpatentable as obvious. Centripetal appealed to the Federal Circuit, arguing that the Board’s decision should be vacated because the allegedly conflicted APJ recused himself only after institution and because the Board failed to address Centripetal’s copying arguments.”
  • “The Federal Circuit determined that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal, noting that the case turned on the interpretation of ethics rules and was not the first instance in which the Court reviewed a conflict-of-interest challenge involving an institution decision. The Court concluded that the Board did not abuse its discretion in determining that Centripetal’s recusal motion was untimely, as Centripetal had been aware of the potential conflict for three months before its filing.”
  • “The Federal Circuit also addressed the substance of the recusal motion and explained that the APJ’s stock holding in Cisco was less than the statutory $15,000 threshold at all times. Although Centripetal argued that different statutory provisions applied to APJs, the Court concluded that those provisions did not govern a federal employee’s personal financial holdings. Under the applicable statute, which requires recusal only when an employee owns more than $15,000 in a party, the Court found that the APJ was not required to recuse himself.”
  • “The Federal Circuit further found that Centripetal’s due process rights were not violated. The Court explained that ethics rules for Article III judges do not apply to administrative proceedings before APJs. The Court further noted that a recent (USPTO) memorandum directing the Board to avoid empaneling judges with any stock ownership in a party was not intended to apply retroactively and therefore did not affect Centripetal’s case.”

Judge Disqualifies Attorney From Malpractice Trial He’s Implicated In” —

  • “A magistrate judge for the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida disqualified a Boca Raton attorney from trying his client’s legal malpractice case after finding he will be a key witness for the defendant — who is also his former co-counsel — when the case goes to trial.”
  • “Judge Lisette M. Reid kicked Andre G. Raikhelson off trial portion of the case in a Tuesday order, noting her decision was backed by legal precedent which holds that attorneys cannot represent clients in cases in which they are ‘central figures’ or when there is risk the client’s representation will be limited ‘by a personal interest of the lawyer.’”
    ‘Here, Mr. Raikhelson arguably has a personal stake in the outcome of this litigation, namely avoiding liability for Plaintiff’s damages himself,’ Reid opined.”
  • “At the heart of the case is a 2020 civil complaint filed by the Securities and Exchange Commission against Joseph Cole Barleta for seven violations of the Securities Exchange Act while participating in a ‘fraud scheme’ that deceived investors of the Philadelphia-based financing firm Par Funding.”
  • “Barleta tapped New York-based attorney Bettina Schein to represent him, with Raikhelson soon joining his legal team as local co-counsel. Schein advised Barleta to sign a consent agreement she described as a ‘no admit — no deny’ agreement. Per Reid’s order, Schein warned Barleta that should he refuse to sign, he was likely to be found liable of at least one count and that a lengthy, costly trial would ensue.”
  • “Barleta signed the consent agreement in November 2021, effectively waiving his right to appeal, consenting to the entry of a disgorgement and acknowledging the allegations lodged against him by the SEC to be true. At a disgorgement hearing in October 2022, Barleta was ordered to pay $10.8 million in disgorgement damages and a civil penalty of more than $1.3 million.”
  • “Represented by Raikhelson, Barleta filed a more than $12 million legal malpractice suit against Schein in September 2023, alleging she misrepresented the effect of the consent decree.”
  • “But Schein argues it wasn’t her fault Barleta was left with such a large bill, but rather Raikhelson’s.”
  • “By the time of the disgorgement hearing, Schein had withdrawn from the case, leaving Raikhelson as the sole counsel. Despite having attended every other hearing in the case, Raikhelson was not there to represent Barleta at the disgorgement hearing, telling the Daily Business Review Friday that he missed it for ‘personal reasons.’”
  • “‘Our position is that though I wasn’t present at the hearing, for personal reasons, the argument that (Barleta) had at that hearing was carried on by other members of the joint defense team,’ Raikhelson said.”
  • “Bob Jarvis, law professor at Nova Southeastern University, said Raikhelson’s absence at the disgorgement hearing was ‘mind-boggling.’ ‘To not show up at that hearing, and to essentially have other lawyers say that he was resting on his brief, I mean, that’s just mind-boggling … It’s like leaving a play right before they reveal who the murderer is,’ Jarvis said.”
  • “He added that had Barleta approached a different lawyer, it’s likely they would have advised him to file the malpractice suit against both Schein and Raikhelson.”
    ‘Raikhelson has every reason to convince Barleta, ‘Oh, it’s Schein’s fault,’ whereas a conflict-free lawyer would have said ‘We’ll sue both of them and then the court or the jury can decide how much responsibility each one of them has,’’ Jarvis said.”



