What Makes a Partnership Transaction a Disguised Sale? – Houston Tax Attorneys


You own a depreciated asset or an asset that has gone down in value. It happens. But say you cannot take advantage of the tax loss for some reason. Maybe it is because you don’t have other Income triggering a tax that year or maybe there is a limitation on the use of the loss for you. The question is then whether you can transfer your loss to another party who might benefit from it. The answer is often, “maybe.”

As the Second Circuit’s recent decision in Pimlico, LLC v. Commissioner, No. 23-7759 (2d Cir. Aug. 11, 2025), the ability to shift tax losses to a third party depends on the economic substance of the transaction. The IRS and the courts have developed timing rules and a multi-factor analysis to determine whether the investor can benefit from the tax loss.

Because business transactions are complex and variable, these same rules can seemingly change the tax outcome for transactions that were not tax motivated. They can put taxpayers in the position of having the IRS second guess their transactions. This is often the case when the transaction happens to provide a tax benefit for the third party. The Pimlico case provides an opportunity to consider this.

Facts & Procedural History

A Brazilian company held $22.7 million in distressed accounts receivable that had little economic value. The company contributed these receivables through a series of LLC transfers. They ultimately ended up in a partnership. On the same day the final partnership formed, a U.S. investor purchased an interest in the partnership for $300,164.

Within months, the Brazilian company requested a partial withdrawal from the partnership structure for exactly $300,164–the exact same amount the U.S. investor had contributed. The bank records showed the investor’s money coming in and an identical amount going out to the Brazilian company. The partnership then sold the receivables to another party and the partnership claimed the $22.7 million loss deduction. This caused the U.S. investor to have a large part of the tax loss.

The IRS challenged this arrangement during a tax audit, arguing the transaction constituted a disguised sale rather than legitimate partnership contributions and distributions. The dispute ended up in tax litigation when the taxpayers challenged the IRS determination. The U.S. Tax Court agreed with the IRS that this was a disguised sale, and the Second Circuit was asked to review the tax court decision.

The Basic Framework of Partnership Contributions

To understand the disguised sale rules in this context, we have to go back and consider the partnership contribution rules.

Section 721 of the tax code provides that partners generally don’t recognize gain or loss when contributing property to a partnership in exchange for partnership interests. This is the general rule for contributions.

Section 731 extends this non-recognition treatment to partnership distributions. The general rule under Section 731(a) is that partners don’t recognize gain or loss when receiving distributions from a partnership. This non-recognition treatment applies whether the distribution is cash or property. The theory is that partners are just receiving back their share of what the partnership owns – they’re not really engaging in a separate transaction that should trigger tax.

There are important exceptions to this general rule. Under Section 731(a)(1), a partner must recognize gain when cash distributions exceed their basis in the partnership interest. Loss recognition is even more limited under Section 731(a)(2) as partners can only recognize a loss when the partnership completely liquidates their interest and they receive only cash, unrealized receivables, or inventory items, and even then only if these distributions are less than their partnership basis. We don’t need to address these rules for our purposes as we are only focusing on the disguised sale aspects and not the manner of getting the tax benefit of the transaction if it is not a sale.

For the disguised sale part of it

For the disguised sale part of it, these non-recognition rules make sense for genuine business combinations. When multiple parties contribute assets to operate a business together, they’re not really disposing of their property–they’re exchanging direct ownership for partnership interests that represent continued economic participation. The partners still bear the economic risks and rewards, just in a different form.

But this favorable treatment assumes the transaction repr…

But this favorable treatment assumes the transaction represents a true partnership arrangement. When property moves into a partnership and cash quickly moves out to the contributing partner, the economic substance might be quite different from the form. The contributing partner may have effectively sold the property while using partnership formalities to avoid immediate tax consequences or to transfer tax attributes to another party.

Disguised Sale Rules Override Partnership Tax Rules

This is where the disgused sale rules come into play. They can override the partnership tax rules.

Section 707(a)(2)(B) authorizes regulations to recharacterize certain partnership contributions and distributions as disguised sales. The provision recognizes that taxpayers might use partnership formalities to achieve results that economically resemble sales while claiming non-recognition treatment. Rather than providing detailed statutory rules, Congress delegated to Treasury the task of distinguishing legitimate partnership transactions from disguised sales.

