How Wrong Does the IRS Have to be to Be Liable for Attorneys Fees? – Houston Tax Attorneys


In most civil litigation cases, the parties are not entitled to an award of attorneys fees. The exceptions are generally when there is a contract that provides for attorneys fees or there is a statute.

This can be problematic in litigation cases–particularly where one party brings or defends a friviolous suit just to drive up the attorneys fees on the other party. This is even more problematic in tax litigation cases against the government as the government typically does not have any concern about attorneys fees. It has attorneys on staff and pays them regardless of whether they are working cases or not.

This is why Congress added a provision to the tax code to allow for an award of attorneys fees. The nuances of this rule however, make it very difficult for taxpayers to recover. This is even true when the taxpayer completely prevails in the underlying tax case.

The recent Gonzalez v. United States, No. 2:22-cv-03370 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2025) case provides an opportunity to consider exactly how wrong the IRS has to be before taxpayers can recover their attorney’s fees.

Facts & Procedural History

The taxpayer served as corporate secretary of a construction company located in New York. The company was owned by her husband. Though she had sold her ownership shares in 2011, she continued to have some connections to the company. She performed administrative duties for the corporation, including signing employee paychecks, using a company debit card, and executing loan documents. She also signed as “owner” and personally guaranteed repayment for a $250,000 loan.

The company did not pay employment taxes totaling over $1.3 million for five quarters in 2012 and 2013. The IRS pursued the taxpayer personally for a trust fund recovery penalty under Section 6672. By 2022, the IRS was seeking to collect the $1,650,826.53 penalty from her personally.

The taxpayer exhausted administrative remedies through IRS appeals and collection due process hearings. She submitted a refund claim for $111.69 representing one employee’s taxes. When the IRS refused to release the assessments, she filed suit in federal district court.

At trial, the government argued the taxpayer’s check-signing authority and corporate position made her responsible for the unpaid taxes. The taxpayer countered that she lacked actual control over company finances and tax decisions. The jury sided with the taxpayer on all counts. The jury found that she was neither a responsible person and she did not willfully fail to pay the employment taxes. The court ordered release of all IRS tax liens against her.

Following this complete victory, the taxpayer sought recovery of $95,042.19 in attorney’s fees and costs under Section 7430. The attorneys fees were the subject of this decision and of this article.

Attorneys Fee Recovery Under Section 7430

Section 7430 says that prevailing taxpayers can recover litigation costs from the government in tax cases. Congress enacted this provision to deter the IRS from pursuing unreasonable positions and cases with no legal or factual basis. The idea is that taxpayers should not have to incur costs to defend against improper assessments. The statute applies to any proceeding involving determination, collection, or refund of taxes, interest, or penalties.

To qualify for fee recovery, taxpayers have to satisfy several requirements. They have to have a net worth less than $2 million for individuals or $7 million for businesses with fewer than 500 employees. They have to file their fee application within thirty days of final judgment. They have to exhaust administrative remedies before going to court. And, as relevant here, they have to be the “prevailing party” in the litigation.

The prevailing party requirement is not as straight forward as it seems. There are two paths for qualification. Taxpayers can substantially prevail on the amount in controversy or on the most significant issues presented. Winning completely at trial, as the taxpayer did here, satisfies this standard. Yet, as this case shows, even complete victory doesn’t guarantee fee recovery.

The Substantial Justification Exception

There is an exception that can take away recovery for prevailing taxpayers. It is found in Section 7430(c)(4)(B).

This code section says that taxpayers cannot be treated as prevailing parties if the government’s position was “substantially justified.” This exception applies regardless of how thoroughly the taxpayer wins at trial. The government bears the burden of proving substantial justification based on the totality of circumstances.

Substantial justification means “justified in substance or in the main”—a position that could satisfy a reasonable person. The standard requires more than mere arguability but less than correctness. The government does not have to prove it should have won. It only has to prove that reasonable people could debate the merits of its position.

Courts evaluate substantial justification by examining the facts known when the government took its position. Later revelations at trial don’t retroactively undermine reasonableness. The analysis focuses on whether the government had adequate grounds for its position, not whether it ultimately persuaded the factfinder.

How Wrong Must the IRS Be?

The substantial justification standard creates a zone where the IRS can be wrong without paying attorney’s fees. The government’s position must be more than incorrect—it must lack reasonable support in law and fact. This distinction between being wrong and being unreasonably wrong protects the government’s ability to pursue debatable cases. It may also result in the government not having to pay when it in fact should.

