Does the IRS Have Authority to Certify ACA Employer Penalties? – Houston Tax Attorneys


The IRS has been sending notices to businesses about Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) penalties. The penalties are often very large in amount and, in many cases, come as a complete suprise to the business owners. This is particularly true for growing businesses that are right around the cutoff for the headcount requirements.

Businesses with 50 or more full-time employees have to comply with the the ACA’s employer mandate requirements. This means that they have to offer employees affordable healthcare options. When employees receive marketplace insurance subsidies and report those on their income tax returns, that triggers the IRS to send notices of these penlaties.

So what rights or remedies does the business have in these situations? Can a business successfully challenge and overturn such assessments? A recent federal court decision addresses these questions–revealing a procedural flaw in how the IRS has imposed these penalties. The Faulk Co. Inc. v. Becerra, No. 4:24-cv-00609 (N.D. Tex. April 10, 2025) case addresses the proper certification procedures required before the IRS can assess an employer shared responsibility payment against a business. Those who have been assessed ACA penalties should take note of this case.

Facts & Procedural History

The taxpayer in this case is a Texas corporation that provides janitorial services to Texas schools. Prior to 2019, the business offered minimum essential health insurance coverage to its employees as required by the ACA’s employer mandate provisions. In 2019, however, the taxpayer stopped providing this coverage to its employees.

On December 1, 2021, the IRS issued what it called a Letter 226-J to the taxpayer proposing an employer shared responsibility payment (“ESRP”) of $205,621 for the failure to offer health insurance coverage under the ACA. The Letter 226-J purported to serve as a “certification” to the taxpayer prior to the assessment of the ESRP. The taxpayer responded on December 30, 2021, informing the IRS that it disagreed with the proposed assessment and that it was paying the ESRP under protest. On January 28, 2022, the taxpayer filed a refund claim with the IRS for the 2019 ESRP but received no response.

The taxpayer filed this tax litigation case on June 28, 2024. The complaint alleged that the United States Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) and the IRS violated the taxpayer’s statutory due process rights by improperly categorizing the Letter 226-J as a “certification” to the taxpayer prior to the assessment of an ESRP. The taxpayer argued that HHS, not the IRS, was required to provide the certification, and that the certification lacked proper notice of potential liability and notice of a right to appeal as required by law.

The Affordable Care Act’s Employer Mandate Structure

The ACA was enacted in March 2010 with the goal of increasing health insurance coverage and decreasing healthcare costs. While it did increase coverage, it also increased healthcare costs. In many instances, it resulted in health insurance policies no longer being offered. This has left businesses in a quandary–with many turning to various alternatives, such as captive self-insurance arrangements, as a means to deal with the ACA.

The minimum coverage requirements for employers is provided in Section 1411 of the ACA, which was codified at 42 U.S.C. §18081. This statute designates HHS as the governing agency. The statute gives HHS exclusive authority to implement its provisions, stating that “The Secretary [of HHS] shall establish a program meeting the requirements of this section.”

The ACA employer mandate applies to businesses employing at least fifty full-time equivalent employees, requiring them to provide minimum health insurance coverage. Congress gave HHS the exclusive authority to effectuate these provisions. The ACA also directs each State to establish a health insurance exchange to operate as a virtual marketplace for health insurance policies. HHS collects and verifies information from employers to facilitate enrollment and ensure compliance with the ACA. If an employer fails to comply, the ACA provides for penalties known as employer shared responsibility payments (“ESRPs”).

The Enforcement Mechanism: Section 4980H

Congress added Section 4980H to the tax code as an enforcement mechanism. This section empowers the IRS to penalize employers through the ESRP excise tax for failing to follow the ACA’s requirements.

Section 4980H specifies that an ESRP may be assessed if two conditions are met:

  1. An employer “fails to offer its full-time employees… the opportunity to enroll in minimum essential coverage… for any month” as ACA § 1411 dictates
  2. At least one full-time employee “has been certified to the employer under [ACA § 1411] as having enrolled for such month in a qualified health plan”

The statute does not explicitly state which agency must provide this certification, only indicating that an employer must be “certified… under [ACA §] 1411.” This ambiguity regarding the certification requirement became the central issue in the Faulk case.

What Due Process Rights Are Guaranteed Under ACA §1411?

ACA § 1411 guarantees important due process rights to employers subject to the mandate. The statute establishes that if HHS determines an employer did not meet the minimum coverage requirements, HHS must notify the Exchange. The Exchange must then provide two specific notices to the employer:

  1. Notice “that the employer may be liable” for an ESRP
  2. Notice of the employer’s right to appeal

These notice requirements serve as procedural protections before an employer can be subjected to potentially substantial penalties. The importance of these protections is underscored by the fact that ACA § 1411 explicitly directs HHS to conduct a study “to ensure… [t]he rights of employers to adequate due process” are sufficiently protected.