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Recent Reviews


The IRS has a number of tools it can use to collect unpaid taxes. This includes liens and levies, offsetting refunds, and, since 2015, requesting that the State Department deny or revoke a taxpayer’s passport.

But what happens when a tax debt is old and seemingly beyond the collection statute of limitations? Can the IRS still certify it as “seriously delinquent” for passport purposes? What if the IRS previously obtained a default judgment against the taxpayer for tax debts for older years? Would that change the answer?

The recent Garcia v. Commissioner, 164 T.C. 8 (2025) case gets into these issues. It considers when tax debts remain “legally enforceable” for passport certification purposes, which, in turn, helps clarify how taxpayers can challenge improper certifications.

Facts & Procedural History

The taxpayer in this case accumulated over $100,000 in unpaid federal tax liabilities for the 2007 and 2010 tax periods.

As part of its IRS tax Collection efforts, the IRS filed Notices of Federal Tax Lien and sent notices of these filings to the taxpayer’s last known address. The IRS also sent Notices of Intent to Levy to the taxpayer in 2008 and in 2010.

The taxpayer requested a Collection Due Process hearing for one of the lien notices. He did not request hearings for any of the levy notices, and the time for requesting hearings on the other lien notices had expired by 2022.

In 2014, the IRS filed suit in the U.S. District Court to reduce the tax liabilities to judgment. The district court entered a default judgment against the taxpayer in late 2014. Without this judgment, the 10-year collection statute would have expired between 2017 and 2020 for most of his liabilities. The judgment probably extended the statute for another ten years.

Eight years after obtaining the judgment, in 2022, the IRS certified to the Secretary of State that the taxpayer had a “seriously delinquent tax debt” under Section 7345 of the tax code.

The taxpayer filed a petition with the U.S. Tax Court challenging the certification. He claimed that he was never served in the district court action, making the default judgment void and, since the statute had ran, his tax debt no longer legally enforceable.

What Is Section 7345 of the Tax Code?

Section 7345 was added to the tax code as part of the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act (“FAST Act”) in 2015. This law created a new process for the IRS to “encourage” tax compliance by limiting a delinquent taxpayer’s ability to travel internationally.

Under this section, if the IRS certifies that a taxpayer has a “seriously delinquent tax debt,” the Secretary of State may deny, revoke, or limit that taxpayer’s passport. The taxpayer can challenge this certification by filing a petition in either the Tax Court or a federal district court.

The tax court’s powers are limited in these proceedings. The tax court’s role in these cases is specifically limited to determining whether the certification was erroneous or whether the IRS has failed to reverse it when required. Thus, the court cannot address the underlying tax liability or grant any relief beyond ordering the IRS to notify the State Department that the certification was erroneous.

Readers of this site may well know that these types of compartmentalized court remedies are usually problematic, as they allow taxpayers to get one part of what they are seeking–but then deny full releif–even though all of the facts, etc. necessary for getting the full remedy are squarely before the court to get the first part of the relief.

What Qualifies as a “Seriously Delinquent Tax Debt”?

This leads to the question as to what qualifies as a “seriously delinquent tax debt.” For a tax debt to be considered “seriously delinquent” under Section 7345(b), it must meet several specific criteria.

First, it must be an “unpaid, legally enforceable Federal tax liability of an individual.” This language is important because a tax debt that is no longer legally enforceable—for example, because the collection statute of limitations has expired—cannot be certified as seriously delinquent.

Second, the debt must have been assessed by the IRS. Assessment is the formal recording of a tax liability in the IRS’s records. So basically the IRS computer has to reflect the balance as being a balance that is due.

Third, the debt must exceed a certain threshold amount, which was $50,000 when the law was enacted but is adjusted annually for inflation. In 2022, the date in this court case when the debt was certified, the threshold was $55,000.

Fourth, either (a) a notice of lien must have been filed under Section 6323 and the taxpayer’s administrative rights under Section 6320 must have been exhausted or lapsed, or (b) a levy must have been made under Section 6331.

The law also excludes certain debts from being considered “seriously delinquent,” such as those being paid in a timely manner under an installment agreement or offer in compromise, or debts for which collection is suspended due to a pending request for innocent spouse relief or a Collection Due Process hearing.

Why Is the “Legally Enforceable” Requirement So Important?

The requirement that a tax debt be “legally enforceable” to qualify as “seriously delinquent” is important. But like many important provisions in our tax laws, the term is explicitly defined in Section 7345.

At minimum, one can deduce that a tax debt is not legally enforceable if the statute of limitations for collecting it has expired. Under Section 6502(a) of the tax code, the IRS generally has 10 years from the date of assessment to collect a tax liability. This includes not only the original tax but also any interest that accrues on the unpaid liability.

