Does the IRS Have Authority to Certify ACA Employer Penalties? – Houston Tax Attorneys


The IRS has been sending notices to businesses about Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) penalties. The penalties are often very large in amount and, in many cases, come as a complete suprise to the business owners. This is particularly true for growing businesses that are right around the cutoff for the headcount requirements.

Businesses with 50 or more full-time employees have to comply with the the ACA’s employer mandate requirements. This means that they have to offer employees affordable healthcare options. When employees receive marketplace insurance subsidies and report those on their income tax returns, that triggers the IRS to send notices of these penlaties.

So what rights or remedies does the business have in these situations? Can a business successfully challenge and overturn such assessments? A recent federal court decision addresses these questions–revealing a procedural flaw in how the IRS has imposed these penalties. The Faulk Co. Inc. v. Becerra, No. 4:24-cv-00609 (N.D. Tex. April 10, 2025) case addresses the proper certification procedures required before the IRS can assess an employer shared responsibility payment against a business. Those who have been assessed ACA penalties should take note of this case.

Facts & Procedural History

The taxpayer in this case is a Texas corporation that provides janitorial services to Texas schools. Prior to 2019, the business offered minimum essential health insurance coverage to its employees as required by the ACA’s employer mandate provisions. In 2019, however, the taxpayer stopped providing this coverage to its employees.

On December 1, 2021, the IRS issued what it called a Letter 226-J to the taxpayer proposing an employer shared responsibility payment (“ESRP”) of $205,621 for the failure to offer health insurance coverage under the ACA. The Letter 226-J purported to serve as a “certification” to the taxpayer prior to the assessment of the ESRP. The taxpayer responded on December 30, 2021, informing the IRS that it disagreed with the proposed assessment and that it was paying the ESRP under protest. On January 28, 2022, the taxpayer filed a refund claim with the IRS for the 2019 ESRP but received no response.

The taxpayer filed this tax litigation case on June 28, 2024. The complaint alleged that the United States Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) and the IRS violated the taxpayer’s statutory due process rights by improperly categorizing the Letter 226-J as a “certification” to the taxpayer prior to the assessment of an ESRP. The taxpayer argued that HHS, not the IRS, was required to provide the certification, and that the certification lacked proper notice of potential liability and notice of a right to appeal as required by law.

The Affordable Care Act’s Employer Mandate Structure

The ACA was enacted in March 2010 with the goal of increasing health insurance coverage and decreasing healthcare costs. While it did increase coverage, it also increased healthcare costs. In many instances, it resulted in health insurance policies no longer being offered. This has left businesses in a quandary–with many turning to various alternatives, such as captive self-insurance arrangements, as a means to deal with the ACA.

The minimum coverage requirements for employers is provided in Section 1411 of the ACA, which was codified at 42 U.S.C. §18081. This statute designates HHS as the governing agency. The statute gives HHS exclusive authority to implement its provisions, stating that “The Secretary [of HHS] shall establish a program meeting the requirements of this section.”

The ACA employer mandate applies to businesses employing at least fifty full-time equivalent employees, requiring them to provide minimum health insurance coverage. Congress gave HHS the exclusive authority to effectuate these provisions. The ACA also directs each State to establish a health insurance exchange to operate as a virtual marketplace for health insurance policies. HHS collects and verifies information from employers to facilitate enrollment and ensure compliance with the ACA. If an employer fails to comply, the ACA provides for penalties known as employer shared responsibility payments (“ESRPs”).

The Enforcement Mechanism: Section 4980H

Congress added Section 4980H to the tax code as an enforcement mechanism. This section empowers the IRS to penalize employers through the ESRP excise tax for failing to follow the ACA’s requirements.

Section 4980H specifies that an ESRP may be assessed if two conditions are met:

  1. An employer “fails to offer its full-time employees… the opportunity to enroll in minimum essential coverage… for any month” as ACA § 1411 dictates
  2. At least one full-time employee “has been certified to the employer under [ACA § 1411] as having enrolled for such month in a qualified health plan”

The statute does not explicitly state which agency must provide this certification, only indicating that an employer must be “certified… under [ACA §] 1411.” This ambiguity regarding the certification requirement became the central issue in the Faulk case.

