Can Judge-Made Doctrine Override Tax Deductions Allowed by Congress? – Houston Tax Attorneys


The tax code provides specific rules for when taxpayers can claim deductions for losses. These are rules enacted by Congress.

There are other so-called “judicial doctrines” that allow the courts to override the rules set by Congress. There are several of these that frequently come up in tax disputes, such as the economic substance doctrine (which was codified into law), the step transaction doctrine, etc. We have covered many of these doctrines in prior articles. We have not addressed the public policy doctrine.

The “public policy doctrine” allows courts to deny tax deductions that would otherwise be perfectly legal under the tax code when allowing such deductions would “frustrate” public policy.

The U.S. Tax Court recently applied this doctrine in Hampton v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2025-32, to disallow a tax loss when the government seized assets of a business for the wrongdoing of the owner. This gets into issues of separation of powers, and how far the courts can go in overriding the rules set by Congress.

Facts & Procedural History

The taxpayer in this case was a stock broker. He operated as an S corporation, and was 100% owner of the S corporation.

In 2009, the taxpayer worked out an arrangement with his high school friend who had been appointed as the deputy treasurer of the State of Ohio. The arrangement involved the deputy treasurer directing trading business from the State of Ohio to the taxpayer, with the taxpayer sharing portions of his commissions with the deputy treasurer and two associates. The payments were aledged to have been disguised as legal fees or business loans. The taxpayer received approximately $3.2 million in commissions from these trades and paid about $524,000 to the conspirators.

In 2013, the taxpayer pleaded guilty to charges of bribery, fraud, and money laundering. In 2014, he was sentenced to 45 months in prison and ordered to forfeit approximately $2.2 million. In 2016, while he was incarcerated, the U.S. Marshals Service seized $1,182,543.71 in funds from seven bank accounts held in the name of either the taxpayer or his S corporation.

On its 2016 Form 1120S, the S corporation claimed a deduction of $855,882 for the forfeiture of its seized accounts. As the S corporation’s sole shareholder, the taxpayer reported this loss on his individual tax return. The IRS audited the tax return and disallowed the deduction for the tax loss. The taxpayer filed a petition with the tax court for review.

About the Public Policy Doctrine

The public policy doctrine is a judicial doctrine the courts have cited for denying tax deductions that would “frustrate sharply defined national or state policies proscribing particular types of conduct, evidenced by some governmental declaration thereof.” This principle was articulated by the Supreme Court in Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30, 33-34 (1958).

This is not a rule created by Congress through legislation. Instead, it was developed by judges who decided that some tax deductions, though technically allowed by the tax code, should nevertheless be denied on public policy grounds. This represents a significant judicial encroachment on what would normally be the legislative domain of determining which deductions are allowable.

The doctrine is particularly applicable to tax penalties imposed by the government–in addition to income tax due resulting from the denial of tax deductions. As the Supreme Court explained, the “[d]eduction of fines and penalties uniformly has been held to frustrate state policy in severe and direct fashion by reducing the ‘sting’ of the penalty prescribed by the state legislature.” The underlying rationale is that allowing a tax deduction for a government-imposed penalty would effectively reduce the financial impact of that penalty, thereby undermining its deterrent effect.

How Does the Public Policy Doctrine Override Section 165?

Section 165(a) of the tax code allows a deduction for “any loss sustained during the taxable year and not compensated for by insurance or otherwise.” For individual taxpayers, the deduction is limited to losses incurred in a trade or business, in transactions entered into for profit, or in certain cases of casualty or theft. Notably, the text of Section 165 contains no exception for losses resulting from criminal forfeitures or other penalties.

In 1969, Congress partially codified the public policy doctrine by amending Section 162 of the tax code (which is the general provision that allows for business tax deductions) to explicitly disallow deductions for fines and penalties paid to a government for violation of law. However, Congress did not make similar amendments to Section 165 (which is the provision for deducting tax losses). This raises the question: Did Congress intend to limit the public policy doctrine to Section 162 deductions, leaving Section 165 free from such judicial restrictions?

The courts have not followed this distinction. The courts have applied the public policy doctrine to Section 165 deductions. For example, the Federal Circuit did so in Nacchio v. United States, 824 F.3d 1370, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2016). In that case, the court explicitly stated that “§165 is subject to a ‘frustration of public policy’ doctrine.”