In this case, most of the taxpayer’s tax liabilities were assessed between March 2007 and August 2010. Without any extension, the collection statute would have expired between March 2017 and August 2020—well before the IRS certification in October 2022.

How Do Federal Court Judgments Extend the Collection Statute?

This brings us to the extension. The 10-year collection statute can be extended in various ways, including when the United States brings an action in court to collect a tax liability and obtains a judgment. In that case, the limitations period is extended until the judgment is satisfied or becomes unenforceable after 20 more years.

When the United States obtains a judgment for unpaid taxes, the judgment creates a lien that lasts for 20 years under 28 U.S.C. §3201, and this lien may be renewed for another 20 years. This means a federal court judgment can potentially extend the IRS’s ability to collect a tax debt far beyond the original 10-year period.

In the present case, the IRS argued that the 2014 default judgment extended the collection statute until at least August 11, 2034—20 years after the judgment was entered. Ouch. If valid, this would mean that the taxpayer’s tax debt was still legally enforceable when the IRS certified it as “seriously delinquent” in October 2022. Double ouch.

Can a Taxpayer Challenge the Underlying Judgment in a Passport Case?

This gets to the default judgment part of the case. The taxpayer claimed that he was never served with the complaint in the 2014 district court action. This claim directly challenged whether the judgment extending the collection statute was valid in the first place.

Under well-established legal principles, a judgment entered without personal jurisdiction over the defendant is void. Personal jurisdiction typically requires proper service of process, which is how a court asserts its authority to adjudicate the rights of a party. This is not tax law, but rather, just the laws involved in general civil litigation.

The Supreme Court has long held that “the want of jurisdiction is a matter that may always be set up against a judgment when sought to be enforced, or where any benefit is claimed under it.” In other words, a person can challenge a judgment as void for lack of personal jurisdiction even years after it was entered if someone tries to use that judgment against them.

If the taxpayer truly was not served in the district court suit, the default judgment would be void and would not have extended the collection statute. This would mean his tax liabilities were no longer legally enforceable when the IRS certified them as “seriously delinquent” for passport purposes. That would be a great reversal of fourtune for the taxpayer.

What Is the Scope of Tax Court Review in Passport Cases?

So what did the court say and how did it get there? The first question the court had to contend with to answer this is what is the scope of the court’s review in passport certification cases? Is the court’s review limited to the administrative record that was before the IRS when it made the certification, or can the court consider new evidence presented during the tax court proceedings?

The IRS often prefers cases to be limited to the administrative record. This gives the IRS the argument that the taxpayer did not produce various items during the proceeding and, therefore, they lose their right to present anything in the court proceeding. Collection due process hearings work this way, typically.

This was important in this case because the administrative record likely contained only the default judgment and related documents. It probably didn’t include any evidence regarding whether the taxpayer was actually served in the district court action. If the tax court’s review was limited to the administrative record, it could not consider the taxpayer’s testimony about lack of service.

To answer this question, the tax court examined its jurisdictional provisions under Section 7345(e), which authorizes the court “to determine whether the certification was erroneous.” The court focused on the word “determine,” noting that in other contexts—such as deficiency redeterminations and innocent spouse relief—Congress’s use of this word signals that the court should conduct a de novo review based on a new record. This means that the court can consider more than just the administrative record.

How Did the Tax Court Rule in the Garcia Case?

Okay, so how did the court rule? The court held that a tax liability is not “legally enforceable” within the meaning of Section 7345(b) if the limitations period for collecting it has expired.

The court recognized that whether the limitations periods remained open in this case depended on whether the taxpayer was served in the district court action, which was a disputed issue of fact that could not be resolved on summary judgment.

Because the taxpayer raised a genuine issue of material fact about whether he was served in the district court action—a fact that could determine whether his tax debt was legally enforceable at the time of certification—the court denied the IRS’s motion for summary judgment.

So in short, the court didn’t really rule on the issue. Unless the case goes forward to trial and an opinion is issued, the implication of this case is that taxpayers can put on evidence to show that older taxes are time barred and therefore the IRS cannot certify the tax debt to the Secretary of State.

The Takeaway

While this case didn’t get to a final decision, the case does open the door for taxpayers to present evidence to defend against passport certifications. For those with older tax debts, this right is critical. The IRS can and does miss the statute of limitations–even in cases where it does not pursue a judgment in district court and even in cases where it does and there is no default judgment. Those with older tax debts needing to travel, should take note of the arguments made in this case as further development of the possible remedies in this area is possible and likely.

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