COVID-19 Extended Tax Deadlines Longer Than Many Realized – Houston Tax Attorneys


Taxpayers have various tax filing deadlines throughout the year. Missing one can trigger penalties, interest charges, and collection actions.

When there is a major disaster, the IRS typically grants short extensions to give affected taxpayers breathing room. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the IRS issued notices extending various tax deadlines by a few months. The agency moved the April 15, 2020 deadline to July 15, 2020, for example. Most taxpayers and tax advisors assumed these specific notices defined the full extent of available relief.

What if the law actually provided a much longer extension than the IRS provided? A recent case from the Court of Federal Claims says that is exactly what happened. In Kwong v. United States, No. 23-271T, (Fed. Cl. Nov. 25, 2025), the court held that statutory relief extended certain tax deadlines until July 2023—years beyond what the IRS had publicly announced in its COVID-19 disaster declarations.

Facts & Procedural History

The taxpayer owned and managed real estate through his business. In 2005, he bought out his co-owners and became the sole owner. As part of that transaction, he refinanced the business property. On advice from his tax attorney and accountant, he claimed a loss of over $2.3 million on his 2005 tax return. He carried that loss forward to subsequent years, including 2007, 2010, and 2011.

The IRS audited the tax return for 2005 and disallowed the loss in 2012. This resulted in additional tax liabilities for the years to which he had applied the loss. The IRS simultaneously assessed delinquency penalties for those tax years in April 2012 for the 2007 tax period and later for 2010 and 2011. The taxpayer also had penalties for tax years 2015 and 2016 related to underwithholding taxes throughout those years.

In 2020, the taxpayer filed penalty abatement requests seeking refunds of the penalties he had paid for each of the 2007, 2010, 2011, 2015, and 2016 tax years. The IRS issued notices of disallowance for his 2007, 2010, and 2011 claims in September and October 2020. The taxpayer filed his complaint to start the tax litigation in February 2023 in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims seeking refunds of the penalties for all five tax years.

The government moved for summary judgment. It argued that the claims for 2007, 2010, and 2011 were untimely because the taxpayer filed suit more than two years after the IRS denied his claims. The government also argued that the IRS had correctly assessed penalties for 2015 and 2016. The taxpayer responded that his suit was timely because of statutory extensions under COVID-19 emergency relief legislation. This defense triggered extensive briefing on whether and how the pandemic extended his deadline to file suit.

The Two-Year Deadline for Tax Refund Suits

Section 6532 of the tax code provides strict time limits for filing suit to recover taxes or penalties. It generally says that a taxpayer cannot file suit “after the expiration of 2 years from the date of mailing . . . of the disallowance of the part of the claim to which the suit or proceeding relates.” This two-year window begins when the IRS formally denies a refund claim. Miss that deadline and the courthouse doors close.

The Federal Circuit has long held that Section 6532’s deadline is jurisdictional. This means courts lack power to hear cases filed after the two-year period expires. The jurisdictional nature of the deadline prevents equitable tolling—the doctrine that allows courts to extend deadlines when extraordinary circumstances beyond a party’s control prevent timely filing. Courts cannot create extensions based on fairness or hardship.

However, jurisdictional deadlines can still be extended by statute. Section 6532 itself recognizes this possibility. The statute provides that the two-year period “shall be extended for such period as may be agreed upon in writing between the taxpayer and the Secretary.” Congress can likewise extend these deadlines through legislation addressing specific circumstances.

Section 7508A: The Disaster Relief Statute

Section 7508A gives the Secretary of the Treasury authority to postpone tax-related deadlines during disasters.

Congress enacted Section 7508A to address natural disasters that temporarily disrupt taxpayers’ ability to meet their obligations. The typical scenario involves hurricanes, floods, or wildfires. These events damage infrastructure, displace populations, and make compliance impossible for defined periods. The statute typically operates for short time periods. A hurricane makes landfall, causes destruction over several days, and the affected area begins recovery. The IRS issues a notice extending deadlines by a few months to give taxpayers time to get back on their feet.

