Can Judge-Made Doctrine Override Tax Deductions Allowed by Congress? – Houston Tax Attorneys


The tax code provides specific rules for when taxpayers can claim deductions for losses. These are rules enacted by Congress.

There are other so-called “judicial doctrines” that allow the courts to override the rules set by Congress. There are several of these that frequently come up in tax disputes, such as the economic substance doctrine (which was codified into law), the step transaction doctrine, etc. We have covered many of these doctrines in prior articles. We have not addressed the public policy doctrine.

The “public policy doctrine” allows courts to deny tax deductions that would otherwise be perfectly legal under the tax code when allowing such deductions would “frustrate” public policy.

The U.S. Tax Court recently applied this doctrine in Hampton v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2025-32, to disallow a tax loss when the government seized assets of a business for the wrongdoing of the owner. This gets into issues of separation of powers, and how far the courts can go in overriding the rules set by Congress.

Facts & Procedural History

The taxpayer in this case was a stock broker. He operated as an S corporation, and was 100% owner of the S corporation.

In 2009, the taxpayer worked out an arrangement with his high school friend who had been appointed as the deputy treasurer of the State of Ohio. The arrangement involved the deputy treasurer directing trading business from the State of Ohio to the taxpayer, with the taxpayer sharing portions of his commissions with the deputy treasurer and two associates. The payments were aledged to have been disguised as legal fees or business loans. The taxpayer received approximately $3.2 million in commissions from these trades and paid about $524,000 to the conspirators.

In 2013, the taxpayer pleaded guilty to charges of bribery, fraud, and money laundering. In 2014, he was sentenced to 45 months in prison and ordered to forfeit approximately $2.2 million. In 2016, while he was incarcerated, the U.S. Marshals Service seized $1,182,543.71 in funds from seven bank accounts held in the name of either the taxpayer or his S corporation.

On its 2016 Form 1120S, the S corporation claimed a deduction of $855,882 for the forfeiture of its seized accounts. As the S corporation’s sole shareholder, the taxpayer reported this loss on his individual tax return. The IRS audited the tax return and disallowed the deduction for the tax loss. The taxpayer filed a petition with the tax court for review.

About the Public Policy Doctrine

The public policy doctrine is a judicial doctrine the courts have cited for denying tax deductions that would “frustrate sharply defined national or state policies proscribing particular types of conduct, evidenced by some governmental declaration thereof.” This principle was articulated by the Supreme Court in Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30, 33-34 (1958).

This is not a rule created by Congress through legislation. Instead, it was developed by judges who decided that some tax deductions, though technically allowed by the tax code, should nevertheless be denied on public policy grounds. This represents a significant judicial encroachment on what would normally be the legislative domain of determining which deductions are allowable.

The doctrine is particularly applicable to tax penalties imposed by the government–in addition to income tax due resulting from the denial of tax deductions. As the Supreme Court explained, the “[d]eduction of fines and penalties uniformly has been held to frustrate state policy in severe and direct fashion by reducing the ‘sting’ of the penalty prescribed by the state legislature.” The underlying rationale is that allowing a tax deduction for a government-imposed penalty would effectively reduce the financial impact of that penalty, thereby undermining its deterrent effect.

How Does the Public Policy Doctrine Override Section 165?

Section 165(a) of the tax code allows a deduction for “any loss sustained during the taxable year and not compensated for by insurance or otherwise.” For individual taxpayers, the deduction is limited to losses incurred in a trade or business, in transactions entered into for profit, or in certain cases of casualty or theft. Notably, the text of Section 165 contains no exception for losses resulting from criminal forfeitures or other penalties.

In 1969, Congress partially codified the public policy doctrine by amending Section 162 of the tax code (which is the general provision that allows for business tax deductions) to explicitly disallow deductions for fines and penalties paid to a government for violation of law. However, Congress did not make similar amendments to Section 165 (which is the provision for deducting tax losses). This raises the question: Did Congress intend to limit the public policy doctrine to Section 162 deductions, leaving Section 165 free from such judicial restrictions?

The courts have not followed this distinction. The courts have applied the public policy doctrine to Section 165 deductions. For example, the Federal Circuit did so in Nacchio v. United States, 824 F.3d 1370, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2016). In that case, the court explicitly stated that “§165 is subject to a ‘frustration of public policy’ doctrine.”

When Can Courts Override the Plain Language of the Tax Code?

How far courts are willing to go and should they be allowed to go in applying the public policy doctrine–even when doing so requires overriding the plain language of the tax code?

