Paying Taxes to the IRS Prior to Filing Bankruptcy – Houston Tax Attorneys


if a taxpayer owes taxes to the IRS and other debts that might push them toward bankruptcy, is it beneficial to pay the IRS first? What if the taxes are not dischargeable in bankruptcy given the various timing rules? Would this change the answer?

For individuals, the bankruptcy process involves the appointment of a trustee. The trustee’s primary role is to collect and liquidate the debtor’s non-exempt assets and distribute the proceeds to creditors. Bankruptcy trustees routinely try to recover assets transferred by debtors prior to bankruptcy. This includes trying to “claw back” tax payments the debtor or taxpayer made to the IRS.

Trustees typically rely on state fraudulent transfer laws as the basis for these recovery actions. But what happens when the IRS is the entity receiving the payment? Can a bankruptcy trustee use state law to recover payments made to the IRS, or does sovereign immunity block such claims?

The case of United States v. Miller, No. 23-824 (U.S. Mar. 26, 2025), provides an opportunity to consider this issue. This is a Supreme Court decision that can impact whether or not to pay the IRS prior to filing bankruptcy or whether bankruptcy is even an option that should be considered by those who have paid significant amounts to the IRS.

Before getting into this issue, it should be noted that this is similar to but factually different than planning for tax refunds in bankruptcy, as there is no IRS refund to recover as the taxes were legally due in these situations.

Facts & Procedural History

The taxpayer in this case was a Utah-based transportation business. Prior to filing for bankruptcy, two of the company’s shareholders misappropriated approximately $145,000 of company funds to pay their personal federal income tax obligations. The company received nothing in return for these payments.

Three years after these transfers occurred, the company filed for bankruptcy. Shortly after his appointment, the bankruptcy trustee filed suit against the United States under Section 544(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, seeking to avoid the tax payments made to the IRS.

The company was insolvent when the transfers were made. The trustee cited Utah’s fraudulent transfer statute as the “applicable law” for his Section 544(b) claim. He argued that the payments would be voidable under that law because the company was insolvent and received no value in return.

The government moved for summary judgment, arguing that the trustee could not satisfy Section 544(b)’s “actual creditor” requirement because, outside of bankruptcy, any creditor’s fraudulent transfer claim against the United States under Utah law would be barred by sovereign immunity. The Bankruptcy Court rejected this argument and ruled for the trustee, holding that Section 106(a) of the Bankruptcy Code waived the government’s sovereign immunity for both the Section 544(b) claim itself and the underlying state law claim.

The District Court adopted the Bankruptcy Court’s decision, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed. The case then proceeded to the Supreme Court on the government’s petition for certiorari.

The Bankruptcy Code’s Avoidance Powers

Section 544 of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes bankruptcy trustees to recover assets for the bankruptcy estate. These “avoidance powers” serve multiple objectives: they help maximize the value of the estate by recovering assets that might otherwise be lost, and they promote equal treatment of creditors by preventing preferential transfers outside the formal bankruptcy process.

Section 544 contains two distinct avoidance mechanisms. Under Section 544(a), known as the “strong-arm” provision, a trustee can avoid transfers that would be voidable by certain hypothetical creditors. This applies “whether or not such a creditor exists.” This provision gives trustees the rights of a hypothetical lien creditor or bona fide purchaser, regardless of whether any actual creditor holds such rights.

Section 544(b), in contrast, allows a trustee to “avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor… that is voidable under applicable law by a creditor holding an unsecured claim.” Unlike Section 544(a), this rule requires the trustee to identify an actual creditor who could avoid the transfer under applicable non-bankruptcy law.

The “applicable law” referenced in Section 544(b) typically consists of state fraudulent transfer statutes. These laws, which have been adopted in similar forms across most states, including Texas, allow creditors to invalidate certain transfers made by insolvent debtors or transfers made with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors.

