Distributions From Forfeited IRA are Not Taxable – Houston Tax Attorneys


You commit a crime, you are convicted, and you do your time. Then the IRS steps in to collect taxes. The IRS takes your assets to pay the tax that arose from your criminal activity.

As part of this, the IRS seizes your IRA funds. Are you responsible for paying income taxes on the IRA distribution–even through you never received the money and you did not have control over the IRA at the time the funds are withdrawn?

The recent Sixth Circuit decision in Hubbard v. Commissioner, No. 24-1450 (6th Cir. Mar. 19, 2025), considers whether a taxpayer must pay income tax on IRA funds that were forfeited to the government following a criminal conviction.

Facts & Procedural History

The taxpayer in this case was a pharmacist who owned and operated a pharmacy in eastern Kentucky. His business generated substantial income, allowing him to acquire multiple homes, luxury vehicles, a boat, jet skis, and establish an IRA. By 2017, his IRA had nearly $500,000 in untaxed money.

The source of the taxpayer’s wealth, however, was illegal. He operated what courts described as a “pill mill,” selling large quantities of oxycodone to those addicted to the drug and supplying pseudoephedrine to methamphetamine manufacturers. Following criminal proceedings, a jury convicted the taxpayer of drug and money-laundering offenses. This resulted in a 30-year prison sentence. Importantly, there were no tax fraud charges.

As part of the criminal case, prosecutors invoked criminal forfeiture laws to seize the taxpayer’s assets acquired with proceeds from his illegal activities. The district court ordered the forfeiture of specific property—his homes, vehicles, watercraft, and financial accounts, including his IRA—to the IRS.

In 2017, the IRS seized the nearly $500,000 from the taxpayer’s IRA. The IRS treated this seizure as a taxable distribution to the taxpayer. While the taxpayer was in prison, the IRS sent him a notice of deficiency claiming he owed nearly $300,000 in combined in income taxes, early withdrawal penalty, and interest and penalties for failing to file a tax return.

The taxpayer challenged this notice in tax court. He argued that the tax liability “should be paid by [the] feds” since his account “was forfeited to” them. Although the IRS conceded that the taxpayer shouldn’t have to pay the early withdrawal penalty, it maintained that he still owed income taxes. The tax court sided with the IRS, finding that the taxpayer owed taxes and penalties. This appeal followed, which reversed the tax court.

Understanding Criminal Forfeiture

Criminal forfeiture laws allow the government to seize property connected to illegal activity to “ensure that crime does not pay.” While English common law permitted authorities to confiscate all of a convicted defendant’s property, American forfeiture laws typically target only “specific assets” with a connection to the crime.

The Sixth Circuit explained that there are two general types of forfeitures in our legal system, i.e., a specific property forfeiture and a personal money judgment forfeiture. The tax implications are not the same for each type.

What is a Specific Property Forfeiture?

The first type of forfeiture identifies “specific property” that the defendant must relinquish. The government becomes the owner of this property upon conviction.

Some forfeiture laws incorporate a “relation back” doctrine that treats the government as having ownership rights in the property dating back to when the crime was committed.

This type of forfeiture resembles an “in rem” judgment because it permits the government to seize only the identified “tainted property” rather than the defendant’s other assets.

What is a Personal Money Judgment Forfeiture?

The second type of forfeiture is a personal money judgment. This type of forfeiture allows courts to impose a “personal money judgment” identifying a sum that the defendant must pay.

With this type of forfeiture, the court calculates this amount based on the value of the forfeitable property involved in the crimes.

This type of forfeiture resembles an “in personam” judgment because the government may collect the debt from any of the defendant’s current or future assets.

Which Type Applied In Hubbard’s Case?

This case involved a specific property forfeiture. The district court identified specific property subject to forfeiture—including his IRA—and ordered the IRS to seize only these assets. The court did not enter a personal money judgment against the taxpayer.

The order stated that the forfeited assets “shall be forfeited to the United States and no right, title, or interest in the property shall exist in any other party.” This meant that the government became the IRA’s owner at the time of the order.

Distributions from Forfeited IRAs, Generally

Questions about gross income start with Section 61(a) of the tax code. Section 61(a) says that “gross income means all income from whatever source derived.” This broad language is intentional. It reflects Congress’s intent to exercise its full constitutional taxing power under the Sixteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court has consistently interpreted this provision broadly, holding that it covers “all economic gains” not specifically exempted by statute. The breadth of Section 61(a) extends beyond direct cash receipts to include just about all forms of economic benefit.