The statute allows the Secretary to “specify a period of up to 1 year that may be disregarded” during a taxpayer’s deadline to file returns, pay taxes, or bring suit for refunds. This discretionary authority under subsection (a) lets the Secretary respond flexibly to emergencies.

The statute also includes an automatic extension provision in subsection (d). This mandatory extension applies without any action by the Secretary. Under the version in effect before November 2021, the automatic extension ran from “the earliest incident date specified in the declaration” to “the date which is 60 days after the latest incident date so specified.” Unlike the discretionary extension under subsection (a), the mandatory extension under subsection (d) contained no express time limit in the pre-2021 version.

The mandatory extension in subsection (d) historically operated in tandem with the discretionary extension. For a typical disaster, the mandatory 60-day extension might run from the disaster’s start through 60 days after its end. This might total three or four months. If taxpayers needed more time, the Secretary could exercise discretionary authority under subsection (a) to extend deadlines up to a year. This two-tier system worked well for localized, short-term emergencies. No one anticipated how it would function during a multi-year national pandemic.

How the Statute Changed in 2021

Congress amended Section 7508A in November 2021. Understanding which version applies requires careful attention to effective dates and statutory language. This proved to be the key issue in Kwong.

The original 2019 version of subsection (d) stated that the mandatory extension period ran from “the earliest incident date specified in the declaration” to “the date which is 60 days after the latest incident date so specified.” This language tied the extension’s length directly to the disaster declaration itself. If the declaration said the disaster lasted from Date A to Date B, the mandatory extension ran until 60 days after Date B. The statute imposed no cap on how long that period could last.

In November 2021, Congress amended subsection (d). The new version changed the end of the extension period from “the date which is 60 days after the latest incident date so specified” to “the date which is 60 days after the later of such earliest incident date . . . or the date such declaration was issued.” This amendment effectively capped the mandatory extension at 60 days maximum. The extension would end 60 days after either the disaster’s start or the declaration’s issuance, whichever came later.

This change matters in this case. Under the 2019 version, a disaster that lasted three years would trigger an extension that lasted three years plus 60 days. Under the 2021 version, that same disaster would trigger only a 60-day extension. The question in this case is which version applies to COVID-19?

The answer depends on when the disaster was declared. The November 2021 amendment applied only “to federally declared disasters declared after the date of enactment of this Act.” The COVID-19 disaster was declared in early 2020. Therefore, the 2019 version of Section 7508A governs COVID-19 cases. The government initially argued that the 2021 amendment should apply retroactively to COVID-19. Only after the court pressed the issue did the government concede that the amendment’s effective date provision barred retroactive application.

When Did the COVID-19 Emergency Begin and End?

On March 13, 2020, President Trump declared a nationwide emergency. On March 22, 2020, he declared California, where this taxpayer resided, a major disaster area “beginning on January 20, 2020, and continuing” due to pandemic conditions. The Federal Emergency Management Agency coordinated the response.

That phrase “beginning on January 20, 2020, and continuing” became the linchpin of the Kwong decision. The declaration established January 20, 2020 as the “earliest incident date.” But what was the “latest incident date”? The declaration said the emergency was “continuing.” This suggested no fixed end date at the time of issuance.

The pandemic emergency declaration remained in effect for over three years. On February 10, 2023, the government amended the declaration to close the incident period effective May 11, 2023. This amendment established May 11, 2023 as the “latest incident date” for purposes of Section 7508A.

Under the plain language of the 2019 statute, the mandatory extension ran from January 20, 2020 through July 10, 2023. The latter date represents 60 days after May 11, 2023. This created an extension period of roughly three and a half years. No one anticipated such a duration when Congress drafted Section 7508A.

Does “Continuing” Mean There Was No Specified End Date?

The government argued that because the initial declaration said “continuing” rather than specifying an end date, only January 20, 2020 qualified as a date “so specified” under the statute. According to this reading, both the earliest and latest incident dates were January 20, 2020. This would yield only a 60-day extension from that single date.