The Sovereign Immunity Waiver in Bankruptcy

Another concept to consider for this issue is sovereign immunity. Sovereign immunity is a defense that generally shields the federal government from lawsuits absent a statute where Congress has explicitly waived this immunity. In the bankruptcy context, Congress has provided a limited waiver of sovereign immunity in Section 106 of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 106(a)(1) states that “sovereign immunity is abrogated as to a governmental unit to the extent set forth in this section with respect to” 59 different provisions of the Code, including Section 544. Section 106(a)(5) adds an important qualification, however, providing that “[n]othing in this section shall create any substantive claim for relief or cause of action not otherwise existing” under other law.

The question in Miller was whether Section 106(a)’s waiver extends only to the federal cause of action created by Section 544(b) or whether it also reaches the underlying state law cause of action that supplies the “applicable law” for that federal claim.

Sovereign Immunity and Substantive Rights

The Supreme Court has consistently treated sovereign immunity waivers as jurisdictional in nature. This means that it operates to deprive courts of the power to hear suits against the United States absent Congress’s express consent.

Importantly, waivers of sovereign immunity are typically understood as “prerequisite[s] for jurisdiction” rather than as provisions that create substantive rights or alter pre-existing ones. The Court has maintained a clear distinction between the question of whether sovereign immunity has been waived and the separate question of whether the source of substantive law provides a cause of action against the government.

This distinction is is important in the bankruptcy tax context. If Section 106(a) merely waives sovereign immunity for Section 544(b) claims without altering their substantive requirements, then a trustee still has to identify an actual creditor who could avoid the transfer under applicable law outside of bankruptcy—including overcoming any sovereign immunity barriers that would exist in that context.

The Supreme Court’s Decision

The Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit in this case, holding that Section 106(a)’s sovereign immunity waiver applies only to the Section 544(b) claim itself and not to any state law claims nested within that federal claim.

The Court’s analysis focused on the text, context, and structure of Section 106 and Section 544. It emphasized that Section 106(a)(5) expressly states that the waiver provision does not “create any substantive claim for relief or cause of action not otherwise existing” under other law. This language, the Court reasoned, directly contradicts the notion that Section 106(a) modifies the substantive elements of a Section 544(b) claim.

The Court also pointed to the contrast between Sections 544(a) and 544(b). While subsection (a) explicitly allows a trustee to avoid transfers that a hypothetical creditor could have avoided “whether or not such a creditor exists,” subsection (b) contains no such language. This difference reflects a deliberate choice by Congress to tie the trustee’s powers under Section 544(b) to the rights of an actual creditor under applicable law.

The majority rejected the argument that its reading would render Section 106(a)’s waiver meaningless with respect to Section 544. The Court noted that the waiver still enables trustees to bring Section 544(a) claims against the government, which have no actual-creditor requirement. Additionally, the waiver grants federal courts jurisdiction to hear Section 544(b) claims against state governments that have consented to being sued under their fraudulent transfer statutes.

Justice Gorsuch authored a lone dissent, arguing that the majority confused sovereign immunity with the requirements of a substantive claim. He contended that a valid fraudulent transfer claim existed under Utah law, and Section 106(a) simply prevented the government from raising sovereign immunity as a procedural defense to that claim.

What About Other Recovery Methods?

The Court’s decision leaves open some alternative approaches for bankruptcy trustees seeking to recover transfers to the federal government. For instance, trustees might still pursue avoidance actions under Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code, which creates a federal fraudulent transfer cause of action that does not rely on state law. However, Section 548 has a shorter lookback period (two years) compared to many state fraudulent transfer statutes (often four years or more).

The Court also noted an alternative theory that the trustee had proposed: whether a trustee could satisfy the actual-creditor requirement by showing that state law would permit a creditor to void the tax payment by suing someone other than the United States, such as the shareholders who orchestrated the transfers. The Court declined to address this theory, leaving it for consideration on remand.

Additionally, trustees might still be able to pursue avoidance claims against governmental entities where those entities have expressly waived their immunity from suit under relevant state laws. Some states have chosen to subject themselves to potential liability under their own fraudulent transfer statutes, and Section 106(a) would grant federal courts jurisdiction to hear Section 544(b) suits against those states.

