Can Judge-Made Doctrine Override Tax Deductions Allowed by Congress? – Houston Tax Attorneys


The tax code provides specific rules for when taxpayers can claim deductions for losses. These are rules enacted by Congress.

There are other so-called “judicial doctrines” that allow the courts to override the rules set by Congress. There are several of these that frequently come up in tax disputes, such as the economic substance doctrine (which was codified into law), the step transaction doctrine, etc. We have covered many of these doctrines in prior articles. We have not addressed the public policy doctrine.

The “public policy doctrine” allows courts to deny tax deductions that would otherwise be perfectly legal under the tax code when allowing such deductions would “frustrate” public policy.

The U.S. Tax Court recently applied this doctrine in Hampton v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2025-32, to disallow a tax loss when the government seized assets of a business for the wrongdoing of the owner. This gets into issues of separation of powers, and how far the courts can go in overriding the rules set by Congress.

Facts & Procedural History

The taxpayer in this case was a stock broker. He operated as an S corporation, and was 100% owner of the S corporation.

In 2009, the taxpayer worked out an arrangement with his high school friend who had been appointed as the deputy treasurer of the State of Ohio. The arrangement involved the deputy treasurer directing trading business from the State of Ohio to the taxpayer, with the taxpayer sharing portions of his commissions with the deputy treasurer and two associates. The payments were aledged to have been disguised as legal fees or business loans. The taxpayer received approximately $3.2 million in commissions from these trades and paid about $524,000 to the conspirators.

In 2013, the taxpayer pleaded guilty to charges of bribery, fraud, and money laundering. In 2014, he was sentenced to 45 months in prison and ordered to forfeit approximately $2.2 million. In 2016, while he was incarcerated, the U.S. Marshals Service seized $1,182,543.71 in funds from seven bank accounts held in the name of either the taxpayer or his S corporation.

On its 2016 Form 1120S, the S corporation claimed a deduction of $855,882 for the forfeiture of its seized accounts. As the S corporation’s sole shareholder, the taxpayer reported this loss on his individual tax return. The IRS audited the tax return and disallowed the deduction for the tax loss. The taxpayer filed a petition with the tax court for review.

About the Public Policy Doctrine

The public policy doctrine is a judicial doctrine the courts have cited for denying tax deductions that would “frustrate sharply defined national or state policies proscribing particular types of conduct, evidenced by some governmental declaration thereof.” This principle was articulated by the Supreme Court in Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30, 33-34 (1958).

This is not a rule created by Congress through legislation. Instead, it was developed by judges who decided that some tax deductions, though technically allowed by the tax code, should nevertheless be denied on public policy grounds. This represents a significant judicial encroachment on what would normally be the legislative domain of determining which deductions are allowable.

The doctrine is particularly applicable to tax penalties imposed by the government–in addition to income tax due resulting from the denial of tax deductions. As the Supreme Court explained, the “[d]eduction of fines and penalties uniformly has been held to frustrate state policy in severe and direct fashion by reducing the ‘sting’ of the penalty prescribed by the state legislature.” The underlying rationale is that allowing a tax deduction for a government-imposed penalty would effectively reduce the financial impact of that penalty, thereby undermining its deterrent effect.

How Does the Public Policy Doctrine Override Section 165?

Section 165(a) of the tax code allows a deduction for “any loss sustained during the taxable year and not compensated for by insurance or otherwise.” For individual taxpayers, the deduction is limited to losses incurred in a trade or business, in transactions entered into for profit, or in certain cases of casualty or theft. Notably, the text of Section 165 contains no exception for losses resulting from criminal forfeitures or other penalties.

In 1969, Congress partially codified the public policy doctrine by amending Section 162 of the tax code (which is the general provision that allows for business tax deductions) to explicitly disallow deductions for fines and penalties paid to a government for violation of law. However, Congress did not make similar amendments to Section 165 (which is the provision for deducting tax losses). This raises the question: Did Congress intend to limit the public policy doctrine to Section 162 deductions, leaving Section 165 free from such judicial restrictions?

The courts have not followed this distinction. The courts have applied the public policy doctrine to Section 165 deductions. For example, the Federal Circuit did so in Nacchio v. United States, 824 F.3d 1370, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2016). In that case, the court explicitly stated that “§165 is subject to a ‘frustration of public policy’ doctrine.”

When Can Courts Override the Plain Language of the Tax Code?

How far courts are willing to go and should they be allowed to go in applying the public policy doctrine–even when doing so requires overriding the plain language of the tax code?

Under a strict reading of Section 165 and the S corporation flow-through rules under Section 1366, the taxpayer here would appear to be entitled to deduct his share of the S corporation’s loss from the asset forfeiture (there was an assignment issue for assigning income thath the court didn’t get to, which may also have been a problem had the court gotten to that issue–but that is beyond the scope of this article).