When Can Courts Override the Plain Language of the Tax Code?

How far courts are willing to go and should they be allowed to go in applying the public policy doctrine–even when doing so requires overriding the plain language of the tax code?

Under a strict reading of Section 165 and the S corporation flow-through rules under Section 1366, the taxpayer here would appear to be entitled to deduct his share of the S corporation’s loss from the asset forfeiture (there was an assignment issue for assigning income thath the court didn’t get to, which may also have been a problem had the court gotten to that issue–but that is beyond the scope of this article).

Section 165 allows deductions for “any loss” with certain limitations that don’t explicitly exclude criminal forfeitures. Section 1366(a) provides that an S corporation shareholder “shall take into account” his pro rata share of the corporation’s income or loss. Nothing in the text of either provision suggests an exception for losses resulting from criminal activity.

Yet the tax court determined that the public policy doctrine overrode these statutory provisions. The court held that even if the S corporation was entitled to claim a deduction (a question the court did not decide), the taxpayer as an individual was barred by the public policy doctrine from reporting his 100% passthrough share of the S corporation’s resulting loss on his individual return.

The court’s rationale was that allowing the taxpayer to deduct the loss would frustrate the sharply defined policy against conspiring to commit offenses against the United States. The taxpayer was the Purported wrongdoer, and the S corporation’s assets were somehow seized as part of a penalty for his wrongdoing. The court did not get into how the denial of a deduction is not a tax penalty, and the code already provides for tax penalties–no doubt which also applied. Thus, apparently the taxpayer should be double penalized–with a tax penalty (probably more than one) and then again by the loss of his tax deduction. According to the court, allowing the taxpayer a deduction would unquestionably reduce the “sting” of the penalty (which a forfeiture is not a penalty), regardless of what the tax code actually says about such tax deductions.

How Far Can Courts Extend the Public Policy Doctrine?

The tax court emphasized that the public policy doctrine is not constrained by formalistic distinctions between legal entities. This is similar to the rules that apply when a taxpayer transfers assets to a spouse to avoid IRS collections. The court cited Holmes Enterprises, Inc. v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 114 (1977), where a corporation claimed a deduction for the criminal forfeiture of a car it owned after its sole owner and president was convicted on illegal drug charges.

In Holmes, the tax court concluded that although the corporation was a “separate, taxable entity, distinct from its employee,” the public policy doctrine forbade it from claiming a deduction because it was not a “wholly innocent bystander.” Due to the convicted person’s role as the corporation’s sole owner and president, the corporation “knew of and fully consented to the illegal use of its automobile.”

This reasoning shows how courts have expanded the public policy doctrine to deny deductions not just to convicted individuals, but also to closely related entities, even when those entities themselves haven’t been charged with any crime. This judicial expansion extends the doctrine well beyond what Congress explicitly codified in Section 162(f).

Can a Taxpayer Challenge Judicial Overreach Through a Tax Deduction?

The taxpayer in this case argued that the application of the public policy doctrine should be limited because the United States’ seizure of the S corp’s assets violated due process and was “over-zealous” given that the S corp was not the wrongdoer. However, the tax court found no legal impropriety in the seizure of the S corp’s assets to satisfy the taxpayer’s forfeiture liability.

The court relied on the Sixth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Parenteau, 647 F. App’x 593 (6th Cir. 2016), which held that a corporation wholly owned by an individual convicted of a criminal conspiracy was not a person “other than the defendant” for purposes of forfeiture proceedings. The Sixth Circuit cited relevant factors including that the defendant wholly owned and controlled the corporation, that the corporation did not follow corporate formalities, and that the defendant used the corporation’s property in his criminal scheme.

By analogy, the tax court concluded that the S corporation in this case was not separate from the taxpayer as an individual for purposes of the substitute forfeiture provisions. The taxpayer wholly owned and controlled the S corp, offered minimal evidence that corporate formalities were followed, and the S corp’s sole source of business income was the commissions generated by the taxpayer that were “assigned” to the S corp—the very commissions that led to the criminal indictment, plea, and forfeiture. This is consistent with the court’s prior rulings that apply various judicial doctrines to S corporations.

Is There Any Limit to Judicial Override of Tax Code Provisions?

