Distributions From Forfeited IRA are Not Taxable – Houston Tax Attorneys


You commit a crime, you are convicted, and you do your time. Then the IRS steps in to collect taxes. The IRS takes your assets to pay the tax that arose from your criminal activity.

As part of this, the IRS seizes your IRA funds. Are you responsible for paying income taxes on the IRA distribution–even through you never received the money and you did not have control over the IRA at the time the funds are withdrawn?

The recent Sixth Circuit decision in Hubbard v. Commissioner, No. 24-1450 (6th Cir. Mar. 19, 2025), considers whether a taxpayer must pay income tax on IRA funds that were forfeited to the government following a criminal conviction.

Facts & Procedural History

The taxpayer in this case was a pharmacist who owned and operated a pharmacy in eastern Kentucky. His business generated substantial income, allowing him to acquire multiple homes, luxury vehicles, a boat, jet skis, and establish an IRA. By 2017, his IRA had nearly $500,000 in untaxed money.

The source of the taxpayer’s wealth, however, was illegal. He operated what courts described as a “pill mill,” selling large quantities of oxycodone to those addicted to the drug and supplying pseudoephedrine to methamphetamine manufacturers. Following criminal proceedings, a jury convicted the taxpayer of drug and money-laundering offenses. This resulted in a 30-year prison sentence. Importantly, there were no tax fraud charges.

As part of the criminal case, prosecutors invoked criminal forfeiture laws to seize the taxpayer’s assets acquired with proceeds from his illegal activities. The district court ordered the forfeiture of specific property—his homes, vehicles, watercraft, and financial accounts, including his IRA—to the IRS.

In 2017, the IRS seized the nearly $500,000 from the taxpayer’s IRA. The IRS treated this seizure as a taxable distribution to the taxpayer. While the taxpayer was in prison, the IRS sent him a notice of deficiency claiming he owed nearly $300,000 in combined in income taxes, early withdrawal penalty, and interest and penalties for failing to file a tax return.

The taxpayer challenged this notice in tax court

The taxpayer challenged this notice in tax court. He argued that the tax liability “should be paid by [the] feds” since his account “was forfeited to” them. Although the IRS conceded that the taxpayer shouldn’t have to pay the early withdrawal penalty, it maintained that he still owed income taxes. The tax court sided with the IRS, finding that the taxpayer owed taxes and penalties. This appeal followed, which reversed the tax court.

Understanding Criminal Forfeiture

Criminal forfeiture laws allow the government to seize property connected to illegal activity to “ensure that crime does not pay.” While English common law permitted authorities to confiscate all of a convicted defendant’s property, American forfeiture laws typically target only “specific assets” with a connection to the crime.

The Sixth Circuit explained that there are two general types of forfeitures in our legal system, i.e., a specific property forfeiture and a personal money judgment forfeiture. The tax implications are not the same for each type.

What is a Specific Property Forfeiture?

The first type of forfeiture identifies “specific property” that the defendant must relinquish. The government becomes the owner of this property upon conviction.

Some forfeiture laws incorporate a “relation back” doctrine that treats the government as having ownership rights in the property dating back to when the crime was committed.

This type of forfeiture resembles an “in rem” judgment because it permits the government to seize only the identified “tainted property” rather than the defendant’s other assets.

What is a Personal Money Judgment Forfeiture?

The second type of forfeiture is a personal money judgment. This type of forfeiture allows courts to impose a “personal money judgment” identifying a sum that the defendant must pay.

With this type of forfeiture, the court calculates this amount based on the value of the forfeitable property involved in the crimes.

This type of forfeiture resembles an “in personam” judgment because the government may collect the debt from any of the defendant’s current or future assets.

Which Type Applied In Hubbard’s Case?

This case involved a specific property forfeiture. The district court identified specific property subject to forfeiture—including his IRA—and ordered the IRS to seize only these assets. The court did not enter a personal money judgment against the taxpayer.