Beyond this general definition, Section 408(d)(1) specifically addresses IRA distributions, stating that “any amount paid or distributed out of an individual retirement plan shall be included in gross income by the payee or distributee, as the case may be.” This language is key here because it identifies who bears the tax burden—the “payee or distributee” of the funds.

These provisions would clearly apply if the taxpayer owned the IRA at the time of the distribution. But the taxpayer did not own the IRA at the time of the distribution. The government owned the IRA.

This ownership question was central to the court’s analysis. The Sixth Circuit had to determine whether the taxpayer remained the “payee or distributee” for tax purposes despite no longer owning or controlling the IRA when the funds were withdrawn.

The court concluded that once the IRS became the owner of the IRA through the forfeiture order, the agency—not the taxpayer—became the “[o]ne to whom money [was] paid or payable” and the “beneficiary entitled to payment” under ordinary definitions of these terms.

Thus, the Sixth Circuit Court held that the broad language of Section 61(a) did not cause the distribution to be taxable income to the taxpayer.

Distribution from Forfeited IRA as Discharge of Debt Income

Since Section 61(a) did not work, the IRS had to find some other rationale for including this in income. The IRS argued that Subsection 61(a)(12) made the distribution income for income tax purposes.

This subsection specifically identifies “income from discharge of indebtedness” as a form of gross income. This principle, sometimes called “cancellation of debt” income, recognizes that when a taxpayer’s financial obligation is satisfied by a third party or otherwise canceled, the taxpayer has realized an economic benefit equivalent to receiving cash and using it to pay the debt.

The seminal case interpreting discharge of indebtedness as income is Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner. In that case, the Supreme Court held that when an employer paid an employee’s tax obligations directly to the government, this payment constituted additional taxable income to the employee. The Court reasoned that the “discharge” of an “obligation” was economically equivalent to a “receipt” of the same sum of money.

Courts have since applied this principle to numerous situations, including involuntary distributions from retirement accounts. For example, the tax court has held that when IRA funds are garnished to pay child support (Vorwald v. Commissioner), to satisfy tax debts (Schroeder v. Commissioner), or to pay restitution (Rodrigues v. Commissioner), the IRA owner must still pay taxes on the distributions despite never receiving the funds directly. This is even true if the debt that is cancelled is exceedingly old.

The question in this case was whether the criminal forfeiture of the taxpayer’s IRA created a “debt” that was discharged when the IRS seized the funds. The Sixth Circuit answered this question by examining the specific type of forfeiture involved.

The court reasoned that had the district court entered a “personal money judgment” against the taxpayer, that judgment might have created a debt. In that case, the withdrawal of IRA funds might have created a tax obligation by reducing a debt the taxpayer owed.

However, since the district court instead granted the IRS ownership of the “specific property” (the IRA), the IRS did not withdraw the funds to “discharge” an “obligation” that the taxpayer owed. Rather, the IRS withdrew the funds because it owned them. As the court noted, “if the forfeiture order created a debt merely by transferring ownership of the IRA from Hubbard to the IRS, why wouldn’t the order have created a debt in Hubbard’s homes and cars too?” The court concluded that Section 61(a)(12)’s discharge of indebtedness provision did not apply because no debt was being discharged—ownership of the asset itself had changed hands through the specific property forfeiture.

As such, the Sixth Circuit Court concluded that there was no debt and the distribution from the IRA did not create cancellation of debt income.

The Takeaway

This decision highlights the distinction between different types of forfeitures and their tax consequences. When the government obtains ownership of specific property through forfeiture (rather than imposing a money judgment), the former owner may not be liable for taxes on subsequent transactions involving that property. For IRA accounts specifically, this means that when the government becomes the owner through forfeiture, it—not the former account holder—becomes the “payee or distributee” responsible for any tax consequences from withdrawals.

The IRS may not be able to distinguish between the types of forfeited IRAs, as the custodians will likely just issue Forms 1099R and that will start the IRS assessment process. Those who have been assessed tax on forfeited IRAs in the past and those that will likely continue in the future should consider their options based on this case, which may include filing refund claims, or challenging the IRS on this issue as the taxpayer did in this case.

Watch Our Free On-Demand Webinar

In 40 minutes, we’ll teach you how to survive an IRS audit.

We’ll explain how the IRS conducts audits and how to manage and close the audit.  



Source link

Leave a Reply

Subscribe to Our Newsletter

Get our latest articles delivered straight to your inbox. No spam, we promise.