While ACA § 1411 allows HHS to make certain delegations, such as to the Exchange, there is no provision allowing delegation to the IRS for the certification process. The statute only allows the IRS Secretary to be one of many federal officers that may hear an appeal on an individual’s eligibility for exchange subsidies.

How Did the HHS Certification Regulation Change the Process?

In 2013, HHS issued a regulation (45 C.F.R. § 155.310(i)) that appeared to delegate certification authority to the IRS. This regulation provides:

“As part of its determination of whether an employer has a liability under section 4980H of the Code, the Internal Revenue Service will adopt methods to certify to an employer that one or more employees has enrolled for one or more months during a year in a QHP for which a premium tax credit or cost-sharing reduction is allowed or paid.”

In explaining this regulation, HHS stated that the “certification program” was “distinct from the notification specified in [ACA § 1411].” This delegation allowed the IRS to carry out the certification requirement through its Letter 226-J process.

Did Congress Intend a Two-Agency Process for ESRP Assessments?

The court’s analysis in this case focused on whether this delegation of authority was consistent with the statutory framework. The court looked to the text of Section 4980H, which requires that an employee “has been certified to the employer under [ACA § 1411].”

The Supreme Court has stated that the word “under” is a “chameleon” that must draw its meaning from context. Following Supreme Court precedent, the court interpreted “under [ACA § 1411]” to mean “by reason of the authority of” ACA § 1411 – authority that was exclusively given to HHS, not the IRS.

Although the term “certification” doesn’t explicitly appear in ACA § 1411 with respect to the employer mandate, the court determined that Congress likely used “certified” to refer broadly to the two notices guaranteed to employers: notice of potential liability and notice of administrative appeal rights.

The court reasoned that if Congress had merely intended for the IRS to certify an employer independently, there would have been no need for Section 4980H to refer back to ACA § 1411. The statute’s use of the past tense – “has been certified” – suggested that a prior certification must take place before the IRS enters the picture.

Why Would Congress Design This Two-Step Process?

The court suggested there are good reasons why Congress might have wanted to keep the administration of due process in ACA § 1411 close to HHS rather than permit delegation. ESRP penalties can have major consequences for employers–for a company with 500 employees in 2024, the penalty could approach $1.5 million annually.

For businesses in low-margin industries, such as janitorial services like the taxpayer in this case, these penalties can be devastating. The court speculated that Congress may have intended for HHS–the primary agency responsible for overseeing employer compliance with the ACA–to also ensure due process is met before penalties are assessed.

The two-agency process creates an important safeguard: HHS first provides certification (including notices of potential liability and appeal rights), and only after these steps are completed can the IRS assess the ESRP. This separation of functions provides additional protection for employers facing potentially substantial penalties.

Was the HHS Certification Regulation Valid?

Having determined that the IRS cannot issue the certification required by Section 4980H, the court addressed whether the HHS Certification Regulation was valid and enforceable.

The court concluded that the regulation exceeded HHS’s statutory authority. Under the Administrative Procedure Act, courts can “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be… arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.”

Since ACA § 1411 does not authorize HHS to delegate certification authority to the IRS, and nothing in Section 4980H grants independent certification power to the IRS, the court held that 45 C.F.R. § 155.310(i) should be set aside as void and unenforceable.

What Are the Implications for Employers Facing ESRP Assessments?

The court’s ruling has significant implications for employers who have been assessed ESRPs by the IRS. If the IRS assessed an ESRP without proper certification from HHS (which would include notice of potential liability and notice of appeal rights), that assessment may be invalid under the court’s interpretation of the statutes.

For the taxpayer in this case, the court ordered the IRS to refund the full $205,621.71 ESRP that the taxpayer had paid under protest. The court also set aside the HHS Certification Regulation as void and unenforceable.

This ruling opens the door for other employers to challenge ESRP assessments that did not follow the proper certification process through HHS. Employers who have paid ESRPs based on IRS Letter 226-J certifications may have grounds to seek refunds based on the reasoning in the this case.

For businesses currently facing proposed ESRP assessments, the ruling suggests they should consider whether they received proper certification from HHS before the IRS assessment. Without such certification, they may have strong grounds to challenge the assessment through IRS tax collections processes or tax litigation.

The Takeaway

This case provides a path forward for businesses that have these penalties. There is a significant procedural flaw in how ACA employer mandate penalties have been assessed by the IRS. The HHS must first provide certification to employers (including notice of potential liability and appeal rights), and only then can the IRS assess the ESRP. When this sequence isn’t followed, the resulting tax assessment may be invalid and refundable. This ruling potentially impacts many businesses who have been assessed or paid ESRP penalties based solely on IRS Letter 226-J notices without proper HHS certification.