Consider the spectrum of government positions. At one end lies the clearly correct position that wins at trial. Moving along the spectrum, we find positions that lose but had reasonable support—these are substantially justified despite being wrong. Further along are positions lacking reasonable basis—only these trigger fee recovery. At the far end are frivolous positions pursued in bad faith.

The substantial justification standard sits well before bad faith on this spectrum. The government need not act improperly or negligently to avoid paying fees. It can pursue positions that ultimately fail as long as reasonable people could have supported them initially.

Why Check-Signing Authority Matters

To evaluate this issue, we have to go back to the facts and law in this case.

Section 6672 imposes personal liability on those responsible for collecting and paying employment taxes who willfully fail to do so. The penalty equals 100% of the unpaid trust fund taxes—the amounts withheld from employee paychecks for income tax and FICA. Courts determine responsibility through a multi-factor test examining the individual’s control over company finances.

Check-signing authority represents one factor in this analysis. Someone who can write checks controls which creditors receive payment and when. This power includes deciding whether employment taxes reach the IRS or whether the company pays other expenses instead. Regular exercise of check-signing authority demonstrates active participation in financial management beyond mere paper authority.

Courts have found individuals responsible based partly on check-signing authority. In Hochstein v. United States, 900 F.2d 543 (2d Cir. 1990), the Second Circuit emphasized how check-signing authority combined with requesting company funds established sufficient control. The ability to direct company payments, even if someone else makes strategic decisions, can support responsibility findings.

So what evidence supports substantial justification for this penalty? That is what this court case addresses. It shows that various combinations of evidence can be cited by the government. Corporate titles and positions provide starting points for inquiry. Check-signing authority and actual check-signing activities strengthen the government’s position. Use of company credit cards and payment of company expenses add support. Execution of loan documents and personal guarantees demonstrate financial involvement.

Given this, the district court found the government’s position substantially. The court noted that the taxpayer’s documented financial activities during the relevant quarters. She signed “hundreds” of employee paychecks in 2012 and 2013. She regularly used a company debit card for business expenses. She executed loan documents as “owner” and personally guaranteed company debt.

The court concluded that these facts created reasonable grounds for believing the taxpayer exercised significant control over company finances. The court noted that “a reasonable factfinder could have found that [the taxpayer’s] activities evidenced a sufficient level of control.” The jury’s contrary conclusion didn’t negate the reasonableness of pursuing the case.

The Takeaway

Unfortunately, simply winning at trial won’t guarantee fee recovery. When it comes down to it, taxpayers have to be able to demonstrate the government lacked reasonable basis for its position from the outset. This requires showing that available evidence couldn’t support responsibility findings by reasonable people. The stronger the documentary evidence against the taxpayer, the harder this can be. Taxpayers who are considering taking the IRS to court and hoping to recover attorneys fees for the tax litigation should evaluate fee recovery prospects realistically given these rules. Even strong defenses may not yield attorney’s fees if the government has colorable arguments.

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You own a depreciated asset or an asset that has gone down in value. It happens. But say you cannot take advantage of the tax loss for some reason. Maybe it is because you don’t have other Income triggering a tax that year or maybe there is a limitation on the use of the loss for you. The question is then whether you can transfer your loss to another party who might benefit from it. The answer is often, “maybe.”

As the Second Circuit’s recent decision in Pimlico, LLC v. Commissioner, No. 23-7759 (2d Cir. Aug. 11, 2025), the ability to shift tax losses to a third party depends on the economic substance of the transaction. The IRS and the courts have developed timing rules and a multi-factor analysis to determine whether the investor can benefit from the tax loss.

Because business transactions are complex and variable, these same rules can seemingly change the tax outcome for transactions that were not tax motivated. They can put taxpayers in the position of having the IRS second guess their transactions. This is often the case when the transaction happens to provide a tax benefit for the third party. The Pimlico case provides an opportunity to consider this.

Facts & Procedural History

A Brazilian company held $22.7 million in distressed accounts receivable that had little economic value. The company contributed these receivables through a series of LLC transfers. They ultimately ended up in a partnership. On the same day the final partnership formed, a U.S. investor purchased an interest in the partnership for $300,164.

Within months, the Brazilian company requested a partial withdrawal from the partnership structure for exactly $300,164–the exact same amount the U.S. investor had contributed. The bank records showed the investor’s money coming in and an identical amount going out to the Brazilian company. The partnership then sold the receivables to another party and the partnership claimed the $22.7 million loss deduction. This caused the U.S. investor to have a large part of the tax loss.