Under a strict reading of Section 165 and the S corporation flow-through rules under Section 1366, the taxpayer here would appear to be entitled to deduct his share of the S corporation’s loss from the asset forfeiture (there was an assignment issue for assigning income thath the court didn’t get to, which may also have been a problem had the court gotten to that issue–but that is beyond the scope of this article).

Section 165 allows deductions for “any loss” with certain limitations that don’t explicitly exclude criminal forfeitures. Section 1366(a) provides that an S corporation shareholder “shall take into account” his pro rata share of the corporation’s income or loss. Nothing in the text of either provision suggests an exception for losses resulting from criminal activity.

Yet the tax court determined that the public policy doctrine overrode these statutory provisions. The court held that even if the S corporation was entitled to claim a deduction (a question the court did not decide), the taxpayer as an individual was barred by the public policy doctrine from reporting his 100% passthrough share of the S corporation’s resulting loss on his individual return.

The court’s rationale was that allowing the taxpayer to d…

The court’s rationale was that allowing the taxpayer to deduct the loss would frustrate the sharply defined policy against conspiring to commit offenses against the United States. The taxpayer was the Purported wrongdoer, and the S corporation’s assets were somehow seized as part of a penalty for his wrongdoing. The court did not get into how the denial of a deduction is not a tax penalty, and the code already provides for tax penalties–no doubt which also applied.

Thus, apparently the taxpayer should be double penalized–with a tax penalty (probably more than one) and then again by the loss of his tax deduction. According to the court, allowing the taxpayer a deduction would unquestionably reduce the “sting” of the penalty (which a forfeiture is not a penalty), regardless of what the tax code actually says about such tax deductions.

How Far Can Courts Extend the Public Policy Doctrine?

The tax court emphasized that the public policy doctrine is not constrained by formalistic distinctions between legal entities. This is similar to the rules that apply when a taxpayer transfers assets to a spouse to avoid IRS collections. The court cited Holmes Enterprises, Inc. v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 114 (1977), where a corporation claimed a deduction for the criminal forfeiture of a car it owned after its sole owner and president was convicted on illegal drug charges.

In Holmes, the tax court concluded that although the corporation was a “separate, taxable entity, distinct from its employee,” the public policy doctrine forbade it from claiming a deduction because it was not a “wholly innocent bystander.” Due to the convicted person’s role as the corporation’s sole owner and president, the corporation “knew of and fully consented to the illegal use of its automobile.”

This reasoning shows how courts have expanded the public policy doctrine to deny deductions not just to convicted individuals, but also to closely related entities, even when those entities themselves haven’t been charged with any crime. This judicial expansion extends the doctrine well beyond what Congress explicitly codified in Section 162(f).

Can a Taxpayer Challenge Judicial Overreach Through a Tax Deduction?

The taxpayer in this case argued that the application of the public policy doctrine should be limited because the United States’ seizure of the S corp’s assets violated due process and was “over-zealous” given that the S corp was not the wrongdoer. However, the tax court found no legal impropriety in the seizure of the S corp’s assets to satisfy the taxpayer’s forfeiture liability.

The court relied on the Sixth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Parenteau, 647 F. App’x 593 (6th Cir. 2016), which held that a corporation wholly owned by an individual convicted of a criminal conspiracy was not a person “other than the defendant” for purposes of forfeiture proceedings. The Sixth Circuit cited relevant factors including that the defendant wholly owned and controlled the corporation, that the corporation did not follow corporate formalities, and that the defendant used the corporation’s property in his criminal scheme.

By analogy, the tax court concluded that the S corporation in this case was not separate from the taxpayer as an individual for purposes of the substitute forfeiture provisions. The taxpayer wholly owned and controlled the S corp, offered minimal evidence that corporate formalities were followed, and the S corp’s sole source of business income was the commissions generated by the taxpayer that were “assigned” to the S corp—the very commissions that led to the criminal indictment, plea, and forfeiture. This is consistent with the court’s prior rulings that apply various judicial doctrines to S corporations.

Is There Any Limit to Judicial Override of Tax Code Provisions?

The tax court also rejected the taxpayer’s argument that the public policy doctrine’s application should be affected by alleged illegality or over-zealousness on the government’s part in seizing the assets. Both the Fourth Circuit and the tax court have previously indicated that the alleged illegality of a criminal forfeiture need not prevent the public policy doctrine from disallowing a deduction for the forfeited property.