Recent Reviews


When a taxpayer has a capital outlay, they generally want to deduct the expense when the money leaves their bank account or when the liability is incurred. However, the accounting matching principle dictates that expenses should be deducted when the related income is received. The matching principle aligns the income and expense recognition. Our income tax rules generally adopt this accounting principle.

The timing issue is disfavored by taxpayers who make substantial capital investments. The taxpayer must pay out funds but cannot take an immediate tax deduction, while still being required to pay income taxes despite having a future tax deduction on the books. This results in a pay-the-IRS-now and recognize-your-tax-benefit later scenario. This issue is particularly problematic for investments in long-term assets such as real estate investments and heavy equipment.

Just about everyone favors immediate expensing. The U.S. Treasury Department has long advocated for a consumption tax system that would essentially allow for immediate expensing of capital investments. Treasury has made incremental progress toward this goal, such as the 2014 tangible property regulations that expanded opportunities for component depreciation of real estate. Similarly, Congress has shown increasing receptivity to immediate expensing, though stopping short of a full consumption tax system. The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 represents a compromise position, providing for bonus depreciation on certain real estate assets while maintaining the basic framework of capitalization.

This framework leaves taxpayers with several options for immediate expensing for certain types of expenses, but not for others. The recent Weston v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2025-16, case provides an opportunity to consider the question of when taxpayers must capitalize rather than deduct certain real estate-related expenses.

Facts & Procedural History

The case involves a commercial real estate agent in California. He began investing in single-family home renovations in Indiana in 2015.

Under an arrangement with his partner, the taxpayer provided funding to acquire and renovate properties. The partner managed the work locally. They both verbally agreed to split profits after the taxpayer recouped his investment plus an 8% return.

In 2016, the taxpayer also began funding a demolition and excavation business run by the partners. This business contracted with Indiana cities for demolition and lot remediation services. The partners had a similar verbal profit-splitting deal for this business.

Through 2017, the taxpayer continued sending money to fund both businesses based on the partner’s periodic funding requests and invoices. These “Indiana Payments” were more than $2.1 million by the end of 2017.

The taxpayer’s confidence in the partner eventually eroded as little progress or financial return materialized. However, he continued funding the demolition business into 2018 and even bought several Indiana properties from the partner in early 2018 for over $700k. After the partner disappeared, the taxpayer attempted to salvage the renovation business. He ended up selling most of the properties in 2018-2019 for a net loss.

On his 2017 tax return, the taxpayer claimed the $2.1 million Indiana Payments as a business loss deduction. The IRS audited the return and disallowed the deduction. The dispute ended up in tax court.

Immediate Expensing Options

The tax code provides several ways to immediately expense real estate-related costs. These provisions usually require some tax planning to benefit from, but the appropriate provision depends on both the nature of the expense and the character of the taxpayer’s real estate activities.

Section 162 serves as the primary authority for deducting ordinary and necessary business expenses, while Section 212 provides parallel treatment for investment activities. Section 179 offers an elective immediate write-off for certain qualifying property, and Section 179D allows deductions for energy-efficient commercial building improvements. There are other provisions that can also apply, but these are the primary tax rules that allow for immediate expensing for real estate expenses.

Section 162 permits immediate deduction of ordinary and necessary business expenses, encompassing routine operating costs such as repairs, maintenance, and utilities, provided these expenses do not materially add to the property’s value or useful life. For taxpayers whose activities do not rise to the level of a trade or business, Section 212 provides similar treatment for expenses incurred in the production of income, primarily benefiting investors who own rental properties but do not qualify as real estate professionals.

Section 179 allows immediate expensing of qualifying property placed in service during the tax year, though significant limitations apply in the real estate context. The deduction is limited to tangible personal property used in an active trade or business, with most building components excluded, and caps apply. Section 179D provides a specialized deduction for commercial building property meeting specified energy efficiency standards, available to both building owners and tenants who make qualifying improvements.

The nuances of each of these rules is beyond the scope of this article–as we are just noting that the first decision a taxpayer has to make is whether one or more of these provisions apply. Our focus in this article is to consider how these immediate expensing options are essentially taken away by the capital improvement rules. What Congress gives in one hand, it often takes away with its other hand.

Caplitziation and Depreciation or Amortization Limitations

The general capitalization rules under Section 263(a) require taxpayers to capitalize amounts paid to improve a unit of property. The regulations establish a three-part test for determining whether an expenditure constitutes an “improvement” requiring capitalization rather than an immediately deductible expense. An improvement exists if the expenditure results in a betterment, adaptation, or restoration of the property.

