When Does a Promissory Note Create Basis in Controlled Company Stock? – Houston Tax Attorneys


Business owners have choices in how to fund their corporations. Should they contribute cash? Property? Perhaps a promissory note?

There may be some benefit of using a promissory note. You get stock in your company without immediately parting with cash or other assets. The promissory note sits on the company’s books as a receivable, and you control when (or if) it gets paid. Ultimately, when you do this, this leads to questions about your tax basis in the stock.

This question matters when you later sell the stock. Higher basis means less taxable gain (or a deductible loss). So if you contribute a $500,000 promissory note for stock, you get a $500,000 tax basis that reduces your gain on sale of the company.

Not surprisingly, the IRS frequently challenges these transactions. The tax treatment of promissory notes exchanged for stock in controlled corporations has resulted in numerous tax disputes over the years, this is in addition to other similar contribution arrangements involving promissory notes, such as stuffing a corporation with assets before a corporate sale without issuing stock.

The recent case Alioto v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2025-125 gets into this issue. The case invovles a shareholder’s promissory note and the question of what the tax basis is in the stock received from the controlled corporation.

Facts & Procedural History

Alioto incorporated, Probity, an Ohio corporation focused on transportation and logistics consulting. Alioto served as Probity’s sole director and owned all 1,000 shares of stock. By 2014, Probity was receiving program fees and commission income.

In June 2014, Alioto entered into an employment agreement with Probity (signed by his wife as Treasurer) that promised him $550,000 in compensation that was payable in a lump sum on January 31, 2018. Alioto never received this compensation.

The stock ownership then went through several transfers. These transfers are important for this case as Alito takes the position that these transfers establish his tax basis in the stock shares. Alioto transferred 501 shares to his wife for $5.01 (a penny per share) in August 2014. A week later, she transferred 376 shares back to him for the same price. The next day, she transferred the remaining 125 shares to Probity itself.

On February 3, 2015, Alioto signed a promissory note to “purchase” those 125 treasury shares from Probity for $500,000. The note required payment (with 3% annual interest) by February 5, 2018. Alioto himself valued the shares at $4,000 each. His wife signed on behalf of Probity. The note gave Alioto the right to offset the $500,000 obligation against amounts Probity owed him under the employment agreement. Alioto made no payments on the note, asserting it was offset by his unpaid salary.

Between March and November 2015, Alioto sold 298 shares of Probity stock to family members and business associates for $142,720. The sales progressed from $130 per share in March to $260 per share in May and July, and finally to $2,000 per share between August and November.

On his 2014 tax return, Alioto had reported a negative adjusted gross income for 2014 and he never filed a 2015 return to report the 2015 transactions.

The IRS audited his 2014 return and then added the 2015 year. It issued a notice of deficiency determining unreported income for both years. The IRS also examined Probity’s returns as well to ensure that the income and expenses of Alioto are properly reported.

One of the issues on the audit was the income from the transfer of the stock in 2015. During the audit, Alito argued that he held two groups of stock with different tax basis: 875 shares with $0.01 basis per share (“penny stock”) and 125 shares with $4,000 basis per share (the treasury stock acquired via the promissory note). According to Alioto, he sold 36 of the high-basis shares in 2015, which would have produced a capital loss rather than a capital gain. The IRS determined capital gain income of $142,170. Alioto petitioned the U.S. Tax Court.

Section 351 and Nonrecognition Treatment for Corporate Contributions

Section 351(a) of the tax code provides that “no gain or loss shall be recognized if property is transferred to a corporation by one or more persons solely in exchange for stock in such corporation” if immediately after the exchange those persons control the corporation. Control means ownership of at least 80% of the total combined voting power and 80% of the total number of shares of all other classes of stock. The policy behind this rule makes sense. When business owners are simply changing the form of their ownership (from direct ownership of property to indirect ownership through corporate stock), Congress decided not to impose an immediate tax.

This nonrecognition treatment extends beyond contributions of tangible property. It applies when shareholders transfer cash, equipment, real estate, patents, and yes, even promissory notes to their corporations in exchange for stock. The question isn’t whether Section 351 applies to such transactions. It almost always does when the control requirement is met. The real question is what happens to the shareholder’s basis in the property contributed.

Section 351 transactions are very common in business. A shareholder contributes property worth $100,000 (with a $60,000 basis) to their wholly-owned corporation in exchange for stock. Under Section 351(a), they recognize no gain on the contribution, even though the stock they receive is worth $100,000. But what’s their basis in that stock?