In Hackworth v. Commissioner, 155 F. App’x 627, 632 (4th Cir. 2005), the Fourth Circuit stated: “If the taxpayers believe that the forfeiture was invalid, the proper remedy is for them to sue the [relevant government unit] and seek return of the funds [rather than claim a tax deduction].” Similarly, in the tax court’s decision in Hackworth, the court stated: “This Court lacks jurisdiction over [the taxpayers’] collateral attack on the forfeiture.”

This principle further demonstrates the power of the public policy doctrine as a judicial override of tax code provisions. Even if a taxpayer believes that a forfeiture was illegal or improper, courts will not allow them to deduct the loss under Section 165. Instead, they must challenge the forfeiture directly in another forum—a requirement found nowhere in the text of the tax code itself.

The Takeaway

This case shows how the judge-made public policy doctrine can override explicit provisions of the tax code. Despite clear statutory language allowing deductions for business losses and requiring S corporation shareholders to report their share of corporate losses, the tax court denied the taxpayer’s deduction based on a doctrine created by judges, not legislators.

The tax law as written by Congress can be trumped by judicial doctrines when courts determine that public policy would be frustrated by allowing certain deductions. Taxpayers facing criminal forfeitures should understand that the public policy doctrine enables courts to disallow deductions that would otherwise be permitted under a plain reading of the tax code, particularly when there is a direct connection between criminal activity and the forfeited assets.

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Recent Reviews


We’ve all experienced those moments when we say something and realize our wording wasn’t perfect. Yet from the other person’s nod or response, we can tell they understood our meaning perfectly well. We don’t feel the need to repeat ourselves with better phrasing. This is simply part of being human.

A similar situation occurs with income tax filings. Consider a taxpayer whose e-filed return gets rejected due to a technical issue. The taxpayer then submits a paper filing, perhaps using a slightly incorrect form. In both attempts, the IRS receives the essential tax information and understands what the taxpayer is communicating.

In these cases, can the IRS legitimately claim these tax returns were never filed? The case of McDow v. United States, No.1:21-cv-00732 (Fed. Cir. April 1, 2025) addresses this very question. The decision considers when an informal refund claim meets the timeliness requirements and how tax returns and refund claims work together under statutory deadlines.

Facts & Procedural History

The taxpayer in this case had overpaid taxes for multiple years. We are going to focus on the 2013 tax year in this article.

For tax year 2013, the taxpayer made a payment in January 2014. He tried to file his 2013 tax return with the IRS electronically in April 2015, but the IRS rejected the filing. Instead of immediately resubmitting the return, the taxpayer filed a Form 843 (Claim for Refund and Request for Abatement) in December 2016. This form was filed more than two years after his tax payment but within three years of his first filing. The taxpayer eventually filed a formal tax return for 2013 in June 2018.

After the IRS denied the refund claim, the taxpayer filed suit in the court of federal claims. In its first ruling on the government’s motion to dismiss, the court determined that the Form 843 qualified as an informal refund claim and was timely filed within the three-year statutory period. The government then filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that without a formally filed tax return, an informal claim must be filed within two years of payment—not three years.

Tax Refund Claim Deadlines Under Sec. 6511

Most questions about timing for refund claims involve the IRS not carrying out its duties timely. The IRS does nothing timely.

The IRS audits years in arrears, routinely forces taxpayers to extend the three year audit period for these old years, and then essentially never processes refund claims timely before the three years expires. This puts taxpayers in a position of having to review the rules in Section 6511 regularly to avoid losing refunds–often not for their own fault, but for the IRS’s inability to act timely.

The timing requirements for refund claims are set out in Section 6511 of the tax code. This section creates two different deadlines depending on whether the taxpayer has previously filed a tax return.

Section 6511(a) says that if a taxpayer must file a return, a refund claim “shall be filed by the taxpayer within 3 years from the time the return was filed or 2 years from the time the tax was paid, whichever of such periods expires the later, or if no return was filed by the taxpayer, within 2 years from the time the tax was paid.”

This creates two paths

This creates two paths: taxpayers who file returns generally have three years from the filing date to request a refund. Those who don’t file returns have only two years from the payment date. This one-year difference matters when dealing with tax audits and refund claims. Whether the 2 or 3 year period applies can be problematic for taxpayers as missing the filing deadline by even a few months can lose substantial refund amounts they would otherwise be entitled to receive.

Beyond these filing deadlines

Beyond these filing deadlines, Section 6511(b) also creates “look-back” periods that limit how much a taxpayer can recover even with a timely claim. If a claim is filed within the three-year period, the refund is limited to taxes paid within three years (plus any extension) before the claim. If the claim is not filed within that three-year period, the refund is limited to taxes paid within two years before the claim.