Dischargeable vs. Non-Dischargeable Taxes

Those considering whether to pay the IRS before filing bankruptcy also have to distinguish between dischargeable and non-dischargeable tax debts.

For non-dischargeable taxes (such as recent income taxes less than three years old, trust fund taxes, or taxes where returns were filed late), paying the IRS first may make sense given that these debts would survive bankruptcy anyway. By paying these non-dischargeable taxes before filing, the taxpayer potentially stops additional interest and penalties from accruing while addressing other dischargeable debts through the bankruptcy process.

However, for older income taxes that might be dischargeable (generally those more than three years old, filed more than two years ago, and assessed more than 240 days ago), the analysis changes. In these cases, the Miller decision creates a complex dynamic: paying potentially dischargeable tax debts before bankruptcy might prevent those funds from being available to pay other creditors, but the payment to the IRS is now more secure against recovery by the trustee. Had the taxpayer waited and included those dischargeable taxes in the bankruptcy, those funds might have been distributed differently among all creditors–which could be beneficial or not beneficial–depending on whether the other debts are dischargeable or not. Timing and sequencing of payments and bankruptcy filing impacts this.

The Takeaway

The Supreme Court’s decision in this case significantly restricts a bankruptcy trustee’s ability to recover tax payments from the IRS using state fraudulent transfer laws. The ruling highlights the strategic taxpayers have to consider when they have both tax debts and other financial obligations. For taxes that would be non-dischargeable anyway, paying the IRS first may be advantageous since these debts would survive bankruptcy and the payments are now more secure from clawback actions. However, for potentially dischargeable tax debts, taxpayers have to weigh whether paying these taxes before bankruptcy makes sense, as these funds might otherwise be distributed to all creditors in the bankruptcy.

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Natural disasters can be expensive. This is particularly true for those who own or have an interest in real estate.

Our tax laws provide some relief through casualty loss deductions and theft loss deductions. But what happens when someone pays to repair property they don’t legally own? This question is particularly relevant when parents continue to financially support their adult children by paying for property repairs after a disaster. Can they claim the casualty loss deduction on their own tax returns?

The recent case of Taylor v. Commissioner, T.C. Summary Opinion 2025-10 (March 3, 2025), addresses this situation and provides an opportunity to consider the ownership requirement for casualty loss deductions.

Facts & Procedural History

The taxpayer and his then-spouse acquired real estate in Texas in 1992. Following their divorce in 2000, the taxpayer-husband transferred his interest to his wife via a special warranty deed.

The taxpayer-wife died in 2007 and her minor daughters inherited the property. The taxpayer-husband was appointed guardian of the estate for his then-minor daughters.

The daughters reached adulthood by 2012, so the taxpayer-husband transferred the property to the children via a deed. When Hurricane Harvey struck in 2017, the property was owned by the taxpayer-husband’s now adult daughters. The taxpayer-husband did not live in the property in 2017.

The taxpayer-husband paid expenses to repair the damage to the property and he paid the insurance on the property. He claimed a $49,500 casualty loss deduction on his 2017 tax return for the damage.

The IRS conducted a tax audit and issued a Notice of Deficiency in 2021, determining a deficiency of $17,537 in federal income tax and an accuracy-related penalty under Section 6662(a). The IRS did not challenge the substantiation for the casualty loss deduction, as it normally does. Rather, it challenged the deduction on the basis of the taxpayer’s ownership of the property.

The taxpayer petitioned the U.S. Tax Court, challenging the IRS’s determination. The question for the court was whether the taxpayer-husband is entitled to a tax loss for the property that he used to own given that he paid for the repairs to the property.

About Casualty Loss Deductions

Section 165(a) of the tax code provides for a tax loss deduction for “any loss sustained during the taxable year and not compensated for by insurance or otherwise.” This is a very broad provision. This broad provision is then narrowed by specific limitations that are set out in the tax code.