What Due Process Rights Are Guaranteed Under ACA §1411?

ACA § 1411 guarantees important due process rights to employers subject to the mandate. The statute establishes that if HHS determines an employer did not meet the minimum coverage requirements, HHS must notify the Exchange. The Exchange must then provide two specific notices to the employer:

  1. Notice “that the employer may be liable” for an ESRP
  2. Notice of the employer’s right to appeal

These notice requirements serve as procedural protections before an employer can be subjected to potentially substantial penalties. The importance of these protections is underscored by the fact that ACA § 1411 explicitly directs HHS to conduct a study “to ensure… [t]he rights of employers to adequate due process” are sufficiently protected.

While ACA § 1411 allows HHS to make certain delegations, such as to the Exchange, there is no provision allowing delegation to the IRS for the certification process. The statute only allows the IRS Secretary to be one of many federal officers that may hear an appeal on an individual’s eligibility for exchange subsidies.

How Did the HHS Certification Regulation Change the Process?

In 2013, HHS issued a regulation (45 C.F.R. § 155.310(i)) that appeared to delegate certification authority to the IRS. This regulation provides:

“As part of its determination of whether an employer has a liability under section 4980H of the Code, the Internal Revenue Service will adopt methods to certify to an employer that one or more employees has enrolled for one or more months during a year in a QHP for which a premium tax credit or cost-sharing reduction is allowed or paid.”

In explaining this regulation, HHS stated that the “certification program” was “distinct from the notification specified in [ACA § 1411].” This delegation allowed the IRS to carry out the certification requirement through its Letter 226-J process.

Did Congress Intend a Two-Agency Process for ESRP Assessments?

The court’s analysis in this case focused on whether this delegation of authority was consistent with the statutory framework. The court looked to the text of Section 4980H, which requires that an employee “has been certified to the employer under [ACA § 1411].”

The Supreme Court has stated that the word “under” is a “chameleon” that must draw its meaning from context. Following Supreme Court precedent, the court interpreted “under [ACA § 1411]” to mean “by reason of the authority of” ACA § 1411 – authority that was exclusively given to HHS, not the IRS.

Although the term “certification” doesn’t explicitly appear in ACA § 1411 with respect to the employer mandate, the court determined that Congress likely used “certified” to refer broadly to the two notices guaranteed to employers: notice of potential liability and notice of administrative appeal rights.

The court reasoned that if Congress had merely intended for the IRS to certify an employer independently, there would have been no need for Section 4980H to refer back to ACA § 1411. The statute’s use of the past tense – “has been certified” – suggested that a prior certification must take place before the IRS enters the picture.

Why Would Congress Design This Two-Step Process?

The court suggested there are good reasons why Congress might have wanted to keep the administration of due process in ACA § 1411 close to HHS rather than permit delegation. ESRP penalties can have major consequences for employers–for a company with 500 employees in 2024, the penalty could approach $1.5 million annually.

For businesses in low-margin industries, such as janitorial services like the taxpayer in this case, these penalties can be devastating. The court speculated that Congress may have intended for HHS–the primary agency responsible for overseeing employer compliance with the ACA–to also ensure due process is met before penalties are assessed.

The two-agency process creates an important safeguard: HHS first provides certification (including notices of potential liability and appeal rights), and only after these steps are completed can the IRS assess the ESRP. This separation of functions provides additional protection for employers facing potentially substantial penalties.

Was the HHS Certification Regulation Valid?

Having determined that the IRS cannot issue the certification required by Section 4980H, the court addressed whether the HHS Certification Regulation was valid and enforceable.

The court concluded that the regulation exceeded HHS’s statutory authority. Under the Administrative Procedure Act, courts can “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be… arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.”