The tax court also rejected the taxpayer’s argument that the public policy doctrine’s application should be affected by alleged illegality or over-zealousness on the government’s part in seizing the assets. Both the Fourth Circuit and the tax court have previously indicated that the alleged illegality of a criminal forfeiture need not prevent the public policy doctrine from disallowing a deduction for the forfeited property.

In Hackworth v. Commissioner, 155 F. App’x 627, 632 (4th Cir. 2005), the Fourth Circuit stated: “If the taxpayers believe that the forfeiture was invalid, the proper remedy is for them to sue the [relevant government unit] and seek return of the funds [rather than claim a tax deduction].” Similarly, in the tax court’s decision in Hackworth, the court stated: “This Court lacks jurisdiction over [the taxpayers’] collateral attack on the forfeiture.”

This principle further demonstrates the power of the public policy doctrine as a judicial override of tax code provisions. Even if a taxpayer believes that a forfeiture was illegal or improper, courts will not allow them to deduct the loss under Section 165. Instead, they must challenge the forfeiture directly in another forum—a requirement found nowhere in the text of the tax code itself.

The Takeaway

This case shows how the judge-made public policy doctrine can override explicit provisions of the tax code. Despite clear statutory language allowing deductions for business losses and requiring S corporation shareholders to report their share of corporate losses, the tax court denied the taxpayer’s deduction based on a doctrine created by judges, not legislators. The tax law as written by Congress can be trumped by judicial doctrines when courts determine that public policy would be frustrated by allowing certain deductions. Taxpayers facing criminal forfeitures should understand that the public policy doctrine enables courts to disallow deductions that would otherwise be permitted under a plain reading of the tax code, particularly when there is a direct connection between criminal activity and the forfeited assets.

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When someone has an undisclosed foreign bank account that the government has not yet assessed penalties for and they die, can the government still pursue the penalties?

The answer hinges on a fundamental legal classification that courts are actively debating—are FBAR penalties primarily punitive fines or remedial damages? If FBAR penalties are primarily punitive, they might extinguish upon death like other penal sanctions. If they’re primarily remedial, they survive as claims against the estate.

With potential penalties reaching millions of dollars, this distinction could determine whether beneficiaries receive their intended inheritance or whether an estate is largely consumed by government penalties. A recent case United States v. Leeds, No. 22-cv-01234 (D. Idaho March 7, 2025), addresses this issue.

Facts & Procedural History

The taxpayer here was a U.S. citizen. He died in November of 2021. Prior to his death, he had maintained two Swiss bank accounts for more than three decades.

The first account was opened in his name at EFG Bank in 1980. The second account was opened at the same bank in 1997 under the name of an entity that the taxpayer controlled as director and beneficial owner.

Throughout his life, the taxpayer took extraordinary measures to conceal these accounts from the IRS. He used pseudonyms to manage the accounts. He implemented “hold mail” instructions to prevent receiving documentation at his residence. He even consistently denied having foreign accounts when directly asked by his accountant and on his tax returns.

During the tax years at issue (2006-2012), the taxpayer maintained more than half his total income in these accounts. For example, while his original tax return for 2006 reported income of $67,178, his later amended return disclosed his actual income was $184,766, with the difference largely attributable to undisclosed foreign income.

In 2014, with FATCA implementation looming and Swiss banks preparing to share account information with the U.S., the IRS began investigating the taxpayer. He initially applied for the Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program (“OVDP”) but later opted out. After examination, the IRS determined his FBAR violations were willful and in September 2020 assessed penalties totaling approximately $1.5 million.

After the taxpayer’s death, the government filed an action in federal district court against his widow, in her capacity as personal representative of his estate, seeking over $2 million in willful FBAR penalties, late-payment penalties, and interest. The widow was appointed as personal representative solely for defending against this tax litigation, as no formal probate proceedings had been initiated. Following discovery, the government moved for summary judgment against the estate, which resulted in the court’s opinion in this case.

FBAR Requirements and Penalties

The Bank Secrecy Act requires U.S. persons (including estates) to file an FBAR reporting foreign financial accounts exceeding $10,000 in aggregate value during the calendar year. These reports must be filed electronically by April 15 of the following year, with an automatic extension to October 15.

The penalties for non-compliance vary significantly based on whether the violation is deemed willful or non-willful. Non-willful violations carry a maximum penalty of $10,000 per violation. Willful violations, however, result in much harsher penalties: the greater of $100,000 or 50% of the account balance at the time of the violation. We have addressed various aspects of these rules in several other articles on this website, such as there being no collection remedies for FBAR penalties and there being no minimum limit on willful penalties.