The IRS challenged this arrangement during a tax audit, arguing the transaction constituted a disguised sale rather than legitimate partnership contributions and distributions. The dispute ended up in tax litigation when the taxpayers challenged the IRS determination. The U.S. Tax Court agreed with the IRS that this was a disguised sale, and the Second Circuit was asked to review the tax court decision.

The Basic Framework of Partnership Contributions

To understand the disguised sale rules in this context, we have to go back and consider the partnership contribution rules.

Section 721 of the tax code provides that partners generally don’t recognize gain or loss when contributing property to a partnership in exchange for partnership interests. This is the general rule for contributions.

Section 731 extends this non-recognition treatment to partnership distributions. The general rule under Section 731(a) is that partners don’t recognize gain or loss when receiving distributions from a partnership. This non-recognition treatment applies whether the distribution is cash or property. The theory is that partners are just receiving back their share of what the partnership owns – they’re not really engaging in a separate transaction that should trigger tax.

There are important exceptions to this general rule. Under Section 731(a)(1), a partner must recognize gain when cash distributions exceed their basis in the partnership interest. Loss recognition is even more limited under Section 731(a)(2) as partners can only recognize a loss when the partnership completely liquidates their interest and they receive only cash, unrealized receivables, or inventory items, and even then only if these distributions are less than their partnership basis. We don’t need to address these rules for our purposes as we are only focusing on the disguised sale aspects and not the manner of getting the tax benefit of the transaction if it is not a sale.

For the disguised sale part of it

For the disguised sale part of it, these non-recognition rules make sense for genuine business combinations. When multiple parties contribute assets to operate a business together, they’re not really disposing of their property–they’re exchanging direct ownership for partnership interests that represent continued economic participation. The partners still bear the economic risks and rewards, just in a different form.

But this favorable treatment assumes the transaction repr…

But this favorable treatment assumes the transaction represents a true partnership arrangement. When property moves into a partnership and cash quickly moves out to the contributing partner, the economic substance might be quite different from the form. The contributing partner may have effectively sold the property while using partnership formalities to avoid immediate tax consequences or to transfer tax attributes to another party.

Disguised Sale Rules Override Partnership Tax Rules

This is where the disgused sale rules come into play. They can override the partnership tax rules.

Section 707(a)(2)(B) authorizes regulations to recharacterize certain partnership contributions and distributions as disguised sales. The provision recognizes that taxpayers might use partnership formalities to achieve results that economically resemble sales while claiming non-recognition treatment. Rather than providing detailed statutory rules, Congress delegated to Treasury the task of distinguishing legitimate partnership transactions from disguised sales.

The resulting regulations adopt a substance-over-form approach. Even when parties follow partnership formalities perfectly – proper documentation, legal entity formation, technical compliance with partnership tax rules–the transaction may still be treated as a sale if that’s what it economically resembles. This is intended to prevent taxpayers from using partnerships as vehicles to accomplish what are essentially purchase and sale transactions while avoiding the tax consequences of sales.

Treasury Regulation Section 1.707-3(b)(1) sets out two requirements for disguised sale treatment. First, the transfer of money or other consideration would not have been made “but for” the transfer of property. Second, when transfers aren’t simultaneous, the subsequent transfer do not depend on the entrepreneurial risks of partnership operations.

The “but for” rule considers whether the cash distribution represents payment for property or a genuine partnership distribution. Would the partnership have distributed cash to that partner anyway, perhaps based on profit allocations or business needs? Or did the distribution occur specifically because the partner contributed property? This inquiry looks past documentation to economic reality.

The “but for” rule is essentially a causation test

The “but for” rule is essentially a causation test. It asks whether the distribution would have occurred regardless of the contribution? If the partnership would have made the distribution anyway based on its normal operations, profit allocations, or business needs, then the contribution and distribution are likely independent events. But if the distribution only happened because the partner contributed property, this suggests the distribution is really payment for that property.

The “entrepreneurial risk” requirement focuses on whether the partner’s receipt of cash depends on partnership success. Genuine partnership distributions typically vary based on business performance–profits generate larger distributions, losses reduce them. When a partner knows they’ll receive a specific amount regardless of how the partnership performs, it suggests the payment is actually purchase price rather than a true distribution.

How Do Timing Presumptions Work?

The disguised sale rules also have timing rules that can cause the transcation to be presumed to be a disguised sale. These timing presumptions look to the time between contributions and distributions.