Section 165 allows deductions for “any loss” with certain limitations that don’t explicitly exclude criminal forfeitures. Section 1366(a) provides that an S corporation shareholder “shall take into account” his pro rata share of the corporation’s income or loss. Nothing in the text of either provision suggests an exception for losses resulting from criminal activity.

Yet the tax court determined that the public policy doctrine overrode these statutory provisions. The court held that even if the S corporation was entitled to claim a deduction (a question the court did not decide), the taxpayer as an individual was barred by the public policy doctrine from reporting his 100% passthrough share of the S corporation’s resulting loss on his individual return.

The court’s rationale was that allowing the taxpayer to d…

The court’s rationale was that allowing the taxpayer to deduct the loss would frustrate the sharply defined policy against conspiring to commit offenses against the United States. The taxpayer was the Purported wrongdoer, and the S corporation’s assets were somehow seized as part of a penalty for his wrongdoing. The court did not get into how the denial of a deduction is not a tax penalty, and the code already provides for tax penalties–no doubt which also applied.

Thus, apparently the taxpayer should be double penalized–with a tax penalty (probably more than one) and then again by the loss of his tax deduction. According to the court, allowing the taxpayer a deduction would unquestionably reduce the “sting” of the penalty (which a forfeiture is not a penalty), regardless of what the tax code actually says about such tax deductions.

How Far Can Courts Extend the Public Policy Doctrine?

The tax court emphasized that the public policy doctrine is not constrained by formalistic distinctions between legal entities. This is similar to the rules that apply when a taxpayer transfers assets to a spouse to avoid IRS collections. The court cited Holmes Enterprises, Inc. v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 114 (1977), where a corporation claimed a deduction for the criminal forfeiture of a car it owned after its sole owner and president was convicted on illegal drug charges.

In Holmes, the tax court concluded that although the corporation was a “separate, taxable entity, distinct from its employee,” the public policy doctrine forbade it from claiming a deduction because it was not a “wholly innocent bystander.” Due to the convicted person’s role as the corporation’s sole owner and president, the corporation “knew of and fully consented to the illegal use of its automobile.”

This reasoning shows how courts have expanded the public policy doctrine to deny deductions not just to convicted individuals, but also to closely related entities, even when those entities themselves haven’t been charged with any crime. This judicial expansion extends the doctrine well beyond what Congress explicitly codified in Section 162(f).

Can a Taxpayer Challenge Judicial Overreach Through a Tax Deduction?

The taxpayer in this case argued that the application of the public policy doctrine should be limited because the United States’ seizure of the S corp’s assets violated due process and was “over-zealous” given that the S corp was not the wrongdoer. However, the tax court found no legal impropriety in the seizure of the S corp’s assets to satisfy the taxpayer’s forfeiture liability.

The court relied on the Sixth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Parenteau, 647 F. App’x 593 (6th Cir. 2016), which held that a corporation wholly owned by an individual convicted of a criminal conspiracy was not a person “other than the defendant” for purposes of forfeiture proceedings. The Sixth Circuit cited relevant factors including that the defendant wholly owned and controlled the corporation, that the corporation did not follow corporate formalities, and that the defendant used the corporation’s property in his criminal scheme.

By analogy, the tax court concluded that the S corporation in this case was not separate from the taxpayer as an individual for purposes of the substitute forfeiture provisions. The taxpayer wholly owned and controlled the S corp, offered minimal evidence that corporate formalities were followed, and the S corp’s sole source of business income was the commissions generated by the taxpayer that were “assigned” to the S corp—the very commissions that led to the criminal indictment, plea, and forfeiture. This is consistent with the court’s prior rulings that apply various judicial doctrines to S corporations.

Is There Any Limit to Judicial Override of Tax Code Provisions?

The tax court also rejected the taxpayer’s argument that the public policy doctrine’s application should be affected by alleged illegality or over-zealousness on the government’s part in seizing the assets. Both the Fourth Circuit and the tax court have previously indicated that the alleged illegality of a criminal forfeiture need not prevent the public policy doctrine from disallowing a deduction for the forfeited property.

In Hackworth v. Commissioner, 155 F. App’x 627, 632 (4th Cir. 2005), the Fourth Circuit stated: “If the taxpayers believe that the forfeiture was invalid, the proper remedy is for them to sue the [relevant government unit] and seek return of the funds [rather than claim a tax deduction].” Similarly, in the tax court’s decision in Hackworth, the court stated: “This Court lacks jurisdiction over [the taxpayers’] collateral attack on the forfeiture.”

This principle further demonstrates the power of the public policy doctrine as a judicial override of tax code provisions. Even if a taxpayer believes that a forfeiture was illegal or improper, courts will not allow them to deduct the loss under Section 165. Instead, they must challenge the forfeiture directly in another forum—a requirement found nowhere in the text of the tax code itself.