The resulting regulations adopt a substance-over-form approach. Even when parties follow partnership formalities perfectly – proper documentation, legal entity formation, technical compliance with partnership tax rules–the transaction may still be treated as a sale if that’s what it economically resembles. This is intended to prevent taxpayers from using partnerships as vehicles to accomplish what are essentially purchase and sale transactions while avoiding the tax consequences of sales.

Treasury Regulation Section 1.707-3(b)(1) sets out two requirements for disguised sale treatment. First, the transfer of money or other consideration would not have been made “but for” the transfer of property. Second, when transfers aren’t simultaneous, the subsequent transfer do not depend on the entrepreneurial risks of partnership operations.

The “but for” rule considers whether the cash distribution represents payment for property or a genuine partnership distribution. Would the partnership have distributed cash to that partner anyway, perhaps based on profit allocations or business needs? Or did the distribution occur specifically because the partner contributed property? This inquiry looks past documentation to economic reality.

The “but for” rule is essentially a causation test

The “but for” rule is essentially a causation test. It asks whether the distribution would have occurred regardless of the contribution? If the partnership would have made the distribution anyway based on its normal operations, profit allocations, or business needs, then the contribution and distribution are likely independent events. But if the distribution only happened because the partner contributed property, this suggests the distribution is really payment for that property.

The “entrepreneurial risk” requirement focuses on whether the partner’s receipt of cash depends on partnership success. Genuine partnership distributions typically vary based on business performance–profits generate larger distributions, losses reduce them. When a partner knows they’ll receive a specific amount regardless of how the partnership performs, it suggests the payment is actually purchase price rather than a true distribution.

How Do Timing Presumptions Work?

The disguised sale rules also have timing rules that can cause the transcation to be presumed to be a disguised sale. These timing presumptions look to the time between contributions and distributions.

Under Section 1.707-3(c)(1) of the regulations, distributions within two years of the contribution are presumed to be sales unless facts and circumstances clearly establish otherwise. This presumption recognizes that related transfers close in time likely represent integrated transactions rather than independent partnership activities.

Section 1.707-3(d) of the regulations creates an opposite presumption for transfers more than two years apart. With this timing presumption, transfers are presumed not to be sales unless facts clearly establish they are. The longer time period is thought to allow for risk shifting and independent business decisions rather than prearranged transactions.

These presumptions aren’t absolute, however. The two-year presumption can be rebutted by showing genuine business purpose and entrepreneurial risk. And on the other side of it, the IRS can overcome the longer-period presumption by showing the transaction was prearranged or orchestrated primarily for tax benefits.

The Facts and Circumstances Matter

In addition to timing rules, the regulations include facts and circumstances that are to be considered. These facts and circumstances can be the basis for a transaction being a sale or not.

The factors are listed in Section 1.707-3(b)(2) of the regulations. They consider whether the contributing partner has enforceable rights to distributions, whether others made contributions specifically to fund distributions to the contributing partner, and whether distributions are disproportionate to continuing partnership interests.

The courts have emphasized these factors aren’t a mechanical checklist. The analysis requires evaluating the overall economic substance. In some cases, some of the factors might be absent while others strongly indicate a sale. The key is understanding what really happened economically–not checking boxes on a list.

A legally enforceable right to distribution strongly suggests a sale, but the absence of such a right doesn’t prove the transaction is legitimate. Similarly, the partnership incurring debt to fund distributions indicates a sale, but using existing funds doesn’t establish legitimacy if other factors point to disguised sale treatment.

The Receivables Transaction in This Case

This brings us back to this case. This case involves worthless accounts receivable and, according to the tax court and appeals court, several factors that made it look like a sale.

The court focused on the identical amounts of the contribution and distribution–$300,164 in from the U.S. investor and $300,164 out to the Brazilian company. It was the exact amount and the timing that the court considered. The investor joined the partnership when the final partnership formed and the Brazilian company requested withdrawal shortly after. The parties did not wait or have a longer period between the contribution and distribution.

The court also noted that the Brazilian company’s withdrawal represented a partial redemption of its interest for a specific amount. This disproportionate distribution suggested that the Brazilian company was not in it for the long haul. It was not a partner continuing with its partnership interest.

The court also noted the known tax benefit this transaction was using. Before 2004, the tax code allowed new partners to claim built-in losses from property that existing partners had contributed. Under the then-existing Section 704(c) rules and Treasury Regulation 1.704-3(a)(7), when someone purchased an existing partner’s interest, they could step into that partner’s shoes and claim losses from previously contributed property.