What Is the Informal Claim Doctrine?

Courts created the informal claim doctrine as an exception to the formal requirements for tax refund claims.

We have previously considered several cases involving informal refund claims, such as claims signed by tax attorneys, substantial variance and informal claims, and whether an IRS audit report itself an informal claim. Under these court cases, a document that doesn’t meet all the technical requirements for a formal refund claim may still work as a placeholder if it tells the IRS of the taxpayer’s intent to seek a refund.

For an informal claim to be valid, it must tell the IRS in writing that the taxpayer wants a refund. It must specify the tax year and reasons for the refund claim. And the taxpayer must follow up with a formal refund claim within a reasonable time.

The informal claim doctrine helps prevent taxpayers from losing refund rights due to technical problems, as long as they give the IRS enough notice of their claim. This doctrine helps taxpayers unfamiliar tax returns and filing requirements avoid tax litigation for not following the precise procedural filing requirements.

Courts have used this doctrine in many contexts, including cases where taxpayers sent letters, protests, or other documents that clearly showed they wanted a refund, even if these documents didn’t meet official claim requirements. The doctrine essentially favors substance over form in these situations.

How Does the Informal Claim Doctrine Interact with Sec. 6511’s Deadlines?

The main question in McDow was how the informal claim doctrine works with Section 6511’s timing requirements. Does an informal claim filed before a tax return is filed use the three-year period, or does it use the two-year deadline that applies when “no return was filed”?

The government said an informal claim cannot replace a tax return to trigger the three-year deadline. According to this view, the statute treats “claims” and “returns” as separate documents with separate purposes. While the informal claim doctrine allows an informal document to stand in for a formal refund claim, it doesn’t allow that same document to count as a tax return. Thus, the informal return was never filed for purposes of Sec. 6511.

This matters because Section 6511(a) specifically says that if “no return was filed,” the taxpayer has only two years from payment to file a refund claim. The government argued that an informal claim filed before a tax return must meet this two-year deadline to be timely.

Is a Formal Return Required?

The Court of Federal Claims looked at two key cases: Wertz v. United States and Libitzky v. United States. Both cases dealt with whether an informal claim can use the three-year deadline without a tax return.

In Wertz, another judge on the Court of Federal Claims held that an informal claim must be filed within two years of the tax payment to be timely when no return has been filed. The court said that while the IRS can waive its requirement that a claim be filed on the correct form, it cannot change Congress’s statute of limitations, which represents a waiver of sovereign immunity.

In Libitzky, the Ninth Circuit separated the “limitations period” in Section 6511(a) from the “look-back” period in Section 6511(b). The court defined a “refund claim” as a request for a refund of an overpayment, and the “tax return” as the formal filing with the IRS. The court held that an informal claim filed before a tax return must meet the two-year deadline.

After reviewing these cases, the Court of Federal Claims in McDow agreed with Wertz and Libitzky. The court said the statute requires filing a formal tax return to get the benefit of the longer look-back period. When a taxpayer files an informal claim before filing a tax return, that informal claim must be filed within two years of the tax payment to be timely.

Why Did the 2013 Refund Claim Fail?

When the court applied this to the case, it found that the informal claim for 2013 was untimely. The taxpayer filed Form 843 in December 2016, more than two years after the January 2014 payment to the IRS. While the form might have qualified as an informal claim, it was filed too late to meet the two-year deadline.

The taxpayer also argued that his attempted April 2015 electronic filing should count as a tax return for purposes of the statute of limitations, which would give his Form 843 the benefit of the three-year period. But the court rejected this argument. The court noted that because the IRS rejected the filing, the taxpayer needed to refile. Since the IRS did not consider the rejected filing as a valid return, and the taxpayer did not formally file a return until 2018, the informal claim was subject to the stricter two-year deadline.

The court emphasized that when an electronically filed tax return is rejected, the taxpayer must refile for it to be considered filed. This puts the responsibility on taxpayers to ensure their electronic filings are accepted rather than assuming rejected submissions count as filed returns.

The Takeaway

This case clarifies how the informal claim doctrine works with Section 6511’s timing requirements. An informal claim filed before a tax return must meet the two-year deadline from payment to be timely. This preserves the difference between claims and returns while still allowing the informal claim doctrine to work as an equitable remedy in appropriate cases. For taxpayers seeking refunds, the message is clear: file tax returns promptly, follow up on rejected electronic filings, and watch the deadlines for refund claims. When electronic filings are rejected, taxpayers must act quickly to refile, as rejected submissions do not count as filed returns for purposes of extending the refund claim period.

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