Since ACA § 1411 does not authorize HHS to delegate certification authority to the IRS, and nothing in Section 4980H grants independent certification power to the IRS, the court held that 45 C.F.R. § 155.310(i) should be set aside as void and unenforceable.

What Are the Implications for Employers Facing ESRP Assessments?

The court’s ruling has significant implications for employers who have been assessed ESRPs by the IRS. If the IRS assessed an ESRP without proper certification from HHS (which would include notice of potential liability and notice of appeal rights), that assessment may be invalid under the court’s interpretation of the statutes.

For the taxpayer in this case, the court ordered the IRS to refund the full $205,621.71 ESRP that the taxpayer had paid under protest. The court also set aside the HHS Certification Regulation as void and unenforceable.

This ruling opens the door for other employers to challenge ESRP assessments that did not follow the proper certification process through HHS. Employers who have paid ESRPs based on IRS Letter 226-J certifications may have grounds to seek refunds based on the reasoning in the this case.

For businesses currently facing proposed ESRP assessments, the ruling suggests they should consider whether they received proper certification from HHS before the IRS assessment. Without such certification, they may have strong grounds to challenge the assessment through IRS tax collections processes or tax litigation.

The Takeaway

This case provides a path forward for businesses that have these penalties. There is a significant procedural flaw in how ACA employer mandate penalties have been assessed by the IRS. The HHS must first provide certification to employers (including notice of potential liability and appeal rights), and only then can the IRS assess the ESRP. When this sequence isn’t followed, the resulting tax assessment may be invalid and refundable. This ruling potentially impacts many businesses who have been assessed or paid ESRP penalties based solely on IRS Letter 226-J notices without proper HHS certification.

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The tax code provides specific rules for when taxpayers can claim deductions for losses. These are rules enacted by Congress.

There are other so-called “judicial doctrines” that allow the courts to override the rules set by Congress. There are several of these that frequently come up in tax disputes, such as the economic substance doctrine (which was codified into law), the step transaction doctrine, etc. We have covered many of these doctrines in prior articles. We have not addressed the public policy doctrine.

The “public policy doctrine” allows courts to deny tax deductions that would otherwise be perfectly legal under the tax code when allowing such deductions would “frustrate” public policy.

The U.S. Tax Court recently applied this doctrine in Hampton v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2025-32, to disallow a tax loss when the government seized assets of a business for the wrongdoing of the owner. This gets into issues of separation of powers, and how far the courts can go in overriding the rules set by Congress.

Facts & Procedural History

The taxpayer in this case was a stock broker. He operated as an S corporation, and was 100% owner of the S corporation.

In 2009, the taxpayer worked out an arrangement with his high school friend who had been appointed as the deputy treasurer of the State of Ohio. The arrangement involved the deputy treasurer directing trading business from the State of Ohio to the taxpayer, with the taxpayer sharing portions of his commissions with the deputy treasurer and two associates. The payments were aledged to have been disguised as legal fees or business loans. The taxpayer received approximately $3.2 million in commissions from these trades and paid about $524,000 to the conspirators.

In 2013, the taxpayer pleaded guilty to charges of bribery, fraud, and money laundering. In 2014, he was sentenced to 45 months in prison and ordered to forfeit approximately $2.2 million. In 2016, while he was incarcerated, the U.S. Marshals Service seized $1,182,543.71 in funds from seven bank accounts held in the name of either the taxpayer or his S corporation.

On its 2016 Form 1120S, the S corporation claimed a deduction of $855,882 for the forfeiture of its seized accounts. As the S corporation’s sole shareholder, the taxpayer reported this loss on his individual tax return. The IRS audited the tax return and disallowed the deduction for the tax loss. The taxpayer filed a petition with the tax court for review.

About the Public Policy Doctrine

The public policy doctrine is a judicial doctrine the courts have cited for denying tax deductions that would “frustrate sharply defined national or state policies proscribing particular types of conduct, evidenced by some governmental declaration thereof.” This principle was articulated by the Supreme Court in Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30, 33-34 (1958).