The order stated that the forfeited assets “shall be forfeited to the United States and no right, title, or interest in the property shall exist in any other party.” This meant that the government became the IRA’s owner at the time of the order.

Distributions from Forfeited IRAs, Generally

Questions about gross income start with Section 61(a) of the tax code. Section 61(a) says that “gross income means all income from whatever source derived.” This broad language is intentional. It reflects Congress’s intent to exercise its full constitutional taxing power under the Sixteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court has consistently interpreted this provision broadly, holding that it covers “all economic gains” not specifically exempted by statute. The breadth of Section 61(a) extends beyond direct cash receipts to include just about all forms of economic benefit.

Beyond this general definition, Section 408(d)(1) specifically addresses IRA distributions, stating that “any amount paid or distributed out of an individual retirement plan shall be included in gross income by the payee or distributee, as the case may be.” This language is key here because it identifies who bears the tax burden—the “payee or distributee” of the funds.

These provisions would clearly apply if the taxpayer owned the IRA at the time of the distribution. But the taxpayer did not own the IRA at the time of the distribution. The government owned the IRA.

This ownership question was central to the court’s analysis. The Sixth Circuit had to determine whether the taxpayer remained the “payee or distributee” for tax purposes despite no longer owning or controlling the IRA when the funds were withdrawn.

The court concluded that once the IRS became the owner of…

The court concluded that once the IRS became the owner of the IRA through the forfeiture order, the agency—not the taxpayer—became the “[o]ne to whom money [was] paid or payable” and the “beneficiary entitled to payment” under ordinary definitions of these terms.

Thus, the Sixth Circuit Court held that the broad language of Section 61(a) did not cause the distribution to be taxable income to the taxpayer.

Distribution from Forfeited IRA as Discharge of Debt Income

Since Section 61(a) did not work, the IRS had to find some other rationale for including this in income. The IRS argued that Subsection 61(a)(12) made the distribution income for income tax purposes.

This subsection specifically identifies “income from discharge of indebtedness” as a form of gross income. This principle, sometimes called “cancellation of debt” income, recognizes that when a taxpayer’s financial obligation is satisfied by a third party or otherwise canceled, the taxpayer has realized an economic benefit equivalent to receiving cash and using it to pay the debt.

The seminal case interpreting discharge of indebtedness as income is Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner. In that case, the Supreme Court held that when an employer paid an employee’s tax obligations directly to the government, this payment constituted additional taxable income to the employee. The Court reasoned that the “discharge” of an “obligation” was economically equivalent to a “receipt” of the same sum of money.

Courts have since applied this principle to numerous situations, including involuntary distributions from retirement accounts. For example, the tax court has held that when IRA funds are garnished to pay child support (Vorwald v. Commissioner), to satisfy tax debts (Schroeder v. Commissioner), or to pay restitution (Rodrigues v. Commissioner), the IRA owner must still pay taxes on the distributions despite never receiving the funds directly. This is even true if the debt that is cancelled is exceedingly old.

The question in this case was whether the criminal forfei…

The question in this case was whether the criminal forfeiture of the taxpayer’s IRA created a “debt” that was discharged when the IRS seized the funds. The Sixth Circuit answered this question by examining the specific type of forfeiture involved.

The court reasoned that had the district court entered a …

The court reasoned that had the district court entered a “personal money judgment” against the taxpayer, that judgment might have created a debt. In that case, the withdrawal of IRA funds might have created a tax obligation by reducing a debt the taxpayer owed.

However, since the district court instead granted the IRS ownership of the “specific property” (the IRA), the IRS did not withdraw the funds to “discharge” an “obligation” that the taxpayer owed. Rather, the IRS withdrew the funds because it owned them. As the court noted, “if the forfeiture order created a debt merely by transferring ownership of the IRA from Hubbard to the IRS, why wouldn’t the order have created a debt in Hubbard’s homes and cars too?” The court concluded that Section 61(a)(12)’s discharge of indebtedness provision did not apply because no debt was being discharged—ownership of the asset itself had changed hands through the specific property forfeiture.