The Kwong court rejected this argument. The word “continuing” has meaning. If the declaration was meant to cover only January 20, 2020, it would not have added “and continuing.” The government’s choice to maintain the disaster declaration beyond January 20, 2020 demonstrated that the emergency period extended far beyond that initial date. The government kept the declaration in effect for more than three years. This active maintenance of the declaration showed that the emergency continued throughout that period.

The government relied on Abdo v. Commissioner, 162 T.C. 148 (2024), for support. In Abdo, the Tax Court addressed whether COVID-19 extended certain filing deadlines. The court held that taxpayers who filed within 60 days of January 20, 2020 had filed timely. But Abdo did not address whether the extension could last longer than 60 days. The taxpayers there had filed within the initial 60-day window. The Tax Court explicitly noted: “We need not, and therefore do not, express a view on what the outer limits of the extension period may be where a declaration omits an ending date or is extended.”

The Kwong court thus faced a question Abdo left open. The court concluded that the declaration’s use of “continuing” meant the emergency period extended as long as the declaration remained in effect. When the government amended the declaration in February 2023 to close the incident period on May 11, 2023, that date became the “latest incident date” under the statute. The mandatory extension therefore ran until 60 days after that date.

How This Applied to the Taxpayer’s Refund Suit

The taxpayer’s deadline to file suit began when the IRS denied his refund claims in September and October 2020. Under normal circumstances, he would have had until September or October 2022 to file suit. This represents the two-year period from the denial date under Section 6532. He filed in February 2023—several months after that normal deadline expired.

But the COVID-19 mandatory extension under Section 7508A lasted until July 10, 2023. Section 7508A allows affected taxpayers to “disregard” deadlines that fall within the extension period. The taxpayer’s September and October 2020 denial notices triggered deadlines that would normally expire in September and October 2022. Those expiration dates fell within the January 2020 to July 2023 extension period. Therefore, the taxpayer could disregard those deadlines until the extension period ended.

When the July 2023 extension period ended, the taxpayer’s two-year clock to file suit would have started running again. Because he filed in February 2023—well before July 2023—his suit was timely. This analysis applies regardless of whether we characterize Section 7508A as providing tolling or a postponement period. Tolling pauses the clock while postponement moves the deadline. Either characterization leads to the same result here.

The court granted summary judgment in the taxpayer’s favor on the timeliness issue for tax years 2007, 2010, and 2011. This means his refund claims for those years can proceed to address their merits. Whether he ultimately wins those refunds depends on whether the IRS properly assessed the underlying penalties. The court did not reach that question in its summary judgment decision. The parties will need to litigate the substantive penalty issues at trial or through further proceedings.

The Takeaway

The Kwong decision explains that the COVID-19 emergency extended tax deadlines far longer than the IRS’s public guidance suggested. The mandatory extension under Section 7508A’s pre-2021 version ran from January 20, 2020 through July 10, 2023. This extension applied automatically to any taxpayer affected by the declared disaster. It operated regardless of whether the IRS issued specific guidance for particular situations. The practical impact remains viable for some taxpayers even to today. By late 2025, a taxpayer seeking to invoke the July 2023 extension would need to have had a deadline fall during the COVID-19 period. They would then need to have acted quickly enough after July 2023 to file claims while their own limitations periods remained open. Most such claims have now expired through the passage of time, but those who filed during this time, even if late, may benefit. This may preserve claims the government thought time-barred.

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The IRS has ten years to collect unpaid taxes after assessment. But that deadline isn’t always final.

Those with unpaid tax debts often seek payment plans to be able to pay their tax liabilities over time. When a taxpayer requests or enters into an IRS installment agreement, the clock on the collection statute stops running. The question is: for how long?

These rules matters whether you’re negotiating a payment plan, evaluating collection alternatives, or advising considering the strategic timing of collection resolution options. The wrong move can inadvertently extend the government’s collection window, while the right strategy might run out the clock.

United States v. Phelps, No. 7:25-CV-00014-BO (E.D.N.C. Nov. 18, 2025), provides an opportunity to examine the mechanics of collection statute suspensions and extensions arising from installment agreements. It gets into questions about what happens when the government files suit after the apparent expiration of the ten-year collection period, claiming that an installment agreement extended its deadline.