Basis Determination Under Section 358

Section 358(a)(1) answers the basis question. It provides that “the basis of the property permitted to be received under section 351 without the recognition of gain or loss shall be the same as that of the property exchanged.” This is called “substituted basis” or “exchanged basis.” The shareholder’s basis in the stock received equals their basis in the property they contributed.

This rule preserves the built-in gain (or loss) for later recognition. Using the example above, the shareholder contributed property with a $60,000 basis and $100,000 value. Under Section 358(a)(1), their stock basis is $60,000. If they later sell the stock for $100,000, they’ll recognize the $40,000 gain that was deferred when they made the contribution. The tax hasn’t been forgiven, just postponed.

The substituted basis rule applies regardless of what type of property the shareholder contributed. Real estate, equipment, inventory, intellectual property—the shareholder’s basis in the stock equals their basis in whatever they put in. This leads to a logical question: What’s a shareholder’s basis in a promissory note they create and contribute to their controlled corporation?

When Does a Promissory Note Create Basis?

The Tax Court in Alioto relied on Alderman v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 662 (1971), for the proposition that “a taxpayer incurs no cost in making such a note and that the basis to the taxpayer is zero.” This makes intuitive sense. You’re writing an IOU to yourself (or rather, to your company that you control). You haven’t parted with anything of value. You haven’t incurred any economic cost. Therefore, you have zero basis in your own promise to pay.

Under Sections 351 and 358, this zero basis carries over to the stock received. The shareholder exchanges property (the promissory note) with zero basis for stock. Under Section 358(a)(1), the stock basis “shall be the same as that of the property exchanged”—which is zero.

This result frustrates business owners who want to create basis through paper transactions. But it reflects sound tax policy. Allowing shareholders to create basis by giving IOUs to their own controlled corporations would let them manufacture tax losses at will. They could contribute a $1 million promissory note for stock, claim $1 million of basis, immediately sell the stock, and generate a tax loss without any real economic investment or loss.

The problem gets worse in closely held corporations where the shareholder controls both sides of the transaction. There’s no arm’s-length negotiation. No real expectation of payment. No genuine economic substance. Just paper shuffling designed to create tax benefits.

The Peracchi Exception: Notes Backed by Business Risk

But what if the promissory note isn’t just paper? What if there’s genuine risk that the shareholder will have to pay? That’s the question the Ninth Circuit addressed in Peracchi v. Commissioner, 143 F.3d 487 (9th Cir. 1998) and that the court in this case distinguished in a footnote in the case.

In Peracchi, a shareholder contributed both cash and a promissory note to his corporation in exchange for stock. The Ninth Circuit held that the note could create basis equal to its face value because it was “contributed to an operating business which is subject to a non-trivial risk of bankruptcy or receivership.” The court reasoned that if the business failed, creditors could enforce the note against the shareholder personally. This created real economic risk and real economic cost.

The Peracchi exception makes economic sense. If a shareholder gives their corporation a $500,000 promissory note, and the corporation later goes bankrupt with creditors who can enforce that note, the shareholder faces genuine liability. They might actually have to pay $500,000 to satisfy creditors. That’s a real economic burden, not just paper shuffling.

The Ninth Circuit emphasized that the exception applied because the note was contributed to “an operating business” with real bankruptcy risk. This wasn’t a shell corporation or passive investment vehicle. It was an active business with operations, creditors, and the possibility of financial failure. That business risk made the promissory note meaningful.

Peracchi created a circuit split. The Ninth Circuit allows basis in promissory notes when there’s genuine business risk of enforcement. Other circuits have not adopted this exception. The Tax Court noted in Alioto that Peracchi represents the minority view. Most courts follow Alderman and hold that a shareholder’s promissory note to their controlled corporation creates zero basis, period.

For taxpayers in the Ninth Circuit (which includes California, Oregon, Washington, Alaska, Hawaii, Arizona, Nevada, Idaho, and Montana), Peracchi remains good law. Business owners in those states can potentially claim basis in promissory notes contributed to their corporations if they can show genuine business risk. But the exception is narrow and one has to document the transfers, which many taxpayers fail to do.

Why Alioto’s Note Failed the Peracchi Test

The Alioto court distinguished Peracchi on several grounds. First, and most fundamentally, Alioto retained the ability to “unilaterally extinguish his debt by offset” with the employment agreement. The promissory note required Alioto to pay Probity $500,000 (plus interest) by February 5, 2018. But his employment agreement provided that Probity owed him $550,000 on January 31, 2018—just five days earlier. The note explicitly gave Alioto the right to offset one obligation against the other.