This meant the U

This meant the U.S. investor could purchase part of the Brazilian company’s partnership interest and become entitled to claim the $22.7 million loss when the partnership sold the receivables. The Brazilian company, which couldn’t use U.S. tax losses, effectively monetized them by selling its partnership interest. Congress recognized this potential for abuse and closed this loophole through the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 by adding Section 704(c)(1)(C) to prevent the shifting of built-in losses through partnership interest transfers. This no doubt informed the court’s decision in this case.

The taxpayer argued that the Brazilian company lacked leg…

The taxpayer argued that the Brazilian company lacked legally enforceable distribution rights and the partnership didn’t incur debt to fund the distribution. The Second Circuit found these arguments unpersuasive, emphasizing that the regulatory factors aren’t exclusive or mechanical requirements.

The court explained that the absence of some factors doesn’t negate disguised sale treatment when the overall pattern clearly shows a sale. The economic reality mattered more than technical compliance with certain factors. The transaction’s substance–a U.S. investor paying for tax losses from a foreign entity that couldn’t use them–demonstrated a sale regardless of missing factors.

The Takeaway

Partnerships considering transactions involving built-in loss property have to ensure genuine business purpose exists beyond tax planning. Distributions should relate to partnership performance, business needs, or predetermined allocation formulas based on partnership interests–not to specific partner contributions. The lack of correlation between contributions and distributions helps establish legitimacy.

Documentation should reflect business reasoning for significant distributions. Partnership agreements should articulate business purposes and establish distribution policies tied to operational factors. Meeting minutes should show business-based decision-making rather than mechanical triggers. Contemporary documentation carries more weight than after-the-fact explanations when IRS audits examine the taxpayer’s transactions.

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Recent Reviews


You think the IRS owes you a refund. You file a refund claim. The IRS eventually processes your refund, but does not issue checks to refund the money to you.

You later find out that the IRS had referred the matter to the Department of Justice–maybe you find out years later even. Can the simple internal governmental act of referring the matter to the Department of Justice preclude the IRS from issuing a refund? What if the IRS agrees that the refund is due and payable, but the Department of Justice does not? Is the IRS stripped of power to simply process the tax refund as filed in that case?

The case of JPM Restaurant, LLC v. United States, No. 1:24-cv-00357 (E.D. Tenn. 2025) gets into this exact issue. It considers whether the IRS loses its authority to process tax refund claims if the matter has been referred to the Department of Justice.

Facts & Procedural History

The taxpayer operated a restaurant. This case involves the COVID-19 pandemic that shut down most restaurants across the United States.

Like many businesses in the food service industry, the restaurant experienced substantial operational impacts from government-mandated restrictions, including capacity limitations, social distancing requirements, and increased processing times for employees.

Based on these pandemic-related disruptions, the business believed it qualified for the Employee Retention Credit (“ERC”) for six calendar quarters spanning from Q2 2020 through Q3 2021. On May 19, 2023, the restaurant filed an ERC refund claim with the IRS totaling $338,132.56 for all six quarters.

After waiting six months without receiving a refund, the taxpayer filed a suit against the United States on November 11, 2024. The IRS initially handled the case internally, but on January 7, 2025, the IRS Office of Chief Counsel referred the matter to the Department of Justice for defense. The DOJ filed its response to the complaint on January 14, 2025.

More than a month after the case had been referred to the…

More than a month after the case had been referred to the DOJ, the IRS reviewed and approved the taxpayer’s ERC requests. On February 18, 2025, the IRS approved claims for the third and fourth quarters of 2020 and the first, second, and third quarters of 2021. Despite this approval, the IRS never issued any refunds to the taxpayer. The IRS later claimed that the approvals had been made “erroneously.” According to the government’s declaration, the IRS erroneously approved claims for four of the six quarters at issue as the IRS did not have the requisite authority to do so.

The taxpayer filed a motion for partial summary judgment arguing that the IRS’s approval created “an unequivocal obligation” to issue payment for the approved quarters.

When Does IRS Authority Transfer to the Department of Justice?

The central legal issue in this case concerned the division of authority between the IRS and the Department of Justice in tax matters. More specifically, it concerned the division of settlement authority and timing.

The law for this issue starts with Section 7122 of the tax code. This is the general provision that allows the IRS to settle back taxes. Section 7122(a) provides that “the Secretary [of the Treasury] may compromise any civil or criminal case arising under the internal revenue laws prior to reference to the Department of Justice for prosecution or defense.” The key phrase here is “prior to reference.” What does “reference” mean?