This is not a rule created by Congress through legislation. Instead, it was developed by judges who decided that some tax deductions, though technically allowed by the tax code, should nevertheless be denied on public policy grounds. This represents a significant judicial encroachment on what would normally be the legislative domain of determining which deductions are allowable.

The doctrine is particularly applicable to tax penalties imposed by the government–in addition to income tax due resulting from the denial of tax deductions. As the Supreme Court explained, the “[d]eduction of fines and penalties uniformly has been held to frustrate state policy in severe and direct fashion by reducing the ‘sting’ of the penalty prescribed by the state legislature.” The underlying rationale is that allowing a tax deduction for a government-imposed penalty would effectively reduce the financial impact of that penalty, thereby undermining its deterrent effect.

How Does the Public Policy Doctrine Override Section 165?

Section 165(a) of the tax code allows a deduction for “any loss sustained during the taxable year and not compensated for by insurance or otherwise.” For individual taxpayers, the deduction is limited to losses incurred in a trade or business, in transactions entered into for profit, or in certain cases of casualty or theft. Notably, the text of Section 165 contains no exception for losses resulting from criminal forfeitures or other penalties.

In 1969, Congress partially codified the public policy doctrine by amending Section 162 of the tax code (which is the general provision that allows for business tax deductions) to explicitly disallow deductions for fines and penalties paid to a government for violation of law. However, Congress did not make similar amendments to Section 165 (which is the provision for deducting tax losses). This raises the question: Did Congress intend to limit the public policy doctrine to Section 162 deductions, leaving Section 165 free from such judicial restrictions?

The courts have not followed this distinction. The courts have applied the public policy doctrine to Section 165 deductions. For example, the Federal Circuit did so in Nacchio v. United States, 824 F.3d 1370, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2016). In that case, the court explicitly stated that “§165 is subject to a ‘frustration of public policy’ doctrine.”

When Can Courts Override the Plain Language of the Tax Code?

How far courts are willing to go and should they be allowed to go in applying the public policy doctrine–even when doing so requires overriding the plain language of the tax code?

Under a strict reading of Section 165 and the S corporation flow-through rules under Section 1366, the taxpayer here would appear to be entitled to deduct his share of the S corporation’s loss from the asset forfeiture (there was an assignment issue for assigning income thath the court didn’t get to, which may also have been a problem had the court gotten to that issue–but that is beyond the scope of this article).

Section 165 allows deductions for “any loss” with certain limitations that don’t explicitly exclude criminal forfeitures. Section 1366(a) provides that an S corporation shareholder “shall take into account” his pro rata share of the corporation’s income or loss. Nothing in the text of either provision suggests an exception for losses resulting from criminal activity.

Yet the tax court determined that the public policy doctrine overrode these statutory provisions. The court held that even if the S corporation was entitled to claim a deduction (a question the court did not decide), the taxpayer as an individual was barred by the public policy doctrine from reporting his 100% passthrough share of the S corporation’s resulting loss on his individual return.

The court’s rationale was that allowing the taxpayer to d…

The court’s rationale was that allowing the taxpayer to deduct the loss would frustrate the sharply defined policy against conspiring to commit offenses against the United States. The taxpayer was the Purported wrongdoer, and the S corporation’s assets were somehow seized as part of a penalty for his wrongdoing. The court did not get into how the denial of a deduction is not a tax penalty, and the code already provides for tax penalties–no doubt which also applied.

Thus, apparently the taxpayer should be double penalized–with a tax penalty (probably more than one) and then again by the loss of his tax deduction. According to the court, allowing the taxpayer a deduction would unquestionably reduce the “sting” of the penalty (which a forfeiture is not a penalty), regardless of what the tax code actually says about such tax deductions.

How Far Can Courts Extend the Public Policy Doctrine?