This offset provision destroyed any claim of genuine debt. Alioto controlled both obligations. He decided whether Probity would pay him under the employment agreement. He decided whether to exercise his right to offset the note. The entire arrangement was “wholly in Mr. Alioto’s control and exceedingly unlikely” to result in any actual payment by anyone. This wasn’t a note backed by business risk. It was a circular arrangement designed to cancel itself out.

The court also found several other deficiencies that showed the note lacked economic substance. There was no payment schedule for principal or interest. Probity had “no clear source of income that might assure” it could pay the employment compensation that Alioto would then use to pay the note. The whole structure suggested that “the parties did not contemplate that the obligation would be met.”

Most tellingly, Alioto’s own testimony “suggests that the two agreements were meant to cancel each other out, with no indication that Probity planned to pay Mr. Alioto anything under the employment agreement or that Mr. Alioto planned to pay under the promissory note.” When the taxpayer himself admits the arrangements were designed to offset each other, it’s hard to argue there’s genuine debt with genuine risk.

The court applied “special scrutiny” to the transaction, as required for dealings between closely held corporations and their shareholders. The Court cited Electric & Neon, Inc. v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1324, 1339 (1971), for this principle. When a shareholder controls all aspects of a transaction with their corporation—deciding what the corporation pays them, what they pay the corporation, and whether to offset one against the other—courts examine such arrangements skeptically.

Even if Alioto had been in the Ninth Circuit (he wasn’t—he was in Ohio, which falls under the Sixth Circuit), he couldn’t satisfy the Peracchi exception. Peracchi requires “non-trivial risk of bankruptcy or receivership” that would force the shareholder to pay creditors on the note. Alioto had no such risk. He could unilaterally eliminate his obligation through the offset provision. No creditors could force him to pay. No bankruptcy would make him write a check. The note created no real economic burden.

The Takeaway

This case highlights the stock basis questions that come up when promissory notes are given by shareholders to their controlled corporations. This can result in zero basis in stock received, even when structured as formal transactions with interest and maturity dates. As in this case, when shareholders retain the ability to unilaterally extinguish their debt through offset provisions or other control mechanisms, courts will find the notes lack economic substance and create no basis. The Peracchi exception remains available in the Ninth Circuit for notes contributed to operating businesses with genuine bankruptcy risk, but that exception is narrow and one has to document the transaction to prove it. Business owners capitalizing their corporations must ensure that debt instruments reflect real economic obligations with realistic prospects of payment, not just paper transactions that cancel themselves out through related party agreements.

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Recent Reviews


Taxpayers have various tax filing deadlines throughout the year. Missing one can trigger penalties, interest charges, and collection actions.

When there is a major disaster, the IRS typically grants short extensions to give affected taxpayers breathing room. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the IRS issued notices extending various tax deadlines by a few months. The agency moved the April 15, 2020 deadline to July 15, 2020, for example. Most taxpayers and tax advisors assumed these specific notices defined the full extent of available relief.

What if the law actually provided a much longer extension than the IRS provided? A recent case from the Court of Federal Claims says that is exactly what happened. In Kwong v. United States, No. 23-271T, (Fed. Cl. Nov. 25, 2025), the court held that statutory relief extended certain tax deadlines until July 2023—years beyond what the IRS had publicly announced in its COVID-19 disaster declarations.

Facts & Procedural History

The taxpayer owned and managed real estate through his business. In 2005, he bought out his co-owners and became the sole owner. As part of that transaction, he refinanced the business property. On advice from his tax attorney and accountant, he claimed a loss of over $2.3 million on his 2005 tax return. He carried that loss forward to subsequent years, including 2007, 2010, and 2011.

The IRS audited the tax return for 2005 and disallowed the loss in 2012. This resulted in additional tax liabilities for the years to which he had applied the loss. The IRS simultaneously assessed delinquency penalties for those tax years in April 2012 for the 2007 tax period and later for 2010 and 2011. The taxpayer also had penalties for tax years 2015 and 2016 related to underwithholding taxes throughout those years.

In 2020, the taxpayer filed penalty abatement requests seeking refunds of the penalties he had paid for each of the 2007, 2010, 2011, 2015, and 2016 tax years. The IRS issued notices of disallowance for his 2007, 2010, and 2011 claims in September and October 2020. The taxpayer filed his complaint to start the tax litigation in February 2023 in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims seeking refunds of the penalties for all five tax years.

The government moved for summary judgment. It argued that the claims for 2007, 2010, and 2011 were untimely because the taxpayer filed suit more than two years after the IRS denied his claims. The government also argued that the IRS had correctly assessed penalties for 2015 and 2016. The taxpayer responded that his suit was timely because of statutory extensions under COVID-19 emergency relief legislation. This defense triggered extensive briefing on whether and how the pandemic extended his deadline to file suit.