The court did not note the odd language or its impact on the timing. Something may be referenced at one point and maybe referred later or not at all. The language used does not make it all that clear.

Section 7122(b) is commonly understood to mean that after a case is “referred” to the Department of Justice for prosecution or defense, “only the Attorney General or his delegate may compromise such case.” With this definition, this creates a clear demarcation of settlement power: before DOJ referral, the IRS has settlement authority; after referral, only the Attorney General or designated DOJ officials can settle.

This common understanding is supported by prior court cases

This common understanding is supported by prior court cases. The court in this case cited International Paper Co. v. United States, 36 Fed. Cl. 313 (1996). In that case, the Court of Federal Claims held that “it is beyond the scope of the IRS’s authority to settle unilaterally a factual issue in a case pending in this court, after the case has been referred to the Department of Justice.” The court emphasized that such actions exceed the IRS’s statutory authority once DOJ assumes responsibility for the case.

The United States v

The United States v. Hurley case, No. 3:18-CV-485, 2020 WL 4677428 (E.D. Tenn. June 8, 2020) was also cited by the court in this case. It says that once a case is referred to the DOJ, “only the Attorney General or a person to whom authority has been delegated by the Attorney General may settle the matter.” Any IRS attempt to settle or compromise after referral exceeds its authority.

The IRS’s own Internal Revenue Manual acknowledges this division of authority. According to the court’s citation of the Manual in this case, after referring a case to the DOJ, “Justice has the exclusive authority to make and approve adjustments to the referred tax liabilities.” Thus, this internal guidance reinforces the statutory framework–given the courts analysis.

What Actions Constitute a “Compromise”?

The court’s analysis in this case passes over a fundamental question: does processing a routine tax refund claim actually constitute a “compromise” under Section 7122? The distinction matters because Section 7122 specifically restricts the IRS’s ability to “compromise” cases after DOJ referral—not its ability to perform administrative functions.

Processing a legitimate refund claim is a ministerial act. It would not seem to be a compromise. When taxpayers file refund claims, they are asserting legal entitlements based on their reading of tax law and their factual circumstances. If the IRS reviews those claims and determines they’re valid under existing law, approving the refund would seem to represent an administrative determination and not a settlement or compromise of disputed liability.

This is more in line with the common meaning of the term “compromise.” The term “compromise” typically implies give-and-take, negotiation, or acceptance of less than what’s claimed. When the IRS approves a refund claim in full, it’s simply acknowledging that the taxpayer correctly applied the law to their situation. This administrative function seems like it would remain within IRS authority even after DOJ referral, just as the agency continues processing other routine matters after a DOJ referral.

When Government Agencies Exceed Their Authority

The IRS’s approval of the restaurant’s refund claim after DOJ referral raises a fundamental question: what happens when a government agency acts beyond its statutory limits?

Government agencies possess only the authority Congress grants them through statute. When agencies step outside those boundaries, their actions lack legal foundation regardless of how official they appear. This ultra vires doctrine applies across all areas of administrative law, but it carries particular weight in tax matters where substantial sums and complex procedures are involved. So unfortunately, the government gets an “out” for statements it makes. This is even true for statements in writing, if they exceed the government agency’s authority.

The timing and lack of visibility makes this especially unforgiving. Before DOJ referral, which might not even be disclosed to or known by the taxpayer, the IRS retains broad authority to approve refund claims, negotiate settlements, and make binding administrative determinations. Once that often secret referral occurs, however, the statutory framework strictly limits IRS authority. Any subsequent approvals or compromises become legally meaningless, even if they follow standard IRS procedures and appear completely legitimate and even if the DOJ is nowhere in sight from the taxpayer’s vantage point.

The Takeaway

This case can have a significant impact on tax refunds. The ruling clarifies that the division of authority between the IRS and DOJ is not merely procedural but has substantive legal consequences. Taxpayers cannot rely on post-referral IRS approvals to establish their legal rights. Even when such approvals appear official and definitive, they may be void for lack of authority.

This principle applies not just to ERC claims but to any tax refund dispute that happens to be referred to the DOJ. But with many things tax, timing matters. An arbitrary date of a “referral” can impact the outcome and fundamentally change the dynamics of the dispute. Taxpayers considering refund litigation have to consider these issues if the IRS approves a refund claim after the case is referred to the DOJ.

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In 40 minutes, we’ll teach you how to survive an IRS audit.

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