As such, the Sixth Circuit Court concluded that there was no debt and the distribution from the IRA did not create cancellation of debt income.

The Takeaway

This decision highlights the distinction between different types of forfeitures and their tax consequences. When the government obtains ownership of specific property through forfeiture (rather than imposing a money judgment), the former owner may not be liable for taxes on subsequent transactions involving that property. For IRA accounts specifically, this means that when the government becomes the owner through forfeiture, it—not the former account holder—becomes the “payee or distributee” responsible for any tax consequences from withdrawals.

The IRS may not be able to distinguish between the types of forfeited IRAs, as the custodians will likely just issue Forms 1099R and that will start the IRS assessment process. Those who have been assessed tax on forfeited IRAs in the past and those that will likely continue in the future should consider their options based on this case, which may include filing refund claims, or challenging the IRS on this issue as the taxpayer did in this case.

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When someone has an undisclosed foreign bank account that the government has not yet assessed penalties for and they die, can the government still pursue the penalties?

The answer hinges on a fundamental legal classification that courts are actively debating—are FBAR penalties primarily punitive fines or remedial damages? If FBAR penalties are primarily punitive, they might extinguish upon death like other penal sanctions. If they’re primarily remedial, they survive as claims against the estate.

With potential penalties reaching millions of dollars, this distinction could determine whether beneficiaries receive their intended inheritance or whether an estate is largely consumed by government penalties. A recent case United States v. Leeds, No. 22-cv-01234 (D. Idaho March 7, 2025), addresses this issue.

Facts & Procedural History

The taxpayer here was a U.S. citizen. He died in November of 2021. Prior to his death, he had maintained two Swiss bank accounts for more than three decades.

The first account was opened in his name at EFG Bank in 1980. The second account was opened at the same bank in 1997 under the name of an entity that the taxpayer controlled as director and beneficial owner.

Throughout his life, the taxpayer took extraordinary measures to conceal these accounts from the IRS. He used pseudonyms to manage the accounts. He implemented “hold mail” instructions to prevent receiving documentation at his residence. He even consistently denied having foreign accounts when directly asked by his accountant and on his tax returns.

During the tax years at issue (2006-2012), the taxpayer maintained more than half his total income in these accounts. For example, while his original tax return for 2006 reported income of $67,178, his later amended return disclosed his actual income was $184,766, with the difference largely attributable to undisclosed foreign income.

In 2014, with FATCA implementation looming and Swiss banks preparing to share account information with the U.S., the IRS began investigating the taxpayer. He initially applied for the Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program (“OVDP”) but later opted out. After examination, the IRS determined his FBAR violations were willful and in September 2020 assessed penalties totaling approximately $1.5 million.

After the taxpayer’s death

After the taxpayer’s death, the government filed an action in federal district court against his widow, in her capacity as personal representative of his estate, seeking over $2 million in willful FBAR penalties, late-payment penalties, and interest. The widow was appointed as personal representative solely for defending against this tax litigation, as no formal probate proceedings had been initiated. Following discovery, the government moved for summary judgment against the estate, which resulted in the court’s opinion in this case.

FBAR Requirements and Penalties

The Bank Secrecy Act requires U.S. persons (including estates) to file an FBAR reporting foreign financial accounts exceeding $10,000 in aggregate value during the calendar year. These reports must be filed electronically by April 15 of the following year, with an automatic extension to October 15.

The penalties for non-compliance vary significantly based on whether the violation is deemed willful or non-willful. Non-willful violations carry a maximum penalty of $10,000 per violation. Willful violations, however, result in much harsher penalties: the greater of $100,000 or 50% of the account balance at the time of the violation. We have addressed various aspects of these rules in several other articles on this website, such as there being no collection remedies for FBAR penalties and there being no minimum limit on willful penalties.

In this case, the willful FBAR penalties assessed against the taxpayer were approximately $1.5 million, with late-payment penalties and interest bringing the total to over $2 million by the time of the government’s action against his estate.

Penal vs. Remedial Sanction?