The Two-Year Deadline for Tax Refund Suits

Section 6532 of the tax code provides strict time limits for filing suit to recover taxes or penalties. It generally says that a taxpayer cannot file suit “after the expiration of 2 years from the date of mailing . . . of the disallowance of the part of the claim to which the suit or proceeding relates.” This two-year window begins when the IRS formally denies a refund claim. Miss that deadline and the courthouse doors close.

The Federal Circuit has long held that Section 6532’s deadline is jurisdictional. This means courts lack power to hear cases filed after the two-year period expires. The jurisdictional nature of the deadline prevents equitable tolling—the doctrine that allows courts to extend deadlines when extraordinary circumstances beyond a party’s control prevent timely filing. Courts cannot create extensions based on fairness or hardship.

However, jurisdictional deadlines can still be extended by statute. Section 6532 itself recognizes this possibility. The statute provides that the two-year period “shall be extended for such period as may be agreed upon in writing between the taxpayer and the Secretary.” Congress can likewise extend these deadlines through legislation addressing specific circumstances.

Section 7508A: The Disaster Relief Statute

Section 7508A gives the Secretary of the Treasury authority to postpone tax-related deadlines during disasters.

Congress enacted Section 7508A to address natural disasters that temporarily disrupt taxpayers’ ability to meet their obligations. The typical scenario involves hurricanes, floods, or wildfires. These events damage infrastructure, displace populations, and make compliance impossible for defined periods. The statute typically operates for short time periods. A hurricane makes landfall, causes destruction over several days, and the affected area begins recovery. The IRS issues a notice extending deadlines by a few months to give taxpayers time to get back on their feet.

The statute allows the Secretary to “specify a period of up to 1 year that may be disregarded” during a taxpayer’s deadline to file returns, pay taxes, or bring suit for refunds. This discretionary authority under subsection (a) lets the Secretary respond flexibly to emergencies.

The statute also includes an automatic extension provision in subsection (d). This mandatory extension applies without any action by the Secretary. Under the version in effect before November 2021, the automatic extension ran from “the earliest incident date specified in the declaration” to “the date which is 60 days after the latest incident date so specified.” Unlike the discretionary extension under subsection (a), the mandatory extension under subsection (d) contained no express time limit in the pre-2021 version.

The mandatory extension in subsection (d) historically operated in tandem with the discretionary extension. For a typical disaster, the mandatory 60-day extension might run from the disaster’s start through 60 days after its end. This might total three or four months. If taxpayers needed more time, the Secretary could exercise discretionary authority under subsection (a) to extend deadlines up to a year. This two-tier system worked well for localized, short-term emergencies. No one anticipated how it would function during a multi-year national pandemic.

How the Statute Changed in 2021

Congress amended Section 7508A in November 2021. Understanding which version applies requires careful attention to effective dates and statutory language. This proved to be the key issue in Kwong.

The original 2019 version of subsection (d) stated that the mandatory extension period ran from “the earliest incident date specified in the declaration” to “the date which is 60 days after the latest incident date so specified.” This language tied the extension’s length directly to the disaster declaration itself. If the declaration said the disaster lasted from Date A to Date B, the mandatory extension ran until 60 days after Date B. The statute imposed no cap on how long that period could last.

In November 2021, Congress amended subsection (d). The new version changed the end of the extension period from “the date which is 60 days after the latest incident date so specified” to “the date which is 60 days after the later of such earliest incident date . . . or the date such declaration was issued.” This amendment effectively capped the mandatory extension at 60 days maximum. The extension would end 60 days after either the disaster’s start or the declaration’s issuance, whichever came later.

This change matters in this case. Under the 2019 version, a disaster that lasted three years would trigger an extension that lasted three years plus 60 days. Under the 2021 version, that same disaster would trigger only a 60-day extension. The question in this case is which version applies to COVID-19?

The answer depends on when the disaster was declared. The November 2021 amendment applied only “to federally declared disasters declared after the date of enactment of this Act.” The COVID-19 disaster was declared in early 2020. Therefore, the 2019 version of Section 7508A governs COVID-19 cases. The government initially argued that the 2021 amendment should apply retroactively to COVID-19. Only after the court pressed the issue did the government concede that the amendment’s effective date provision barred retroactive application.

When Did the COVID-19 Emergency Begin and End?

On March 13, 2020, President Trump declared a nationwide emergency. On March 22, 2020, he declared California, where this taxpayer resided, a major disaster area “beginning on January 20, 2020, and continuing” due to pandemic conditions. The Federal Emergency Management Agency coordinated the response.