In this case, the willful FBAR penalties assessed against the taxpayer were approximately $1.5 million, with late-payment penalties and interest bringing the total to over $2 million by the time of the government’s action against his estate.

Penal vs. Remedial Sanction?

The taxpayer’s widow argued that the FBAR penalties were “extinguished” when the taxpayer died. This argument is based on the long-standing legal principle that purely penal sanctions abate upon death, while remedial ones survive.

The distinction makes intuitive sense—punishment serves no purpose when the wrongdoer is deceased, but compensation for damages remains valid regardless of the wrongdoer’s status.

To determine whether a penalty is penal or remedial, court in this case applied factors from Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99-100 (1997), examining whether the sanction:

  1. Involves an affirmative disability or restraint
  2. Has historically been regarded as punishment
  3. Comes into play only on a finding of scienter (knowledge of wrongdoing)
  4. Promotes retribution and deterrence
  5. Applies to behavior that is already a crime
  6. Has an alternative purpose
  7. Appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose

In applying these factors, the court concluded that FBAR penalties are “primarily remedial with incidental penal effects” for purposes of survival. Under this classification, the penalties survived Richard’s death and remained enforceable against his estate.

Remedial for Survival, Punitive for the 8th Amendment

The court also addressed whether these same FBAR penalties constitute “fines” subject to the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause. This raises the question as to how can a penalty be remedial enough to survive death but punitive enough to qualify as a “fine” under the Constitution?

This precise issue has created a circuit split. The First Circuit in United States v. Toth, 33 F.4th 1 (1st Cir. 2022) held that FBAR penalties are not “fines” under the Eighth Amendment because they merely represent “liquidated damages” that compensate the government for investigation costs. The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Toth, though Justice Gorsuch dissented, criticizing the government for making no effort to prove the remedial nature of the penalties.

In direct conflict, the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Schwarzbaum, No. 22-14058 (11th Cir. Jan. 23, 2025) held that FBAR penalties are “fines” subject to Eighth Amendment review because they are calculated “irrespective of the magnitude of financial injury to the United States.” In Schwarzbaum, the court found a $300,000 penalty for failing to report a $16,000 account was “grossly disproportional” and violated the Constitution.

In the present case, the court found the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning more persuasive, concluding that while FBAR penalties have remedial aspects sufficient to survive death, they also have significant punitive characteristics that trigger Eighth Amendment scrutiny. The court acknowledged this apparent contradiction in a footnote, stating that the conclusion “is not inconsistent” because “the test in the Excessive Fines context remains whether the purpose of the penalty is solely compensatory.”

Why This Matters for Executors

This contradiction creates both uncertainty and opportunity for executors. If the Supreme Court eventually resolves the circuit split by deciding that FBAR penalties are primarily punitive, it could undermine the rationale for their survival after death. This would fundamentally change how executors handle estates with unreported foreign accounts.

Until such resolution occurs, executors should approach estates with potential FBAR issues with caution, understanding that:

  1. Currently, courts uniformly hold that FBAR penalties survive death and remain enforceable against estates.
  2. The constitutional question about whether these penalties are “fines” subject to Eighth Amendment protection remains unresolved, with a clear circuit split.
  3. Even in jurisdictions following Schwarzbaum and Leeds, where FBAR penalties are considered “fines,” the excessive fines analysis only provides protection against grossly disproportional penalties—not against all penalties.
  4. The Leeds case created an important distinction between estate liability and personal liability, finding that penalties that were not excessive against the taxpayer’s estate would be excessive if imposed against the surviving spouse personally due to her lack of knowledge about the accounts.

The Takeaway

For executors, this case explains that FBAR penalties survive death and remain enforceable against the estate regardless of how they’re classified for constitutional purposes. However, the seemingly conflicting legal analysis—remedial enough to survive death but potentially punitive enough for Eighth Amendment protection—suggests this area of law may continue to evolve. The constitutional classification of FBAR penalties as “fines” offers a potential defense against grossly disproportional penalties, but doesn’t currently change the fundamental rule that these obligations survive the death of the account holder and must be addressed during estate administration.

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In 40 minutes, we’ll teach you how to survive an IRS audit.

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