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if a taxpayer owes taxes to the IRS and other debts that might push them toward bankruptcy, is it beneficial to pay the IRS first? What if the taxes are not dischargeable in bankruptcy given the various timing rules? Would this change the answer?

For individuals, the bankruptcy process involves the appointment of a trustee. The trustee’s primary role is to collect and liquidate the debtor’s non-exempt assets and distribute the proceeds to creditors. Bankruptcy trustees routinely try to recover assets transferred by debtors prior to bankruptcy. This includes trying to “claw back” tax payments the debtor or taxpayer made to the IRS.

Trustees typically rely on state fraudulent transfer laws as the basis for these recovery actions. But what happens when the IRS is the entity receiving the payment? Can a bankruptcy trustee use state law to recover payments made to the IRS, or does sovereign immunity block such claims?

The case of United States v. Miller, No. 23-824 (U.S. Mar. 26, 2025), provides an opportunity to consider this issue. This is a Supreme Court decision that can impact whether or not to pay the IRS prior to filing bankruptcy or whether bankruptcy is even an option that should be considered by those who have paid significant amounts to the IRS.

Before getting into this issue, it should be noted that this is similar to but factually different than planning for tax refunds in bankruptcy, as there is no IRS refund to recover as the taxes were legally due in these situations.

Facts & Procedural History

The taxpayer in this case was a Utah-based transportation business. Prior to filing for bankruptcy, two of the company’s shareholders misappropriated approximately $145,000 of company funds to pay their personal federal income tax obligations. The company received nothing in return for these payments.

Three years after these transfers occurred, the company filed for bankruptcy. Shortly after his appointment, the bankruptcy trustee filed suit against the United States under Section 544(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, seeking to avoid the tax payments made to the IRS.

The company was insolvent when the transfers were made. The trustee cited Utah’s fraudulent transfer statute as the “applicable law” for his Section 544(b) claim. He argued that the payments would be voidable under that law because the company was insolvent and received no value in return.

The government moved for summary judgment, arguing that the trustee could not satisfy Section 544(b)’s “actual creditor” requirement because, outside of bankruptcy, any creditor’s fraudulent transfer claim against the United States under Utah law would be barred by sovereign immunity. The Bankruptcy Court rejected this argument and ruled for the trustee, holding that Section 106(a) of the Bankruptcy Code waived the government’s sovereign immunity for both the Section 544(b) claim itself and the underlying state law claim.

The District Court adopted the Bankruptcy Court’s decision, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed. The case then proceeded to the Supreme Court on the government’s petition for certiorari.

The Bankruptcy Code’s Avoidance Powers

Section 544 of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes bankruptcy trustees to recover assets for the bankruptcy estate. These “avoidance powers” serve multiple objectives: they help maximize the value of the estate by recovering assets that might otherwise be lost, and they promote equal treatment of creditors by preventing preferential transfers outside the formal bankruptcy process.

Section 544 contains two distinct avoidance mechanisms. Under Section 544(a), known as the “strong-arm” provision, a trustee can avoid transfers that would be voidable by certain hypothetical creditors. This applies “whether or not such a creditor exists.” This provision gives trustees the rights of a hypothetical lien creditor or bona fide purchaser, regardless of whether any actual creditor holds such rights.

Section 544(b), in contrast, allows a trustee to “avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor… that is voidable under applicable law by a creditor holding an unsecured claim.” Unlike Section 544(a), this rule requires the trustee to identify an actual creditor who could avoid the transfer under applicable non-bankruptcy law.

The “applicable law” referenced in Section 544(b) typically consists of state fraudulent transfer statutes. These laws, which have been adopted in similar forms across most states, including Texas, allow creditors to invalidate certain transfers made by insolvent debtors or transfers made with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors.

The Sovereign Immunity Waiver in Bankruptcy

Another concept to consider for this issue is sovereign immunity. Sovereign immunity is a defense that generally shields the federal government from lawsuits absent a statute where Congress has explicitly waived this immunity. In the bankruptcy context, Congress has provided a limited waiver of sovereign immunity in Section 106 of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 106(a)(1) states that “sovereign immunity is abrogated as to a governmental unit to the extent set forth in this section with respect to” 59 different provisions of the Code, including Section 544. Section 106(a)(5) adds an important qualification, however, providing that “[n]othing in this section shall create any substantive claim for relief or cause of action not otherwise existing” under other law.

The question in Miller was whether Section 106(a)’s waiver extends only to the federal cause of action created by Section 544(b) or whether it also reaches the underlying state law cause of action that supplies the “applicable law” for that federal claim.

Sovereign Immunity and Substantive Rights

The Supreme Court has consistently treated sovereign immunity waivers as jurisdictional in nature. This means that it operates to deprive courts of the power to hear suits against the United States absent Congress’s express consent.