That phrase “beginning on January 20, 2020, and continuing” became the linchpin of the Kwong decision. The declaration established January 20, 2020 as the “earliest incident date.” But what was the “latest incident date”? The declaration said the emergency was “continuing.” This suggested no fixed end date at the time of issuance.

The pandemic emergency declaration remained in effect for over three years. On February 10, 2023, the government amended the declaration to close the incident period effective May 11, 2023. This amendment established May 11, 2023 as the “latest incident date” for purposes of Section 7508A.

Under the plain language of the 2019 statute, the mandatory extension ran from January 20, 2020 through July 10, 2023. The latter date represents 60 days after May 11, 2023. This created an extension period of roughly three and a half years. No one anticipated such a duration when Congress drafted Section 7508A.

Does “Continuing” Mean There Was No Specified End Date?

The government argued that because the initial declaration said “continuing” rather than specifying an end date, only January 20, 2020 qualified as a date “so specified” under the statute. According to this reading, both the earliest and latest incident dates were January 20, 2020. This would yield only a 60-day extension from that single date.

The Kwong court rejected this argument. The word “continuing” has meaning. If the declaration was meant to cover only January 20, 2020, it would not have added “and continuing.” The government’s choice to maintain the disaster declaration beyond January 20, 2020 demonstrated that the emergency period extended far beyond that initial date. The government kept the declaration in effect for more than three years. This active maintenance of the declaration showed that the emergency continued throughout that period.

The government relied on Abdo v. Commissioner, 162 T.C. 148 (2024), for support. In Abdo, the Tax Court addressed whether COVID-19 extended certain filing deadlines. The court held that taxpayers who filed within 60 days of January 20, 2020 had filed timely. But Abdo did not address whether the extension could last longer than 60 days. The taxpayers there had filed within the initial 60-day window. The Tax Court explicitly noted: “We need not, and therefore do not, express a view on what the outer limits of the extension period may be where a declaration omits an ending date or is extended.”

The Kwong court thus faced a question Abdo left open. The court concluded that the declaration’s use of “continuing” meant the emergency period extended as long as the declaration remained in effect. When the government amended the declaration in February 2023 to close the incident period on May 11, 2023, that date became the “latest incident date” under the statute. The mandatory extension therefore ran until 60 days after that date.

How This Applied to the Taxpayer’s Refund Suit

The taxpayer’s deadline to file suit began when the IRS denied his refund claims in September and October 2020. Under normal circumstances, he would have had until September or October 2022 to file suit. This represents the two-year period from the denial date under Section 6532. He filed in February 2023—several months after that normal deadline expired.

But the COVID-19 mandatory extension under Section 7508A lasted until July 10, 2023. Section 7508A allows affected taxpayers to “disregard” deadlines that fall within the extension period. The taxpayer’s September and October 2020 denial notices triggered deadlines that would normally expire in September and October 2022. Those expiration dates fell within the January 2020 to July 2023 extension period. Therefore, the taxpayer could disregard those deadlines until the extension period ended.

When the July 2023 extension period ended, the taxpayer’s two-year clock to file suit would have started running again. Because he filed in February 2023—well before July 2023—his suit was timely. This analysis applies regardless of whether we characterize Section 7508A as providing tolling or a postponement period. Tolling pauses the clock while postponement moves the deadline. Either characterization leads to the same result here.

The court granted summary judgment in the taxpayer’s favor on the timeliness issue for tax years 2007, 2010, and 2011. This means his refund claims for those years can proceed to address their merits. Whether he ultimately wins those refunds depends on whether the IRS properly assessed the underlying penalties. The court did not reach that question in its summary judgment decision. The parties will need to litigate the substantive penalty issues at trial or through further proceedings.

The Takeaway

The Kwong decision explains that the COVID-19 emergency extended tax deadlines far longer than the IRS’s public guidance suggested. The mandatory extension under Section 7508A’s pre-2021 version ran from January 20, 2020 through July 10, 2023. This extension applied automatically to any taxpayer affected by the declared disaster. It operated regardless of whether the IRS issued specific guidance for particular situations. The practical impact remains viable for some taxpayers even to today. By late 2025, a taxpayer seeking to invoke the July 2023 extension would need to have had a deadline fall during the COVID-19 period. They would then need to have acted quickly enough after July 2023 to file claims while their own limitations periods remained open. Most such claims have now expired through the passage of time, but those who filed during this time, even if late, may benefit. This may preserve claims the government thought time-barred.

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