Under Section 1.707-3(c)(1) of the regulations, distributions within two years of the contribution are presumed to be sales unless facts and circumstances clearly establish otherwise. This presumption recognizes that related transfers close in time likely represent integrated transactions rather than independent partnership activities.

Section 1.707-3(d) of the regulations creates an opposite presumption for transfers more than two years apart. With this timing presumption, transfers are presumed not to be sales unless facts clearly establish they are. The longer time period is thought to allow for risk shifting and independent business decisions rather than prearranged transactions.

These presumptions aren’t absolute, however. The two-year presumption can be rebutted by showing genuine business purpose and entrepreneurial risk. And on the other side of it, the IRS can overcome the longer-period presumption by showing the transaction was prearranged or orchestrated primarily for tax benefits.

The Facts and Circumstances Matter

In addition to timing rules, the regulations include facts and circumstances that are to be considered. These facts and circumstances can be the basis for a transaction being a sale or not.

The factors are listed in Section 1.707-3(b)(2) of the regulations. They consider whether the contributing partner has enforceable rights to distributions, whether others made contributions specifically to fund distributions to the contributing partner, and whether distributions are disproportionate to continuing partnership interests.

The courts have emphasized these factors aren’t a mechanical checklist. The analysis requires evaluating the overall economic substance. In some cases, some of the factors might be absent while others strongly indicate a sale. The key is understanding what really happened economically–not checking boxes on a list.

A legally enforceable right to distribution strongly suggests a sale, but the absence of such a right doesn’t prove the transaction is legitimate. Similarly, the partnership incurring debt to fund distributions indicates a sale, but using existing funds doesn’t establish legitimacy if other factors point to disguised sale treatment.

The Receivables Transaction in This Case

This brings us back to this case. This case involves worthless accounts receivable and, according to the tax court and appeals court, several factors that made it look like a sale.

The court focused on the identical amounts of the contribution and distribution–$300,164 in from the U.S. investor and $300,164 out to the Brazilian company. It was the exact amount and the timing that the court considered. The investor joined the partnership when the final partnership formed and the Brazilian company requested withdrawal shortly after. The parties did not wait or have a longer period between the contribution and distribution.

The court also noted that the Brazilian company’s withdrawal represented a partial redemption of its interest for a specific amount. This disproportionate distribution suggested that the Brazilian company was not in it for the long haul. It was not a partner continuing with its partnership interest.

The court also noted the known tax benefit this transaction was using. Before 2004, the tax code allowed new partners to claim built-in losses from property that existing partners had contributed. Under the then-existing Section 704(c) rules and Treasury Regulation 1.704-3(a)(7), when someone purchased an existing partner’s interest, they could step into that partner’s shoes and claim losses from previously contributed property.

This meant the U

This meant the U.S. investor could purchase part of the Brazilian company’s partnership interest and become entitled to claim the $22.7 million loss when the partnership sold the receivables. The Brazilian company, which couldn’t use U.S. tax losses, effectively monetized them by selling its partnership interest. Congress recognized this potential for abuse and closed this loophole through the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 by adding Section 704(c)(1)(C) to prevent the shifting of built-in losses through partnership interest transfers. This no doubt informed the court’s decision in this case.

The taxpayer argued that the Brazilian company lacked leg…

The taxpayer argued that the Brazilian company lacked legally enforceable distribution rights and the partnership didn’t incur debt to fund the distribution. The Second Circuit found these arguments unpersuasive, emphasizing that the regulatory factors aren’t exclusive or mechanical requirements.

The court explained that the absence of some factors doesn’t negate disguised sale treatment when the overall pattern clearly shows a sale. The economic reality mattered more than technical compliance with certain factors. The transaction’s substance–a U.S. investor paying for tax losses from a foreign entity that couldn’t use them–demonstrated a sale regardless of missing factors.

The Takeaway

Partnerships considering transactions involving built-in loss property have to ensure genuine business purpose exists beyond tax planning. Distributions should relate to partnership performance, business needs, or predetermined allocation formulas based on partnership interests–not to specific partner contributions. The lack of correlation between contributions and distributions helps establish legitimacy.

Documentation should reflect business reasoning for significant distributions. Partnership agreements should articulate business purposes and establish distribution policies tied to operational factors. Meeting minutes should show business-based decision-making rather than mechanical triggers. Contemporary documentation carries more weight than after-the-fact explanations when IRS audits examine the taxpayer’s transactions.

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In 40 minutes, we’ll teach you how to survive an IRS audit.

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