Importantly, waivers of sovereign immunity are typically understood as “prerequisite[s] for jurisdiction” rather than as provisions that create substantive rights or alter pre-existing ones. The Court has maintained a clear distinction between the question of whether sovereign immunity has been waived and the separate question of whether the source of substantive law provides a cause of action against the government.

This distinction is is important in the bankruptcy tax context. If Section 106(a) merely waives sovereign immunity for Section 544(b) claims without altering their substantive requirements, then a trustee still has to identify an actual creditor who could avoid the transfer under applicable law outside of bankruptcy—including overcoming any sovereign immunity barriers that would exist in that context.

The Supreme Court’s Decision

The Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit in this case, holding that Section 106(a)’s sovereign immunity waiver applies only to the Section 544(b) claim itself and not to any state law claims nested within that federal claim.

The Court’s analysis focused on the text, context, and structure of Section 106 and Section 544. It emphasized that Section 106(a)(5) expressly states that the waiver provision does not “create any substantive claim for relief or cause of action not otherwise existing” under other law. This language, the Court reasoned, directly contradicts the notion that Section 106(a) modifies the substantive elements of a Section 544(b) claim.

The Court also pointed to the contrast between Sections 544(a) and 544(b). While subsection (a) explicitly allows a trustee to avoid transfers that a hypothetical creditor could have avoided “whether or not such a creditor exists,” subsection (b) contains no such language. This difference reflects a deliberate choice by Congress to tie the trustee’s powers under Section 544(b) to the rights of an actual creditor under applicable law.

The majority rejected the argument that its reading would render Section 106(a)’s waiver meaningless with respect to Section 544. The Court noted that the waiver still enables trustees to bring Section 544(a) claims against the government, which have no actual-creditor requirement. Additionally, the waiver grants federal courts jurisdiction to hear Section 544(b) claims against state governments that have consented to being sued under their fraudulent transfer statutes.

Justice Gorsuch authored a lone dissent, arguing that the majority confused sovereign immunity with the requirements of a substantive claim. He contended that a valid fraudulent transfer claim existed under Utah law, and Section 106(a) simply prevented the government from raising sovereign immunity as a procedural defense to that claim.

What About Other Recovery Methods?

The Court’s decision leaves open some alternative approaches for bankruptcy trustees seeking to recover transfers to the federal government. For instance, trustees might still pursue avoidance actions under Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code, which creates a federal fraudulent transfer cause of action that does not rely on state law. However, Section 548 has a shorter lookback period (two years) compared to many state fraudulent transfer statutes (often four years or more).

The Court also noted an alternative theory that the trustee had proposed: whether a trustee could satisfy the actual-creditor requirement by showing that state law would permit a creditor to void the tax payment by suing someone other than the United States, such as the shareholders who orchestrated the transfers. The Court declined to address this theory, leaving it for consideration on remand.

Additionally, trustees might still be able to pursue avoidance claims against governmental entities where those entities have expressly waived their immunity from suit under relevant state laws. Some states have chosen to subject themselves to potential liability under their own fraudulent transfer statutes, and Section 106(a) would grant federal courts jurisdiction to hear Section 544(b) suits against those states.

Dischargeable vs. Non-Dischargeable Taxes

Those considering whether to pay the IRS before filing bankruptcy also have to distinguish between dischargeable and non-dischargeable tax debts.

For non-dischargeable taxes (such as recent income taxes less than three years old, trust fund taxes, or taxes where returns were filed late), paying the IRS first may make sense given that these debts would survive bankruptcy anyway. By paying these non-dischargeable taxes before filing, the taxpayer potentially stops additional interest and penalties from accruing while addressing other dischargeable debts through the bankruptcy process.

However, for older income taxes that might be dischargeable (generally those more than three years old, filed more than two years ago, and assessed more than 240 days ago), the analysis changes. In these cases, the Miller decision creates a complex dynamic: paying potentially dischargeable tax debts before bankruptcy might prevent those funds from being available to pay other creditors, but the payment to the IRS is now more secure against recovery by the trustee. Had the taxpayer waited and included those dischargeable taxes in the bankruptcy, those funds might have been distributed differently among all creditors–which could be beneficial or not beneficial–depending on whether the other debts are dischargeable or not. Timing and sequencing of payments and bankruptcy filing impacts this.

The Takeaway

The Supreme Court’s decision in this case significantly restricts a bankruptcy trustee’s ability to recover tax payments from the IRS using state fraudulent transfer laws. The ruling highlights the strategic taxpayers have to consider when they have both tax debts and other financial obligations. For taxes that would be non-dischargeable anyway, paying the IRS first may be advantageous since these debts would survive bankruptcy and the payments are now more secure from clawback actions. However, for potentially dischargeable tax debts, taxpayers have to weigh whether paying these taxes before bankruptcy makes sense, as these funds might otherwise be distributed to all creditors in the bankruptcy.

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