The taxpayer’s widow argued that the FBAR penalties were “extinguished” when the taxpayer died. This argument is based on the long-standing legal principle that purely penal sanctions abate upon death, while remedial ones survive.

The distinction makes intuitive sense—punishment serves no purpose when the wrongdoer is deceased, but compensation for damages remains valid regardless of the wrongdoer’s status.

To determine whether a penalty is penal or remedial, court in this case applied factors from Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99-100 (1997), examining whether the sanction:

  1. Involves an affirmative disability or restraint
  2. Has historically been regarded as punishment
  3. Comes into play only on a finding of scienter (knowledge of wrongdoing)
  4. Promotes retribution and deterrence
  5. Applies to behavior that is already a crime
  6. Has an alternative purpose
  7. Appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose

In applying these factors, the court concluded that FBAR penalties are “primarily remedial with incidental penal effects” for purposes of survival. Under this classification, the penalties survived Richard’s death and remained enforceable against his estate.

Remedial for Survival, Punitive for the 8th Amendment

The court also addressed whether these same FBAR penalties constitute “fines” subject to the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause. This raises the question as to how can a penalty be remedial enough to survive death but punitive enough to qualify as a “fine” under the Constitution?

This precise issue has created a circuit split. The First Circuit in United States v. Toth, 33 F.4th 1 (1st Cir. 2022) held that FBAR penalties are not “fines” under the Eighth Amendment because they merely represent “liquidated damages” that compensate the government for investigation costs. The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Toth, though Justice Gorsuch dissented, criticizing the government for making no effort to prove the remedial nature of the penalties.

In direct conflict, the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Schwarzbaum, No. 22-14058 (11th Cir. Jan. 23, 2025) held that FBAR penalties are “fines” subject to Eighth Amendment review because they are calculated “irrespective of the magnitude of financial injury to the United States.” In Schwarzbaum, the court found a $300,000 penalty for failing to report a $16,000 account was “grossly disproportional” and violated the Constitution.

In the present case

In the present case, the court found the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning more persuasive, concluding that while FBAR penalties have remedial aspects sufficient to survive death, they also have significant punitive characteristics that trigger Eighth Amendment scrutiny. The court acknowledged this apparent contradiction in a footnote, stating that the conclusion “is not inconsistent” because “the test in the Excessive Fines context remains whether the purpose of the penalty is solely compensatory.”

Why This Matters for Executors

This contradiction creates both uncertainty and opportunity for executors. If the Supreme Court eventually resolves the circuit split by deciding that FBAR penalties are primarily punitive, it could undermine the rationale for their survival after death. This would fundamentally change how executors handle estates with unreported foreign accounts.

Until such resolution occurs, executors should approach estates with potential FBAR issues with caution, understanding that:

  1. Currently, courts uniformly hold that FBAR penalties survive death and remain enforceable against estates.
  2. The constitutional question about whether these penalties are “fines” subject to Eighth Amendment protection remains unresolved, with a clear circuit split.
  3. Even in jurisdictions following Schwarzbaum and Leeds, where FBAR penalties are considered “fines,” the excessive fines analysis only provides protection against grossly disproportional penalties—not against all penalties.
  4. The Leeds case created an important distinction between estate liability and personal liability, finding that penalties that were not excessive against the taxpayer’s estate would be excessive if imposed against the surviving spouse personally due to her lack of knowledge about the accounts.

The Takeaway

For executors, this case explains that FBAR penalties survive death and remain enforceable against the estate regardless of how they’re classified for constitutional purposes. However, the seemingly conflicting legal analysis—remedial enough to survive death but potentially punitive enough for Eighth Amendment protection—suggests this area of law may continue to evolve. The constitutional classification of FBAR penalties as “fines” offers a potential defense against grossly disproportional penalties, but doesn’t currently change the fundamental rule that these obligations survive the death of the account holder and must be addressed during estate administration.

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In 40 minutes, we’ll teach you how to survive an IRS audit.

We’ll explain how the IRS conducts audits and how to manage and close the audit.  



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