Specifically, for individual taxpayers, Section 165(c) restricts deductible losses to three categories:

  1. Losses incurred in a trade or business
  2. Losses incurred in transactions entered into for profit, though not connected with a trade or business
  3. Personal losses arising from “fire, storm, shipwreck, or other casualty, or from theft”

The third category—personal casualty losses—enables taxpayers to deduct losses from sudden, unexpected events like hurricanes, floods, and fires. These deductions provide important tax relief for taxpayers facing significant financial setbacks due to disasters and other unexpected events.

The Ownership Requirement for Casualty Losses

While Section 165 itself doesn’t explicitly say that there is an ownership requirement, the courts have consistently held that only the owner of property at the time of a casualty can claim the resulting loss deduction. This judicial interpretation reflects the fundamental purpose of the casualty loss provision: to provide tax relief to those who have suffered an economic loss from damage to their property.

The leading case establishing this principle is Draper v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 135 (1950), where the Tax Court denied a casualty loss deduction to a taxpayer who replaced his adult daughter’s property destroyed in a fire. The court held that since the taxpayer didn’t own the property, he couldn’t claim the deduction, regardless of his financial contribution to replacing the items.

This ownership requirement continues to be enforced in more recent cases. In Rogers v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2019-90, the Tax Court reaffirmed that “a casualty loss deduction is authorized only when the claimant is the owner of the property with respect to which the loss is claimed.”

Paying for Someone Else’s Property Repairs

Many taxpayers voluntarily pay expenses for property they don’t own–particularly when helping family members. That is the situation in the Taylor case.

These payments might include:

  1. Parents paying repair costs for properties owned by their adult children
  2. Individuals paying expenses for properties owned by elderly parents
  3. Taxpayers contributing to repairs for damaged properties in their communities

When these payments are made out of generosity or family support, they generally do not create a deductible interest in the property for tax purposes. The IRS and courts consistently maintain that paying expenses for someone else’s property–regardless of the amount or reason–does not transfer the casualty loss deduction to the payer.

From a tax perspective, voluntary payments for property expenses are more akin to gifts than investments creating deductible interests. This principle applies even in cases where the taxpayer previously owned the property or has an emotional attachment to it.

The court in Taylor acknowledged that the taxpayer may have paid for the repairs to the damaged property. However, it found that these voluntary payments did not establish a deductible interest in the property under Section 165. The court noted that a tax deduction for a casualty loss for property is allocated to the person who owned the property and incurred the economic loss, not to those who voluntarily pay to repair it. Citing Draper v. Commissioner, the court reaffirmed that a taxpayer cannot claim casualty loss deductions for property owned by adult children, even if the taxpayer pays for expenses related to that property.

Exceptions to the Ownership Rule

While the general rule requires legal ownership for casualty loss deductions, tax law recognizes certain limited exceptions where non-title holders might claim such deductions. These exceptions generally involve taxpayers who have economic interests in the property despite not holding legal title:

  1. Equitable ownership – where a taxpayer is making payments under a contract to purchase property but hasn’t yet received formal title
  2. Leasehold interests – where a tenant has made substantial improvements to leased property
  3. Life estates and remainder interests – where the taxpayer holds a legally recognized partial interest
  4. Properties held in certain trust arrangements where the taxpayer maintains beneficial ownership

Taxpayers who wish to maintain tax benefits while supporting family members might consider alternative approaches based on these interests. With a little tax planning, such as converting a house to a rental property (rental property losses would fall under the business/profit-seeking categories of Section 165(c) rather than personal casualty losses), maximizing partial asset dispositions, etc., the taxpayer very well may be able to claim the casualty loss for property that they do not own. Suffice it to say that these approaches should be implemented with proper documentation and genuine economic substance to withstand IRS scrutiny.

The Takeaway

This case reiterates that a casualty loss deduction goes to the owner. The taxpayer has to own the property that suffered the damage. Simply paying for repairs or maintenance does not transfer the deduction to the payer, regardless of family relationships or previous ownership history. When supporting family members with property expenses, taxpayers should understand that these payments generally don’t create tax benefits. If tax considerations are important, alternative arrangements that maintain legitimate ownership interests should be established before a casualty occurs.

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In 40 minutes, we’ll teach you how to survive an IRS audit.

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