The Takeaway

This case shows how the judge-made public policy doctrine can override explicit provisions of the tax code. Despite clear statutory language allowing deductions for business losses and requiring S corporation shareholders to report their share of corporate losses, the tax court denied the taxpayer’s deduction based on a doctrine created by judges, not legislators.

The tax law as written by Congress can be trumped by judicial doctrines when courts determine that public policy would be frustrated by allowing certain deductions. Taxpayers facing criminal forfeitures should understand that the public policy doctrine enables courts to disallow deductions that would otherwise be permitted under a plain reading of the tax code, particularly when there is a direct connection between criminal activity and the forfeited assets.

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You commit a crime, you are convicted, and you do your time. Then the IRS steps in to collect taxes. The IRS takes your assets to pay the tax that arose from your criminal activity.

As part of this, the IRS seizes your IRA funds. Are you responsible for paying income taxes on the IRA distribution–even through you never received the money and you did not have control over the IRA at the time the funds are withdrawn?

The recent Sixth Circuit decision in Hubbard v. Commissioner, No. 24-1450 (6th Cir. Mar. 19, 2025), considers whether a taxpayer must pay income tax on IRA funds that were forfeited to the government following a criminal conviction.

Facts & Procedural History

The taxpayer in this case was a pharmacist who owned and operated a pharmacy in eastern Kentucky. His business generated substantial income, allowing him to acquire multiple homes, luxury vehicles, a boat, jet skis, and establish an IRA. By 2017, his IRA had nearly $500,000 in untaxed money.

The source of the taxpayer’s wealth, however, was illegal. He operated what courts described as a “pill mill,” selling large quantities of oxycodone to those addicted to the drug and supplying pseudoephedrine to methamphetamine manufacturers. Following criminal proceedings, a jury convicted the taxpayer of drug and money-laundering offenses. This resulted in a 30-year prison sentence. Importantly, there were no tax fraud charges.

As part of the criminal case, prosecutors invoked criminal forfeiture laws to seize the taxpayer’s assets acquired with proceeds from his illegal activities. The district court ordered the forfeiture of specific property—his homes, vehicles, watercraft, and financial accounts, including his IRA—to the IRS.

In 2017, the IRS seized the nearly $500,000 from the taxpayer’s IRA. The IRS treated this seizure as a taxable distribution to the taxpayer. While the taxpayer was in prison, the IRS sent him a notice of deficiency claiming he owed nearly $300,000 in combined in income taxes, early withdrawal penalty, and interest and penalties for failing to file a tax return.

The taxpayer challenged this notice in tax court

The taxpayer challenged this notice in tax court. He argued that the tax liability “should be paid by [the] feds” since his account “was forfeited to” them. Although the IRS conceded that the taxpayer shouldn’t have to pay the early withdrawal penalty, it maintained that he still owed income taxes. The tax court sided with the IRS, finding that the taxpayer owed taxes and penalties. This appeal followed, which reversed the tax court.

Understanding Criminal Forfeiture

Criminal forfeiture laws allow the government to seize property connected to illegal activity to “ensure that crime does not pay.” While English common law permitted authorities to confiscate all of a convicted defendant’s property, American forfeiture laws typically target only “specific assets” with a connection to the crime.

The Sixth Circuit explained that there are two general types of forfeitures in our legal system, i.e., a specific property forfeiture and a personal money judgment forfeiture. The tax implications are not the same for each type.

What is a Specific Property Forfeiture?

The first type of forfeiture identifies “specific property” that the defendant must relinquish. The government becomes the owner of this property upon conviction.

Some forfeiture laws incorporate a “relation back” doctrine that treats the government as having ownership rights in the property dating back to when the crime was committed.

This type of forfeiture resembles an “in rem” judgment because it permits the government to seize only the identified “tainted property” rather than the defendant’s other assets.

What is a Personal Money Judgment Forfeiture?

The second type of forfeiture is a personal money judgment. This type of forfeiture allows courts to impose a “personal money judgment” identifying a sum that the defendant must pay.

With this type of forfeiture, the court calculates this amount based on the value of the forfeitable property involved in the crimes.

This type of forfeiture resembles an “in personam” judgment because the government may collect the debt from any of the defendant’s current or future assets.

Which Type Applied In Hubbard’s Case?

This case involved a specific property forfeiture. The district court identified specific property subject to forfeiture—including his IRA—and ordered the IRS to seize only these assets. The court did not enter a personal money judgment against the taxpayer.

The order stated that the forfeited assets “shall be forfeited to the United States and no right, title, or interest in the property shall exist in any other party.” This meant that the government became the IRA’s owner at the time of the order.