Facts & Procedural History

Phelps and Yamaoka owed $11 million in federal income taxes for the 2012 tax year. The couple filed their married filing jointly return to report this balance. The IRS then assessed the tax liability for them on September 29, 2014.

The balance remained unpaid for over 10 years. Interest and penalties accumulated, bringing their total liability to over $24 million by late 2024.

On December 23, 2019, Phelps and Yamaoka submitted a request for an installment agreement to the IRS. The IRS accepted the agreement on April 3, 2020. The agreement remained in effect for approximately 15 months before being terminated on July 7, 2021.

On January 27, 2025, the government filed suit to reduce the assessment to a judgment and to foreclose federal tax liens on four properties on Trails End Road in Wilmington, North Carolina, where the taxpayers resided. The complaint also named Bank OZK and New Hanover County as defendants because they held potential interests in the properties.

Phelps and Yamaoka responded by filing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Their argument was straightforward: the tax was assessed on September 29, 2014, and the complaint was filed on January 27, 2025. That’s more than ten years. Under the tax code’s collection statute, the case was time-barred.

The government opposed the motion by arguing that the ins…

The government opposed the motion by arguing that the installment agreement suspended the limitations period. It claimed that under the suspension provisions, the filing deadline was extended to February 8, 2025, making the January 27, 2025 complaint timely.

The 10-Year Collection Statute of Limitations

The tax code imposes a time limit on the IRS’s ability to collect assessed taxes. Section 6502(a) provides that where the IRS has properly assessed a tax, “such tax may be collected by levy or by a proceeding in court” but only if the levy or proceeding is begun within ten years after the assessment. This period is the Collection Statute Expiration Date or CSED.

Each assessment has its own CSED. If a taxpayer has unpaid liabilities from multiple years, each year’s assessment starts its own ten-year clock. The ten-year period begins on the date of assessment. For most taxpayers, this is the date they file their return and the IRS accepts it. For taxpayers who don’t file, the assessment date might be when the IRS files a substitute for return on their behalf. For adjustments arising from audits, the assessment date is when the IRS formally records the additional tax liability after the examination concludes.

During this ten-year window, the IRS can pursue collection through administrative means or judicial proceedings. Administrative collection includes levies on wages, bank accounts, accounts receivable, and other property. It includes filing notices of federal tax lien to establish priority against other creditors. Judicial collection involves filing suit in federal district court to reduce the assessment to judgment and foreclose on property.

Once the CSED expires

Once the CSED expires, the IRS loses its ability to use these collection tools. The IRS cannot file new levies or initiate new judicial proceedings. However, levies that attached to property or rights to payment before the CSED expired can continue to operate. The IRS can also retain any refunds or credits arising after the CSED has passed.

When the Collection Statute Gets Suspended

The ten-year period is not always a continuous countdown. Various events can suspend the statute, meaning the clock stops running temporarily. When the suspension ends, the clock resumes from where it left off. These suspension periods effectively extend the IRS’s collection authority beyond the original ten-year mark.

Section 6503 of the tax code says that several circumstances suspend the collection statute. For example, the IRS cannot collect while a taxpayer is in bankruptcy, so the statute is suspended during bankruptcy proceedings plus an additional six months. Also, the statute is suspended while the taxpayer is outside the United States for a continuous period of at least six months. And it is also suspended while a case is pending in U.S. Tax Court and for 60 days afterward.

One of the most common suspensions involves collection due process hearings. When a taxpayer requests a hearing to challenge a proposed levy or lien filing, the statute is suspended from the date the IRS receives the request until the date the determination becomes final. If the taxpayer appeals to court, the suspension continues through that appeal process. These hearings can easily add a year or more to the CSED.

Installment Agreement Requests Suspend the CSED

Section 6331(k) addresses when the IRS is prohibited from levying on a taxpayer’s property. When levy is prohibited, the collection statute is suspended. This provision specifically applies to installment agreement requests and creates one of the most significant CSED suspension periods that taxpayers encounter.