The tax court emphasized that the public policy doctrine is not constrained by formalistic distinctions between legal entities. This is similar to the rules that apply when a taxpayer transfers assets to a spouse to avoid IRS collections. The court cited Holmes Enterprises, Inc. v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 114 (1977), where a corporation claimed a deduction for the criminal forfeiture of a car it owned after its sole owner and president was convicted on illegal drug charges.

In Holmes, the tax court concluded that although the corporation was a “separate, taxable entity, distinct from its employee,” the public policy doctrine forbade it from claiming a deduction because it was not a “wholly innocent bystander.” Due to the convicted person’s role as the corporation’s sole owner and president, the corporation “knew of and fully consented to the illegal use of its automobile.”

This reasoning shows how courts have expanded the public policy doctrine to deny deductions not just to convicted individuals, but also to closely related entities, even when those entities themselves haven’t been charged with any crime. This judicial expansion extends the doctrine well beyond what Congress explicitly codified in Section 162(f).

Can a Taxpayer Challenge Judicial Overreach Through a Tax Deduction?

The taxpayer in this case argued that the application of the public policy doctrine should be limited because the United States’ seizure of the S corp’s assets violated due process and was “over-zealous” given that the S corp was not the wrongdoer. However, the tax court found no legal impropriety in the seizure of the S corp’s assets to satisfy the taxpayer’s forfeiture liability.

The court relied on the Sixth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Parenteau, 647 F. App’x 593 (6th Cir. 2016), which held that a corporation wholly owned by an individual convicted of a criminal conspiracy was not a person “other than the defendant” for purposes of forfeiture proceedings. The Sixth Circuit cited relevant factors including that the defendant wholly owned and controlled the corporation, that the corporation did not follow corporate formalities, and that the defendant used the corporation’s property in his criminal scheme.

By analogy, the tax court concluded that the S corporation in this case was not separate from the taxpayer as an individual for purposes of the substitute forfeiture provisions. The taxpayer wholly owned and controlled the S corp, offered minimal evidence that corporate formalities were followed, and the S corp’s sole source of business income was the commissions generated by the taxpayer that were “assigned” to the S corp—the very commissions that led to the criminal indictment, plea, and forfeiture. This is consistent with the court’s prior rulings that apply various judicial doctrines to S corporations.

Is There Any Limit to Judicial Override of Tax Code Provisions?

The tax court also rejected the taxpayer’s argument that the public policy doctrine’s application should be affected by alleged illegality or over-zealousness on the government’s part in seizing the assets. Both the Fourth Circuit and the tax court have previously indicated that the alleged illegality of a criminal forfeiture need not prevent the public policy doctrine from disallowing a deduction for the forfeited property.

In Hackworth v. Commissioner, 155 F. App’x 627, 632 (4th Cir. 2005), the Fourth Circuit stated: “If the taxpayers believe that the forfeiture was invalid, the proper remedy is for them to sue the [relevant government unit] and seek return of the funds [rather than claim a tax deduction].” Similarly, in the tax court’s decision in Hackworth, the court stated: “This Court lacks jurisdiction over [the taxpayers’] collateral attack on the forfeiture.”

This principle further demonstrates the power of the public policy doctrine as a judicial override of tax code provisions. Even if a taxpayer believes that a forfeiture was illegal or improper, courts will not allow them to deduct the loss under Section 165. Instead, they must challenge the forfeiture directly in another forum—a requirement found nowhere in the text of the tax code itself.

The Takeaway

This case shows how the judge-made public policy doctrine can override explicit provisions of the tax code. Despite clear statutory language allowing deductions for business losses and requiring S corporation shareholders to report their share of corporate losses, the tax court denied the taxpayer’s deduction based on a doctrine created by judges, not legislators.

The tax law as written by Congress can be trumped by judicial doctrines when courts determine that public policy would be frustrated by allowing certain deductions. Taxpayers facing criminal forfeitures should understand that the public policy doctrine enables courts to disallow deductions that would otherwise be permitted under a plain reading of the tax code, particularly when there is a direct connection between criminal activity and the forfeited assets.

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