Distributions from Forfeited IRAs, Generally

Questions about gross income start with Section 61(a) of the tax code. Section 61(a) says that “gross income means all income from whatever source derived.” This broad language is intentional. It reflects Congress’s intent to exercise its full constitutional taxing power under the Sixteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court has consistently interpreted this provision broadly, holding that it covers “all economic gains” not specifically exempted by statute. The breadth of Section 61(a) extends beyond direct cash receipts to include just about all forms of economic benefit.

Beyond this general definition, Section 408(d)(1) specifically addresses IRA distributions, stating that “any amount paid or distributed out of an individual retirement plan shall be included in gross income by the payee or distributee, as the case may be.” This language is key here because it identifies who bears the tax burden—the “payee or distributee” of the funds.

These provisions would clearly apply if the taxpayer owned the IRA at the time of the distribution. But the taxpayer did not own the IRA at the time of the distribution. The government owned the IRA.

This ownership question was central to the court’s analysis. The Sixth Circuit had to determine whether the taxpayer remained the “payee or distributee” for tax purposes despite no longer owning or controlling the IRA when the funds were withdrawn.

The court concluded that once the IRS became the owner of…

The court concluded that once the IRS became the owner of the IRA through the forfeiture order, the agency—not the taxpayer—became the “[o]ne to whom money [was] paid or payable” and the “beneficiary entitled to payment” under ordinary definitions of these terms.

Thus, the Sixth Circuit Court held that the broad language of Section 61(a) did not cause the distribution to be taxable income to the taxpayer.

Distribution from Forfeited IRA as Discharge of Debt Income

Since Section 61(a) did not work, the IRS had to find some other rationale for including this in income. The IRS argued that Subsection 61(a)(12) made the distribution income for income tax purposes.

This subsection specifically identifies “income from discharge of indebtedness” as a form of gross income. This principle, sometimes called “cancellation of debt” income, recognizes that when a taxpayer’s financial obligation is satisfied by a third party or otherwise canceled, the taxpayer has realized an economic benefit equivalent to receiving cash and using it to pay the debt.

The seminal case interpreting discharge of indebtedness as income is Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner. In that case, the Supreme Court held that when an employer paid an employee’s tax obligations directly to the government, this payment constituted additional taxable income to the employee. The Court reasoned that the “discharge” of an “obligation” was economically equivalent to a “receipt” of the same sum of money.

Courts have since applied this principle to numerous situations, including involuntary distributions from retirement accounts. For example, the tax court has held that when IRA funds are garnished to pay child support (Vorwald v. Commissioner), to satisfy tax debts (Schroeder v. Commissioner), or to pay restitution (Rodrigues v. Commissioner), the IRA owner must still pay taxes on the distributions despite never receiving the funds directly. This is even true if the debt that is cancelled is exceedingly old.

The question in this case was whether the criminal forfei…

The question in this case was whether the criminal forfeiture of the taxpayer’s IRA created a “debt” that was discharged when the IRS seized the funds. The Sixth Circuit answered this question by examining the specific type of forfeiture involved.

The court reasoned that had the district court entered a …

The court reasoned that had the district court entered a “personal money judgment” against the taxpayer, that judgment might have created a debt. In that case, the withdrawal of IRA funds might have created a tax obligation by reducing a debt the taxpayer owed.

However, since the district court instead granted the IRS ownership of the “specific property” (the IRA), the IRS did not withdraw the funds to “discharge” an “obligation” that the taxpayer owed. Rather, the IRS withdrew the funds because it owned them. As the court noted, “if the forfeiture order created a debt merely by transferring ownership of the IRA from Hubbard to the IRS, why wouldn’t the order have created a debt in Hubbard’s homes and cars too?” The court concluded that Section 61(a)(12)’s discharge of indebtedness provision did not apply because no debt was being discharged—ownership of the asset itself had changed hands through the specific property forfeiture.

As such, the Sixth Circuit Court concluded that there was no debt and the distribution from the IRA did not create cancellation of debt income.

The Takeaway

This decision highlights the distinction between different types of forfeitures and their tax consequences. When the government obtains ownership of specific property through forfeiture (rather than imposing a money judgment), the former owner may not be liable for taxes on subsequent transactions involving that property. For IRA accounts specifically, this means that when the government becomes the owner through forfeiture, it—not the former account holder—becomes the “payee or distributee” responsible for any tax consequences from withdrawals.

The IRS may not be able to distinguish between the types of forfeited IRAs, as the custodians will likely just issue Forms 1099R and that will start the IRS assessment process. Those who have been assessed tax on forfeited IRAs in the past and those that will likely continue in the future should consider their options based on this case, which may include filing refund claims, or challenging the IRS on this issue as the taxpayer did in this case.

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