The statute prohibits the IRS from levying while a request for an installment agreement is pending with the IRS. What does “pending” mean? The request is pending when it provides sufficient information to identify the taxpayer and proposes specific payment terms. It remains pending until the IRS either accepts the agreement, rejects it, or the taxpayer withdraws the request.

During this pending period, the CSED clock stops. If a taxpayer submits an installment agreement request with two years remaining on the CSED, and the IRS takes 90 days to review and accept the request, those 90 days don’t count against the two years. The taxpayer still has two years remaining after the request is approved.

The suspension continues for 30 days after the IRS rejects an installment agreement request. This gives the taxpayer time to exercise their appeal rights. If the taxpayer timely files an appeal of the rejection, the suspension continues throughout the appeal process until a final determination is made. The same rules apply if the IRS proposes to terminate an existing installment agreement. The statute is suspended for 30 days after the proposed termination, and throughout any appeal of that termination.

These suspension periods can add up quickly

These suspension periods can add up quickly. Consider a taxpayer who requests an installment agreement that remains under review for 60 days before being rejected. The taxpayer appeals, and the appeal takes 180 days to resolve. The total suspension is 270 days (60 days pending, 30 days after rejection, and 180 days on appeal). That’s approximately nine months added to the CSED.

The statute does not suspend while the installment agreem…

The statute does not suspend while the installment agreement is in effect. Once the IRS accepts an installment agreement and it becomes effective, the CSED clock resumes running. The taxpayer makes monthly payments while the collection statute continues to tick down.

This leads to a strategic consideration that taxpayers have to make. If a taxpayer has a short time remaining on the CSED and cannot afford to fully pay within that period, entering into an installment agreement might seem like a solution. But if the agreement will take longer than the remaining CSED to fully pay the liability, the taxpayer needs to think carefully about whether to request it.

What Happened in the Phelps Case

One would think that the IRS would track these dates carefully because once a CSED expires, the government loses its legal authority to collect that particular liability through IRS tax collections methods. It does not do this, however. It is common for the statute of limitations to expire with little or no collection activities. The Phelps case is an example.

The Phelps case is one where the government had to rely on installment agreement suspensions to extend collection authority to justify their tax collection lawsuit. The taxpayers had their income tax assessed on their account by the IRS on September 29, 2014, creating an original CSED of September 29, 2024. They requested an installment agreement on December 23, 2019, which was accepted on April 3, 2020 and terminated on July 7, 2021.

The government calculated that these events suspended the CSED long enough to extend the deadline to February 8, 2025. Under this calculation, the January 27, 2025 complaint was timely by less than two weeks. But the government’s complaint that it filed in the lawsuit didn’t include any allegations about the installment agreement or the suspension periods.

The taxpayers moved to dismiss

The taxpayers moved to dismiss, arguing the case was filed more than ten years after the assessment. The government opposed the motion by arguing that the installment agreement tolled the statute, but it never amended its complaint to add these allegations. The court found that when a complaint is facially untimely, the plaintiff must plead the facts demonstrating why the suit is nevertheless within the limitations period.

Because the complaint contained no allegations about the …

Because the complaint contained no allegations about the installment agreement, and because the government never formally moved to amend, the court granted the motion to dismiss. The case was dismissed in its entirety, likely ending the government’s ability to collect over $24 million through judicial proceedings.

The Takeaway

This case shows that while the suspension periods resulting from installment agreements can extend the government’s collection window, the government must properly plead those facts when filing suit beyond the original ten-year period. Beyond the implications for bringing a tax colleciton lawsuit, these rules create important strategic considerations for taxpayers deciding whether to request an installment agreement, particularly when little time remains on the collection statute.

As noted in the case, installment agreements can suspend the collection statute of limitations during specific periods: while the request is pending, for 30 days after rejection or proposed termination, and throughout any appeal of those actions. These suspensions can add months or years to the IRS’s collection authority, potentially extending it well beyond the original ten-year deadline.

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