A betterment occurs when an expenditure fixes a pre-existing material defect, creates a material addition or expansion, or produces a material increase in the property’s capacity, productivity, efficiency, strength, or quality. For example, replacing a leaky roof with upgraded materials that extend its useful life would constitute a betterment requiring capitalization.

An adaptation arises when the expenditure modifies the property for a new or different use from its intended purpose when placed in service. Converting a residential property into an office building exemplifies an adaptation that must be capitalized. However, minor modifications that do not fundamentally change the property’s use may qualify as deductible repairs.

A restoration exists when the expenditure returns the property to its ordinarily efficient operating condition after deterioration, rebuilds the property to a like-new condition, or replaces a major component or substantial structural part. The replacement of an entire HVAC system, for instance, would likely constitute a restoration requiring capitalization.

Beyond these general rules, specific tax code provisions impose additional capitalization requirements for certain real estate expenditures. For example, Section 280B mandates capitalization of demolition costs into the land basis, regardless of the property’s intended future use. There are even more nuanced rules that govern the treatment of interest, taxes, insurance, permits, environmental remediation, construction period overhead, and property management costs.

This is the framework that taxpayers have to apply. The immediate expensing rules only apply to current expenses, not capital improvements. The distinction turns on whether the expense merely keeps the property in ordinary efficient operating condition, in which case it may be deducted immediately, or whether it materially adds to the property’s value or substantially prolongs its useful life, in which case it must be capitalized. Thus, while routine repairs and maintenance may typically be deducted in the current year, major renovations require capitalization. And then there are more nuanced expenses that one cannot readily discern how the rules apply to, such as standby line of credit fees.

Before moving on, we also note that there are other provisions that can apply even after this expense-vs-capitalization framework that limit otherwise allowable deductions, such as the passive activity loss rules, excess business loss rules, net operating loss rules, hobby loss rules, and others. You can read about these other rules in various posts on our site as we have covered them at length in other articles.

Example of Expensing-Capitalization

This brings us back to this case. In this case, the court had to examine whether the $2.1 million in Indiana Payments could qualify for immediate expensing under any of the discussed provisions, or whether they required capitalization.

The court first considered whether the payments could be deducted as ordinary and necessary business expenses under Section 162. While the taxpayer argued he was engaged in a trade or business, the court found his involvement was more akin to that of an investor. He operated as a passive funding source, rarely visited the properties, and left the day-to-day operations to his partner. The court emphasized that merely managing one’s investments, no matter how extensive, does not rise to the level of a trade or business. This finding effectively precluded any immediate deduction under Section 162.

Similarly, the court found that Section 212 could not salvage the deductions. Even though this provision has a lower threshold than Section 162, applying to investment activities rather than requiring a trade or business, the nature of the expenses themselves still required capitalization. The improvements to the properties were not mere maintenance costs but rather substantial renovations that materially added to the properties’ value.

The Section 179 election was not available because the expenditures primarily involved improvements to residential real property, which is explicitly excluded from Section 179 treatment. The fact that some personal property may have been included in the renovations could not help the taxpayer, as he failed to maintain records adequately distinguishing between real and personal property improvements.

For the home renovation business, the court found the expenses fell squarely within Section 263A’s scope. The Indiana Payments covered direct costs like building materials and labor, as well as indirect costs such as utilities and equipment rentals. Because the properties were held for resale, these improvement costs had to be capitalized into inventory under Section 263A and could only be deducted when the renovated homes were sold. Since no sales occurred in 2017, no deduction was permitted for that year.

The tax court also considered the expenses for the demolition business. As this business did not own the properties it worked on, Section 263A did not apply. However, the court still denied the loss deduction for two reasons. First, some of the expenses may have required capitalization under Section 280B, which mandates adding demolition costs to the land basis. Second, and more fundamentally, the taxpayer failed to maintain adequate records distinguishing between deductible business expenses and capital expenditures for equipment and other assets.

The Takeaway

The case shows both the complexity and importance of properly analyzing real estate-related expenses under the various expensing and capitalization rules. Detailed records that distinguish between potentially deductible expenses and capital improvements are key. Without this type of documentation, taxpayers risk losing deductions even for expenses that might otherwise qualify for immediate expensing, as demonstrated by the court’s denial of deductions for both the renovation and demolition businesses in this case.

Watch Our Free On-Demand Webinar

In 40 minutes, we’ll teach you how to survive an IRS audit.

We’ll explain how the IRS conducts audits and how to manage and close the audit.  



Source link